This is the first book in English devoted entirely to Kantâe(tm)s Opus Postumum and its place in the Kantian oeuvre. Over the last few decades, the importance of this text for our understanding of Kantâe(tm)s philosophy has emerged with increasing clarity. Although Kant began it in order to solve a relatively minor problem within his philosophy, his reflections soon forced him to readdress virtually all the key problems of his critical philosophy: the objective validity of the categories, the dynamical theory of matter, the natures of space and time, the refutation of idealism, the theory of the self and its agency, the question of living organisms, the doctrine of the practical postulates and the idea of God, the unity of theoretical and practical reason, and the idea of transcendental philosophy itself. In the end Kant was convinced that these problems, some of which had preoccupied him throughout his career, could finally be brought to a coherent and adequate solution and integrated into a single philosophical conception. As Eckart Förster shows in his penetrating study, Kantâe(tm)s conviction deserves not only our intellectual respect but also our undivided philosophical attention. Förster provides detailed analyses of the key problems of Kantâe(tm)s Opus Postumum and also relates them to Kantâe(tm)s major published writings. In this way he provides unique insights into the extraordinary continuity and inner dynamics of Kantâe(tm)s transcendental philosophy as it progresses toward its final synthesis.

Occupying him for more than the last decade of his life, this volume includes the first English translation of Kant's last major work, the so-called Opus postumum, which he described as his "chef d'oeuvre" and the keystone of his entire philosophical system.

Kant declared that philosophy began in 1781 with his Critique of Pure Reason. In 1806 Hegel announced that philosophy had now been completed. Eckart Förster examines the reasons behind these claims and assesses the steps that led in such a short time from Kant's "(Bbeginning" to Hegel's "(Bend." He concludes that, in an unexpected yet significant sense, both Kant and Hegel were indeed right. The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy follows the unfolding of a key idea during this exceptionally productive period: the Kantian idea that philosophy can be scientific and, consequently, can be completed. Förster's study combines historical research with philosophical insight and leads him to propose a new thesis. The development of Kant's transcendental philosophy in his three Critiques, Förster claims, resulted in a fundamental distinction between "(Bintellectual intuition" and "(Bintuitive understanding." Overlooked until now, this distinction yields two takes on how to pursue philosophy as science after Kant. One line of thought culminates in Fichte's theory of freedom (Wissenschaftslehre), while the other--and here Förster brings Goethe's significance to the fore--results in Goethe's transformation of the Kantian idea of an intuitive understanding in light of Spinoza's third kind of knowledge. Both strands are brought together in Hegel and propel his split from Schelling. Förster's work makes an original contribution to our understanding of the classical era of German philosophy--an expanding interest within the Anglophone philosophical community.

A milestone in Kant scholarship, this interpretation of his critical philosophy makes sense of his notorious 'synthetic judgments a priori'.

The goal of the present book is nothing less than to correct what Alfredo Ferrarin calls the standard reading of Kant s. Ferrarin argues that this widespread form of interpretation has failed to do justice to Kant s philosophy primarily because it is rooted in several uncritical and unjustified assumptions. Two are particularly egregious: a compartmentalization of the First Critique, and an isolation of each Critique from the others. Ultimately these two assumptions cause one to lose sight of the fact that the cognitive/epistemological functions laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic are functions of an overarching pure reason of which the constitution of experience (and of a science of nature) is only one problem among others. This book, by contrast, argues that the main problem, which pervades the entire first critique, is the power that reason has to reach beyond itself and legislate over the world. Ferrarin pays close attention to both the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method where Kant lays out his conception of cosmic philosophy as embodied in the ideal philosopher."

A concise commentary on Kant's aims and arguments in his celebrated First Critique, within the context of the dominant schools of philosophy of his time.

Kant's discussion of the relations between cognition and self-consciousness lie at the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason , in the celebrated transcendental deduction. Although this section of Kant's masterpiece is widely believed to contain important insights into cognition and self-consciousness, it has long been viewed as unusually obscure. Many philosophers have tried to avoid the transcendental psychology that Kant employed. By contrast, Patricia Kitcher follows Kant's careful delineation of the necessary conditions for knowledge and his intricate argument that knowledge requires self-consciousness. She argues that far from being an exercise in armchair psychology, the thesis that thinkers must be aware of the connections among their mental states offers an astute analysis of the requirements of rational thought.The book opens by situating Kant's theories in the then contemporary debates about 'apperception,' personal identity and the relations between object cognition and self-consciousness. After laying out Kant's argument that the distinctive kind of knowledge that humans have requires a unified self- consciousness, Kitcher considers the implications of his theory for current problems in the philosophy of mind. If Kant is right that rational cognition requires acts of thought that are at least implicitly conscious, then theories of consciousness face a second 'hard problem' beyond the familiar difficulties with the qualities of sensations. How is conscious reasoning to be understood? Kitcher shows that current accounts of the self-ascription of belief have great trouble in explaining the case where subjects know their reasons for the belief. She presents a 'new' Kantian approach to handling this problem. In this way, the book reveals Kant as a thinker of great relevance to contemporary philosophy, one whose allegedly obscure achievements provide solutions to problems that are still with us.

Thomas C. Vinci aims to reveal and assess the structure of Kant's argument in the Critique of Pure Reason called the "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories." At the end of the first part of the Deduction in the B-edition Kant states that his purpose is achieved: to show that all intuitions in general are subject to the categories. On the standard reading, this means that all of our mental representations, including those originating in sense-experience, are structured by conceptualization. But this reading encounters an exegetical problem: Kant states in the second part of the Deduction that a major part of what remains to be shown is that empirical intuitions are subject to the categories. How can this be if it has already been shown that intuitions in general are subject to the categories? Vinci calls this the Triviality Problem, and he argues that solving it requires denying the standard reading. In its place he proposes that intuitions in general and empirical intuitions constitute disjoint classes and that, while all intuitions for Kant are unified, there are two kinds of unification: logical unification vs. aesthetic unification. Only the former is due to the categories. A second major theme of the book is that Kant's Idealism comes in two versions-for laws of nature and for objects of empirical intuition-and that demonstrating these versions is the ultimate goal of the Deduction of the Categories and the similarly structured Deduction of the Concepts of Space, respectively. Vinci shows that the Deductions have the argument structure of an inference to the best explanation for correlated domains of explananda, each arrived at by independent applications of Kantian epistemic and geometrical methods.

According to current philosophical lore, Kant rejected the notion that philosophy can progress by psychological means and endeavored to restrict it accordingly. This book reverses the frame from Kant the anti-psychological critic of psychological philosophy to Kant the preeminent psychological critic of non-psychological philosophy.

Kojin Karatani's Transcritique introduces a startlingly new dimension to Immanuel Kant's transcendental critique by using Kant to read Karl Marx and Marx to read Kant. In a direct challenge to standard academic approaches to both thinkers, Karatani's transcritical readings discover the ethical roots of socialism in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and a Kantian critique of money in Marx's Capital. Karatani reads Kant as a philosopher who sought to wrest metaphysics from the discredited realm of theoretical dogma in order to restore it to its proper place in the sphere of ethics and praxis. With this as his own critical model, he then presents a reading of Marx that attempts to liberate Marxism from longstanding Marxist and socialist presuppositions in order to locate a solid theoretical basis for a positive activism capable of gradually superseding the trinity of Capital-Nation-State.