Examining the efficacy of U.N. peace efforts, Dr. Ramesh Thakur compares limited peacekeeping through U.N. authority with more coercive means such as the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon. He finds that the role of the U.S.-led MNF coalition cannot be justified in terms of great-power responsibility for ensuring a stable international order, since the coalition has attempted to substitute military power for authoritative peacekeeping. When MNF legitimacy was questioned and authority was challenged, the MNF's use of force in response to those challenges switched the coalition's role from third-party peacekeeper to factional participant. As a result, every successive attempt to strengthen the MNF mandate has further subordinated the concept of neutral international peacekeeping to calculated support of national interests. If reasoned attempts to keep the peace are not to collapse into exercises in national self-interest, then peacekeeping responsibilities must remain with the U.N., supported by the great powers: Only the U.N. can provide an authoritative exposition of values within the context of international society and bestow international legitimacy upon peacekeeping activities; only the great powers can back the U.N. with requisite force.

This book is no. 65 in the Norwegian Foreign Policy Studies of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo.

The Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations presents an innovative, authoritative, and accessible examination and critique of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Since the late 1940s, but particularly since the end of the cold war, peacekeeping has been a central part of the core activities of the United Nations and a major process in global security governance and the management of international relations in general. The volume will present a chronological analysis, designed to provide a comprehensive perspective that highlights the evolution of UN peacekeeping and offers a detailed picture of how the decisions of UN bureaucrats and national governments on the set-up and design of particular UN missions were, and remain, influenced by the impact of preceding operations. The volume will bring together leading scholars and senior practitioners in order to provide overviews and analyses of all 65 peacekeeping operations that have been carried out by the United Nations since 1948. As with all Oxford Handbooks, the volume will be agenda-setting in importance, providing the authoritative point of reference for all those working throughout international relations and beyond.

This book analyzes the UNIFIL as a multinational peacekeeping force deployed in a highly strained context. It investigates the defining features of UNIFIL's environment, the multicultural challenges to its smooth operation and the pattern and impact of the rise of non-European countries.

Dennis C. Jett examines why peacekeeping operations fail by comparing the unsuccessful attempt at peacekeeping in Angola with the successful effort in Mozambique, alongside a wide range of other peacekeeping experiences. The book argues that while the causes of past peacekeeping failures can be identified, the chances for success will be difficult to improve because of the way such operations are initiated and conducted, and the way the United Nations operates as an organization. Jett reviews the history of peacekeeping and the evolution in the number, size, scope, and cost of peacekeeping missions. He also explains why peacekeeping has become more necessary, possible, and desired and yet, at the same time, more complex, more difficult, and less frequently used. The book takes a hard look at the UN's actions and provides useful information for understanding current conflicts.

Explains how peacekeeping can work effectively by employing power through verbal persuasion, financial inducement, and coercion short of offensive force.

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. officials have been more willing to remind allies that the United States will not play the role of international policeman. Given U.S. reluctance, the job of peacekeeping will fall increasingly to international organizations and regional alliances. In International Peacekeeping Paul Diehl examines the recent record of United Nations peacekeeping forces and develops criteria for assessing their operations. His analysis provides useful guidance for the management of new hostilities in areas such as Central and Eastern Europe, where the dissolution of the Soviet Union has spawned bitter civil wars and dangerous border disputes. Diehl identifies three sets of factors that affect traditional international peacekeeping operations. He begins by discussing the practical concerns of peacekeeping efforts, such as force composition, organization, and deployment. He then examines issues related to the political and military context in which the forces are deployed, including the nature of the conflict and the involvement of third parties. Finally, he considers the authorization by the relevant international body - usually the United Nations - as it relates to the mission's mandate, policies, and financing. He concludes by analyzing the viability of new roles for U.N. peacekeeping troops, such as humanitarian assistance, and by exploring structural alternatives to U.N. peacekeeping operations.

No small number of books laud and record the heroic actions of those at war. But the peacekeepers? Who tells their stories? At the beginning of the 1990s, the world exited the cold war and entered an era of great promise for peace and security. Guided by an invigorated United Nations, the international community set out to end conflicts that had flared into vicious civil wars and to unconditionally champion human rights and hold abusers responsible. The stage seemed set for greatness. Today that optimism is shattered. The failure of international engagement in conflict areas ranging from Afghanistan to Congo and Lebanon to Kosovo has turned believers into skeptics. The Fog of Peace is a firsthand reckoning by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the man who led UN peacekeeping efforts for eight years and has been at the center of all the major crises since the beginning of the 21st century. Guéhenno grapples with the distance between the international community's promise to protect and the reality that our noble aspirations may be beyond our grasp. The author illustrates with personal, concrete examples—from the crises in Afghanistan, Iraq, Congo, Sudan, Darfur, Kosovo, Ivory Coast, Georgia, Lebanon, Haiti, and Syria—the need to accept imperfect outcomes and compromises. He argues that nothing is more damaging than excessive ambition followed by precipitous retrenchment. We can indeed save many thousands of lives, but we need to calibrate our ambitions and stay the course.

Find out about the 1958 U.S. intervention that succeeded and apply those lessons to today's conflicts in the Middle East In July 1958, U.S. Marines stormed the beach in Beirut, Lebanon, ready for combat. They were greeted by vendors and sunbathers. Fortunately, the rest of their mission—helping to end Lebanon's first civil war—went nearly as smoothly and successfully, thanks in large part to the skillful work of American diplomats who helped arrange a compromise solution. Future American interventions in the region would not work out quite as well. Bruce Riedel's new book tells the now-forgotten story (forgotten, that is, in the United States) of the first U.S. combat operation in the Middle East. President Eisenhower sent the Marines in the wake of a bloody coup in Iraq, a seismic event that altered politics not only of that country but eventually of the entire region. Eisenhower feared that the coup, along with other conspiracies and events that seemed mysterious back in Washington, threatened American interests in the Middle East. His action, and those of others, were driven in large part by a cast of fascinating characters whose espionage and covert actions could be grist for a movie. Although Eisenhower's intervention in Lebanon was unique, certainly in its relatively benign outcome, it does hold important lessons for today's policymakers as they seek to deal with the always unexpected challenges in the Middle East. Veteran analyst Bruce Reidel describes the scene as it emerged six decades ago, and he suggests that some of the lessons learned then are still valid today. A key lesson? Not to rush to judgment when surprised by the unexpected. And don't assume the worst.

Africa Nations have contributed to peace operations in conflict zones across the world since the deployment of the United Nations Operations in the Congo in 1960. This has placed Africa as a major stakeholder in the maintenance of peace and security. For over fifty years Ghana has earned the international reputation as one of the largest and consistent Troop Contributing Country in United Nations mandated peace operations. While Ghana has long been an active contributor to peace operations, there are few or no comparative studies that systematically analyze the actual roles played by troops in many of the different conflict context where they have served. This book therefore, focuses on a comparison of two peace operations undertaken by the forces of an African Nation in two different missions in Lebanon and Liberia.