This paper reaches seven conclusions regarding the Yen Bloc that Japan is reputed to be forming in Pacific Asia. (1) Gravity-model estimates of bilateral trade show that the level of trade in East Asia is biased intra-regionally, as it is within the European Community and within the Western Hemisphere, to a greater extent than can be explained naturally by distance. One might call these three regions 'super-natural' blocs, in contrast to Krugman's "natural" trade blocs. (2) There is no evidence of a special Japan effect. (3) Once one properly accounts for rapid growth in Asia, the statistics do not bear out a trend toward intra-regional bias of trade flows. (4) The world's strongest trade grouping is the one that includes the U.S. and Canada with the Asian/Pacific countries, i.e., APEC. (5) There is a bit more evidence of rising Japanese influence in East Asia's financial markets. Tokyo appears to have acquired significant influence over interest rates in a few Asian countries, though overall its influence is as yet no greater than that of New York. (6) Some of Japan's financial and monetary influence takes place through a growing role for the yen, at the expense of the dollar, The yen has become relatively more important in exchange rate policies and invoicing of trade and finance in the region. (7) But this trend is less the outcome of Japanese policy-makers' wishes, than of pressure from the U.S. government to internationalize the yen.

The formation of the yen bloc did not result in the economic and monetary integration of East Asian economies. Rather, it led to the increasing disintegration of East Asian economies. Compared to Japan, Asian regions and countries had to suffer from higher inflation. In fact, the farther the countries were away from Japan, the more their central banks had to print money and the higher their inflation was. Moreover, the income gap between Japan and other Asian countries widened. This means that the regionalization centered on the Japanese yen was destined to fail, suggesting that the Co-prosperity Area was nothing but a strategy of regional dominance, not of regional cooperation. The impact was quite long lasting, and it still haunts East Asian countries, contributing to the nourishment of their distrust vis-à-vis Japan, and throws a shadow on recent monetary and financial cooperation movements in East Asia. This experience highlights the importance of responsible actions on the part of leading countries to boost regional solidarity and cohesion for the viability and sustainability of a regional monetary system.

In this important new book, C.H. Kwan asks whether the Japanese yen can, or will, replace the dollar as the key currency in East Asia. Kwan analyzes the implications for Japan and Asia's developing countries should they come together to form a yen bloc—a grouping of countries that use the yen as an international currency and maintain stable exchange rates against the yen. Combining academic analysis with his experience advising the Japanese prime minister and the Japanese minister of finance, Kwan concludes that a yen bloc might benefit Asia's developing countries—as well as Japan—while contributing to a more stable international monetary order. Kwan's book represents the first attempt to explore systematically the possibility of monetary integration in Asia. It also provides a vision for regional integration in Asia in the twenty-first century.

As Japan's newfound economic power leads to increased political power, there is concern that Japan may be turning East Asia into a regional economic bloc to rival the U.S. and Europe. In Regionalism and Rivalry, leading economists and political scientists address this concern by looking at three central questions: Is Japan forming a trading bloc in Pacific Asia? Does Japan use foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia to achieve national goals? Does Japan possess the leadership qualities necessary for a nation assuming greater political responsibility in international affairs? The authors contend that although intraregional trade in East Asia is growing rapidly, a trade bloc is not necessarily forming. They show that the trade increase can be explained entirely by factors independent of discriminatory trading arrangements, such as the rapid growth of East Asian economies. Other chapters look in detail at cases of Japanese direct investment in Southeast Asia and find little evidence of attempts by Japan to use the power of its multinational corporations for political purposes. A third group of papers attempt to gauge Japan's leadership characteristics. They focus on Japan's "technology ideology," its contributions to international public goods, international monetary cooperation, and economic liberalization in East Asia.

This paper reaches seven conclusions regarding the Yen Bloc that Japan is reputed to be forming in Pacific Asia. (1) Gravity-model estimates of bilateral trade show that the level of trade in East Asia is biased intra-regionally, as it is within the European Community and within the Western Hemisphere, to a greater extent than can be explained naturally by distance. One might call these three regions 'super-natural' blocs, in contrast to Krugman's "natural" trade blocs. (2) There is no evidence of a special Japan effect. (3) Once one properly accounts for rapid growth in Asia, the statistics do not bear out a trend toward intra-regional bias of trade flows. (4) The world's strongest trade grouping is the one that includes the U.S. and Canada with the Asian/Pacific countries, i.e., APEC. (5) There is a bit more evidence of rising Japanese influence in East Asia's financial markets. Tokyo appears to have acquired significant influence over interest rates in a few Asian countries, though overall its influence is as yet no greater than that of New York. (6) Some of Japan's financial and monetary influence takes place through a growing role for the yen, at the expense of the dollar, The yen has become relatively more important in exchange rate policies and invoicing of trade and finance in the region. (7) But this trend is less the outcome of Japanese policy-makers' wishes, than of pressure from the U.S. government to internationalize the yen

The role of the Japanese yen as an international currency is assessed. It is found that the determinants of international-currency use imply some increase for the yen’s use in international finance; however, the implications for the yen’s use in international trade are mixed. It is also shown that, despite Japan’s emergence as the world’s largest net creditor nation, Japan’s capital outflows have not significantly facilitated the yen’s internationalization. Data are presented showing that, although the yen’s use as an international currency has increased, it is still rather modest. Wider use of the yen as a regional currency in Asia has occurred, though a “yen-zone” does not appear to be emerging.

Stabilising Asia-Pacific exchange rates by establishing a system of pegs, bands or target zones around the Japanese yen requires the compromise of domestic policy autonomy. The cost of doing so is least when members reaction to economic shocks are symmetric. This study considers which currencies meet this necessary precondition. To assess regional disturbance symmetry the Blanchard and Quah (1989) procedure is employed to distinguish temporary from permanent shocks for paired aggregate output and price time-series. Disturbance correlations between Japan and other Asia-Pacific nations are calculated. Supply-side disturbance correlations are relatively weak and suggest the economic preconditions for a yen bloc are not in place.

Multinationals and East Asian Integration