Aimed at readers interested in the history of the Cold War and of space exploration, the book makes a major contribution to the history of rocket development and the nuclear age.

How nuclear weapons helped drive the United States into the missile age. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), designed to quickly deliver thermonuclear weapons to distant targets, was the central weapons system of the Cold War. ICBMs also carried the first astronauts and cosmonauts into orbit. More than a generation later, we are still living with the political, technological, and scientific effects of the space race, while nuclear-armed ICBMs remain on alert and in the headlines around the world. In The Bomb and America’s Missile Age, Christopher Gainor explores the US Air Force’s (USAF) decision, in March 1954, to build the Atlas, America’s first ICBM. Beginning with the story of the guided missiles that were created before and during World War II, Gainor describes how the early Soviet and American rocket programs evolved over the course of the following decade. He argues that the USAF was wrongly criticized for unduly delaying the start of its ICBM program, endangering national security, and causing America embarrassment when a Soviet ICBM successfully put Sputnik into orbit ahead of any American satellite. Shedding fresh light on the roots of America’s space program and the development of US strategic forces, The Bomb and America’s Missile Age uses evidence uncovered in the past few decades to set the creation of the Atlas ICBM in its true context—not only in the America of the postwar years but also in comparison with the real story of the Soviet missiles that propelled the space race and the Cold War. Aimed at readers interested in the history of the Cold War and of space exploration, the book makes a major contribution to the history of rocket development and the nuclear age.

Drawing on extensive primary and archive source material this volume traces the development of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) from 1956 through 1960 during the eventful tenures of three secretaties: Charles E. Wilson, Neil H. McElroy and Thomas S. Gates, Jr. It focuses on the secretaties of defense, their staff. and the administration of the Pentagon within the larger framework of national security policy making and execution.

The series of volumes on the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense constitutes a history of national security policy focusing on the role of the secretary of defense and OSD written from the records of the highest levels of the U. S. Government. The range of the volume for the period August 1956-January 1961 is extensive. These were years of great international challenges and enormous technological change that profoundly affected the making of national security policy. The instability of the world manifested itself in all parts of the globe. The secretary of defense confronted crises in the Middle East --Suez in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958--and in the Far East--the Taiwan Strait in 1958 and the worsening situation in Indochina. In Europe the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the Berlin crisis of 1958-61 exacerbated tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Closer to home, the emergence of Fidel Castro's Cuba as a Soviet ally portended a future crisis with which the next administration would have to deal. The rising tide of anti-colonialism, particularly in Africa, affected relations with allies as well. Alliance relationships--especially with NATO--and arms control efforts required much time and attention from the Department of Defense. Military assistance to allies and other countries remained a key element in U.S. policy. The volume emphasizes the centrality of the budget in national security policy considerations. Other influences--particularly the fast-moving technological revolution in weapons--played a significant role. Developments in nuclear weapons and missiles of ever-increasing range and potency exercised a powerful effect on all aspects of planning and programming and quickened the arms race with the Soviet Union. During these years continental defense and the organization and direction of strategic forces presented major issues requiring decisions that had long-term effects. Finally, there occurred a major reorganization of the Department of Defense in 1958 that established the basic shape of the department for most of the next three decades.Close of Wilson Era, 1956-1957 * Defense as an Issue in 1956 Election * 1956 Crises: Suez and Hungary * Middle East in 1956 * Egypt and Suez Canal * Diplomacy in Action * Eastern Europe Boils Over * Attack on Egypt * Suez War Ends * Picking Up Pieces * Eisenhower Doctrine * Aftermath in Hungary * IV. Budget for FY 1958 * Early Budget Estimates * Getting Down to Reality * Public Presentation of Budget * Controversy over National Guard * Economy Push in Congress * Problem of Rising Expenditures * Congress Acts on Budget * Military Program Reexamined * Final Congressional Action * Budget in Retrospect * V. Policy Under Review, 1957 * Military Issues in Policy Discussion * NSC 5707/8 * Strategy in Public Eye: "Limited War" Debate * JSOP-61 and Budget * Cordiner Committee * Budget Guidelines for FY 1959 * Crisis at Little Rock * Shock of Sputnik * VI. FY 1959 Budget: Final * Change of Command at Pentagon * Immediate Response to Sputnik * Gair Report * FY 1959 Budget Takes Shape * Mind of Congress * FY 1959 Supplemental Request * Final Legislative Package * Aftermath * VII. Missile Problems and Progress, 1956-1958 * Arrival of Missile Age * Rise of IRBMs: Thor, Jupiter, Polaris * Deployment Planning * Army Tactical Missiles * Or Missile Programs * Satellite Programs * Missile Programs Reviewed * Initial Effects of Sputnik * Impact of Gair Report * Advanced Research Projects Agency * Furr Acceleration of Effort * National Aeronautics and Space Administration * VIII. Foreign Crises in 1958: Lebanon and Taiwan * Implications of Eisenhower Doctrine * Developments in 1958 * Intervention in Lebanon * Lebanon Pacified * Taiwan Situation * Threat to Offshore Islands * Artillery Blockade * Communist China Backs Down * Aftermath * IX. Reorganization of Department of Defense, 1958 * Organizational Developments, 1953-1957 * Reorganization Becomes a Major Issue

Established during World War ii to advise the President on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council is essential to an understanding of the current work of the Chairman and the Joint Staff. A history of their activities, both in war and peacetime, also provides important insights into the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history of their activities be kept for the record. its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies is self-apparent. Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 follows in the tradition of volumes previously prepared by the Joint History Office dealing with JCS involvement in national policy, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Adopting a broader view than earlier volumes, it surveys the JCS role and contributions from the early days of World War ii through the end of the Cold War. Written from a combination of primary and secondary sources, it is a fresh work of scholarship, looking at the problems of this era and their military implications. The main prism is that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in laying out the JCS perspective, it deals also with the wider impact of key decisions and the ensuing policies.