This book examines closely the origins, evolution, and prospect of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea from both historical and geopolitical perspectives, with particular attention to the interplay of the conflicting perceptions and security needs of the three countries involved.

Morris examines the, "first and only extended war between two communist regimes."

When the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia in 1975, they inherited a war-ravaged and internationally isolated country. Pol Pot’s government espoused the rhetoric of self-reliance, but Democratic Kampuchea was utterly dependent on Chinese foreign aid and technical assistance to survive. Yet in a markedly asymmetrical relationship between a modernizing, nuclear power and a virtually premodern state, China was largely unable to use its power to influence Cambodian politics or policy. In Brothers in Arms, Andrew Mertha traces this surprising lack of influence to variations between the Chinese and Cambodian institutions that administered military aid, technology transfer, and international trade. Today, China’s extensive engagement with the developing world suggests an inexorably rising China in the process of securing a degree of economic and political dominance that was unthinkable even a decade ago. Yet, China’s experience with its first-ever client state suggests that the effectiveness of Chinese foreign aid, and influence that comes with it, is only as good as the institutions that manage the relationship. By focusing on the links between China and Democratic Kampuchea, Mertha peers into the “black box” of Chinese foreign aid to illustrate how domestic institutional fragmentation limits Beijing’s ability to influence the countries that accept its assistance.

Although the Chinese form only a small fraction of the population of Southeast Asia, they are a minority of crucial importance to the future of many countries, for they control much of the commercial economy of the region. Studies have been published on the Chinese in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. This book is the first study of the Chinese in Cambodia. The author is an anthropologist, but the book is not written from that perspective alone; it examines the position of the Chinese in Cambodian society from the historical, the economic, the legal, and the demographic points of view as well.

Peking and Hanoi differed over 5 significant issues from the early 1960s up until the North Vietamesse conques of the South in 1975. The author explores their conflicting desires for a dominant position in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

Aside from self-defence, a UN Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII is the only exception to the prohibition on the use of force. Authorisation of the use of force requires the Security Council to first determine whether that situation constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39. The Charter has long been interpreted as placing few bounds around how the Security Council arrives at such determinations. As such commentators have argued that the phrase ‘threat to the peace’ is undefinable in nature and lacking in consistency. Through a critical discourse analysis of the justificatory discourse of the P5 surrounding individual decisions relating to ‘threat to the peace’ (found in the meeting transcripts), this book demonstrates that each P5 member has a consistent definition and understanding of what constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’.

Why did the People's Republic of China and Vietnam, two "comrades and brothers," engage in such a tragic war?

When costly efforts to cement a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union failed, the combined political pressure of economic crisis at home and imminent external threats posed by a Sino-Cambodian alliance compelled Hanoi to reverse course. Moving away from the Marxist-Leninist ideology that had prevailed during the last decade of the Cold War era, the Vietnamese government implemented broad doi moi ("renovation") reforms intended to create a peaceful regional environment for the country's integration into the global economy. In contrast to earlier studies, Path traces the moving target of these changing policy priorities, providing a vital addition to existing scholarship on asymmetric wartime decision-making and alliance formation among small states. The result uncovers how this critical period had lasting implications for the ways Vietnam continues to conduct itself on the global stage.