This book explores the central importance Kant's concept of autonomy for contemporary moral thought and modern philosophy.

A thorough study of why Kant developed the concept of autonomy, one of his central legacies for contemporary moral thought.

Autonomy for Kant is not just a synonym for the capacity to choose, whether simple or deliberative. It is what the word literally implies: the imposition of a law on one's own authority and out of one's own rational resources. In Kant and the Limits of Autonomy, Shell explores the limits of Kantian autonomy--both the force of its claims and the complications to which they give rise. Through a careful examination of major and minor works, Shell argues for the importance of attending to the difficulty inherent in autonomy and to the related resistance that in Kant's view autonomy necessarily provokes in us. Such attention yields new access to Kant's famous, and famously puzzling, Groundlaying of the Metaphysics of Morals. It also provides for a richer and more unified account of Kant's later political and moral works; and it highlights the pertinence of some significant but neglected early writings, including the recently published Lectures on Anthropology. Kant and the Limits of Autonomy is both a rigorous, philosophically and historically informed study of Kantian autonomy and an extended meditation on the foundation and limits of modern liberalism.

The humanity formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant's moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant's ethics have recently turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant'sethics. Nevertheless, it has received less attention than many other aspects of Kant's ethics. Richard Dean offers the most sustained and systematic examination of the humanity formulation to date. He presents an original analysis of what it means to treat humanity as an end in itself, and examinesthe implications both for Kant scholarship and for practical guidance on specific moral issues.

In many histories of modern ethics, Kant is supposed to have ushered in an anti-realist or constructivist turn by holding that unless we ourselves 'author' or lay down moral norms and values for ourselves, our autonomy as agents will be threatened. In this book, Robert Stern challenges the cogency of this 'argument from autonomy', and claims that Kant never subscribed to it. Rather, it is not value realism but the apparent obligatoriness of morality that really poses a challenge to our autonomy: how can this be accounted for without taking away our freedom? The debate the book focuses on therefore concerns whether this obligatoriness should be located in ourselves (Kant), in others (Hegel) or in God (Kierkegaard). Stern traces the historical dialectic that drove the development of these respective theories, and clearly and sympathetically considers their merits and disadvantages; he concludes by arguing that the choice between them remains open.

This book integrates the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant—particularly the concepts of autonomy, dignity, and character—into economic theory, enriching models of individual choice and policymaking, while contributing to our understanding of how the economic individual fits into society.

Reath presents a selection of his essays on various features of Kant's moral philosophy and moral theory, with particular emphasis on his conception of rational agency and autonomy. He explores Kant's belief that objective moral requrirements are based on principles we choose for ourselves.

This volume investigates Kant's conception of what a human being is and how a human being can act autonomously. Scholars explore fundamental topics such as freedom, autonomy, and personhood from both practical and theoretical perspectives, and consider their importance within Kant's wider system of philosophy.

This book examines the surprising ramifications of Kant’s late account of practical reason’s obligatory ends as well as a revolutionary implication of his theory of property. It thereby sheds new light on Kant’s place in the history of modern moral philosophy.

The essays collected in this volume by Paul Guyer, one of the world's foremost Kant scholars, explore Kant's attempt to develop a morality grounded on the intrinsic and unconditional value of the human freedom to set our own ends. When regulated by the principle that the freedom of all is equally valuable, the freedom to set our own ends -- what Kant calls "humanity" - becomes what he calls autonomy. These essays explore Kant's strategies for establishing the premise that freedom is the inner worth of the world or the essential end of humankind, as he says, and for deriving the specific duties that fundamental principle of morality generates in the empirical circumstances of human existence. The Virtues of Freedom further investigates Kant's attempts to prove that we are always free to live up to this moral ideal, that is, that we have free will no matter what, as well as his more successful explorations of the ways in which our natural tendencies to be moral -- dispositions to the feeling of respect and more specific feelings such as love and self-esteem -- can and must be cultivated and educated. Guyer finally examines the various models of human community that Kant develops from his premise that our associations must be based on the value of freedom for all. The contrasts but also similarities of Kant's moral philosophy to that of David Hume but many of his other predecessors and contemporaries, such as Stoics and Epicureans, Pufendorf and Wolff, Hutcheson, Kames, and Smith, are also explored.