There are many challenges that national and supranational judges have to face when fulfilling their roles as guardians of constitutionalism and human rights. This book brings together academics and judges from different jurisdictions in an endeavour to uncover the intricacies of the judicial function. The contributors discuss several points that each represent contemporary challenges to judging: analysis of judicial balancing of conflicting considerations; the nature of courts’ legitimacy and its alleged dependence on public support; the role of judges in upholding constitutional values in the times of transition to democracy, surveillance and the fight against terrorism; and the role of international judges in guaranteeing globally recognized fundamental rights and freedoms. This book will be of interest to human rights scholars focusing on the issues of judicial oversight, as well as constitutional law scholars interested in comparative perspectives on the role of judges in different contexts. It will also be useful to national constitutional court judges, and law clerks aiming to familiarise themselves with judicial practices within other jurisdictions.

Judicial review by constitutional courts is often presented as a necessary supplement to democracy. This book questions its effectiveness and legitimacy. Drawing on the republican tradition, Richard Bellamy argues that the democratic mechanisms of open elections between competing parties and decision-making by majority rule offer superior and sufficient methods for upholding rights and the rule of law. The absence of popular accountability renders judicial review a form of arbitrary rule which lacks the incentive structure democracy provides to ensure rulers treat the ruled with equal concern and respect. Rights based judicial review undermines the constitutionality of democracy. Its counter-majoritarian bias promotes privileged against unprivileged minorities, while its legalism and focus on individual cases distort public debate. Rather than constraining democracy with written constitutions and greater judicial oversight, attention should be paid to improving democratic processes through such measures as reformed electoral systems and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny.

Scope of Judicial Review

Chief Justice John Marshall argued that a constitution "requires that only its great outlines should be marked [and] its important objects designated." Ours is "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." In recent years, Marshall's great truths have been challenged by proponents of originalism and strict construction. Such legal thinkers as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argue that the Constitution must be construed and applied as it was when the Framers wrote it. In Keeping Faith with the Constitution, three legal authorities make the case for Marshall's vision. They describe their approach as "constitutional fidelity"--not to how the Framers would have applied the Constitution, but to the text and principles of the Constitution itself. The original understanding of the text is one source of interpretation, but not the only one; to preserve the meaning and authority of the document, to keep it vital, applications of the Constitution must be shaped by precedent, historical experience, practical consequence, and societal change. The authors range across the history of constitutional interpretation to show how this approach has been the source of our greatest advances, from Brown v. Board of Education to the New Deal, from the Miranda decision to the expansion of women's rights. They delve into the complexities of voting rights, the malapportionment of legislative districts, speech freedoms, civil liberties and the War on Terror, and the evolution of checks and balances. The Constitution's framers could never have imagined DNA, global warming, or even women's equality. Yet these and many more realities shape our lives and outlook. Our Constitution will remain vital into our changing future, the authors write, if judges remain true to this rich tradition of adaptation and fidelity.

List of Tables and FiguresAcknowledgments1: Introduction 2: The Conditions for the Rights Revolution: Theory 3: The United States: Standard Explanations for the Rights Revolution 4: The Support Structure and the U.S. Rights Revolution 5: India: An Ideal Environment for a Rights Revolution? 6: India's Weak Rights Revolution and Its Handicap 7: Britain: An Inhospitable Environment for a Rights Revolution? 8: Britain's Modest Rights Revolution and Its Sources 9: Canada: A Great Experiment in Constitutional Engineering 10: Canada's Dramatic Rights Revolution and Its Sources 11: Conclusion: Constitutionalism, Judicial Power, and Rights App: Selected Constitutional or Quasi-Constitutional Rights Provisions for the United States, India, Britain, and Canada Notes Bibliography Index Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.

This book investigates the mechanisms of judicial control to determine an efficient methodology for independence and accountability. Using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts, the author creates a theoretical framework that can be applied to future case studies and decrease the frequency of accountability perversions.

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