This book critically discusses and systematically compares J.M. Keynes and F. H. Knight, two giants in the history of economic thought. In 1921 they both published apparently similar books on risk, probability, and uncertainty. However, while Knight's contribution on risk and uncertainty is now well recognized, Keynes's work on probability and uncertainty has been somewhat ignored in the shadow of his more famous The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936). Focusing on an earlier yet equally important volume by Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (1921), this book sheds a light on his outstanding ideas and the lasting influence on his later works, including The General Theory. There are few books that systematically discuss Keynes and Knight, although there are remarkable comparisons between Keynes's concept of probability and uncertainty and Knight's distinction between a measurable risk and a non-measurable uncertainty. This timely book unifies Keynes and Knight into a new, comprehensive approach to a very complex human behavior

A timeless classic of economic theory that remains fascinating and pertinent today, this is Frank Knight's famous explanation of why perfect competition cannot eliminate profits, the important differences between "risk" and "uncertainty," and the vital role of the entrepreneur in profitmaking. Based on Knight's PhD dissertation, this 1921 work, balancing theory with fact to come to stunning insights, is a distinct pleasure to read. FRANK H. KNIGHT (1885-1972) is considered by some the greatest American scholar of economics of the 20th century. An economics professor at the University of Chicago from 1927 until 1955, he was one of the founders of the Chicago school of economics, which influenced Milton Friedman and George Stigler.

John Maynard Keynes is the great British economist of the twentieth century whose hugely influential work The General Theory of Employment, Interest and * is undoubtedly the century's most important book on economics--strongly influencing economic theory and practice, particularly with regard to the role of government in stimulating and regulating a nation's economic life. Keynes's work has undergone significant revaluation in recent years, and "Keynesian" views which have been widely defended for so long are now perceived as at odds with Keynes's own thinking. Recent scholarship and research has demonstrated considerable rivalry and controversy concerning the proper interpretation of Keynes's works, such that recourse to the original text is all the more important. Although considered by a few critics that the sentence structures of the book are quite incomprehensible and almost unbearable to read, the book is an essential reading for all those who desire a basic education in economics. The key to understanding Keynes is the notion that at particular times in the business cycle, an economy can become over-productive (or under-consumptive) and thus, a vicious spiral is begun that results in massive layoffs and cuts in production as businesses attempt to equilibrate aggregate supply and demand. Thus, full employment is only one of many or multiple macro equilibria. If an economy reaches an underemployment equilibrium, something is necessary to boost or stimulate demand to produce full employment. This something could be business investment but because of the logic and individualist nature of investment decisions, it is unlikely to rapidly restore full employment. Keynes logically seizes upon the public budget and government expenditures as the quickest way to restore full employment. Borrowing the * to finance the deficit from private households and businesses is a quick, direct way to restore full employment while at the same time, redirecting or siphoning

Ellsberg elaborates on "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms" and mounts a powerful challenge to the dominant theory of rational decision in this book.

The standard theory of decision making under uncertainty advises the decision maker to form a statistical model linking outcomes to decisions and then to choose the optimal distribution of outcomes. This assumes that the decision maker trusts the model completely. But what should a decision maker do if the model cannot be trusted? Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent, two leading macroeconomists, push the field forward as they set about answering this question. They adapt robust control techniques and apply them to economics. By using this theory to let decision makers acknowledge misspecification in economic modeling, the authors develop applications to a variety of problems in dynamic macroeconomics. Technical, rigorous, and self-contained, this book will be useful for macroeconomists who seek to improve the robustness of decision-making processes.

This book critically discusses and systematically compares J.M. Keynes and F.H. Knight, two giants in the history of economic thought. In 1921 they both published apparently similar books on risk, probability, and uncertainty. However, while Knight's contribution on risk and uncertainty is now well recognized, Keynes's work on probability and uncertainty has been somewhat ignored in the shadow of his more famous The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936). Focusing on an earlier yet equally important volume by Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (1921), this book sheds a light on his outstanding ideas and the lasting influence on his later works, including The General Theory. There are few books that systematically discuss Keynes and Knight, although there are remarkable comparisons between Keynes's concept of probability and uncertainty and Knight's distinction between a measurable risk and a non-measurable uncertainty. This timely book unifies Keynes and Knight into a new, comprehensive approach to a very complex human behavior.--

Volume 14 addresses the central issue of entrepreneurial action: while many factors are important to the phenomenon of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship does not happen until someone takes action!

In his 'New Guide' to The General Theory, Mark G. Hayes presents Keynes's illustrious work as a sophisticated Marshallian theory of the competitive equilibrium of the economy as a whole. This unique book takes full account of the nature of time and money and illustrates that The General Theory remains highly relevant to the teacher and advanced student of modern macroeconomics. The Economics of Keynes introduces several interpretative innovations to resolve many puzzles presented in the literature of the last 70 years. It is designed to be read in parallel with The General Theory and will allow modern readers to find their bearings before plunging into an in-depth analysis of major themes contained in The General Theory. The key areas in which this 'New Guide' differs from the familiar exposition of current macroeconomics textbooks are also explicitly identified. The author reaches positive and hopeful conclusions for the development of economic theory and policy. Promoting a thorough understanding of the legitimate domain of equilibrium analysis and a renewed commitment to the possibility of genuinely full employment, this book will provide an illuminating and fascinating read for anyone wishing to appreciate fully the value of The General Theory. More specifically, academics and advanced students of macroeconomics across the board - classical, orthodox, Post Keynesian and heterodox - interested in a fresh attempt to connect The General Theory with modern macroeconomics will find this book to be the ideal tool.

How modern economics abandoned classical liberalism and lost its way Milton Friedman once predicted that advances in scientific economics would resolve debates about whether raising the minimum wage is good policy. Decades later, Friedman’s prediction has not come true. In Where Economics Went Wrong, David Colander and Craig Freedman argue that it never will. Why? Because economic policy, when done correctly, is an art and a craft. It is not, and cannot be, a science. The authors explain why classical liberal economists understood this essential difference, why modern economists abandoned it, and why now is the time for the profession to return to its classical liberal roots. Carefully distinguishing policy from science and theory, classical liberal economists emphasized values and context, treating economic policy analysis as a moral science where a dialogue of sensibilities and judgments allowed for the same scientific basis to arrive at a variety of policy recommendations. Using the University of Chicago—one of the last bastions of classical liberal economics—as a case study, Colander and Freedman examine how both the MIT and Chicago variants of modern economics eschewed classical liberalism in their attempt to make economic policy analysis a science. By examining the way in which the discipline managed to lose its bearings, the authors delve into such issues as the development of welfare economics in relation to economic science, alternative voices within the Chicago School, and exactly how Friedman got it wrong. Contending that the division between science and prescription needs to be restored, Where Economics Went Wrong makes the case for a more nuanced and self-aware policy analysis by economists.

'Animal spirits' is a term that describes the instincts and emotions driving human behaviour in economic settings. In recent years, this concept has been discussed in relation to the emerging field of narrative economics. When unscheduled events hit the stock market, from corporate scandals and technological breakthroughs to recessions and pandemics, relationships driving returns change in unforeseeable ways. To deal with uncertainty, investors engage in narratives which simplify the complexity of real-time, non-routine change. This book assesses the novelty-narrative hypothesis for the U.S. stock market by conducting a comprehensive investigation of unscheduled events using big data textual analysis of financial news. This important contribution to the field of narrative economics finds that major macro events and associated narratives spill over into the churning stream of corporate novelty and sub-narratives, spawning different forms of unforeseeable stock market instability.