November 1995 Support for international commodity agreements is waning, but the commodity problem remains. And producer cartels are the main alternative. International commodity agreements (ICAs) fit uneasily in a world in which markets are becoming globalized and increasingly competitive. Development policy -- both as preached by international agencies and as practiced by typically democratically elected and nonsocialist governments in the major producing countries -- emphasizes productive efficiency, product quality, and effective marketing. This is a long way from the ideology that gave central place to supply restrictions operating through central marketing boards and quota allocations. In today's less centralized, more competitive world, the winners and losers from commodity stabilization are more evenly distributed across producing and consuming countries. Commodity policy is no longer a matter of redistribution from consumers to producers. This institutional change has been reinforced by the widespread belief -- evidenced, for example, by the collapse of the international tin and coffee agreements -- that commodity market stabilization through international agreements cannot succeed. In earlier decades, the belief that stabilization could and would improve the position of commodity producers provided the impetus for resolving some of the problems that intervention threw up. Since the collapse of the tin market in 1985, the belief that commodity market stabilization cannot work has undermined producers' willingness to try to resolve difficulties within existing ICAs and has reinforced the suspicion of consumer governments that these agreements were in no one's interests. In the current climate, encouraging competitive markets, state interventions are seen as requiring clear justification in terms of market failure. The existence of active futures markets in all of the industries that have commodity agreements makes justification along these lines problematic. But the commodity problem has not disappeared, and producers may look for other mechanisms to raise prices from often very low levels in industries experiencing excess capacity. Developed country governments may be forced to decide whether they prefer to see markets controlled by producer cartels (where they will lack representation) or under the auspices of international commodity agreements. An earlier version of this paper -- a product of the Commodity Policy and Analysis Unit, International Economics Department -- was prepared as a background working paper for Global Economic Prospects 1994.

Written by Sultan Nazrin Shah - the author of the highly acclaimed works Charting the Economy and Striving for Inclusive Development - this book is a pioneering study of the many economic and social changes in the natural resource-rich Malaysian state of Perak over the last two centuries. When globalization first took hold and international trade networks broadened and deepened in the first half of the 19th century, and a new capitalist world order emerged in the second, Perak was a key player. Its tin was in high demand in Western industrializing countries and foreign capital, labour, and technology propelled it forward. By 1900, Perak accounted for almost half of Malaya's tin output and a staggering quarter of world output, with its prosperity making it the Malay peninsula's commercial hub. Likewise, during the global rubber boom that began in the early 20th century as cars were mass produced for the first time, Perak was the largest rubber-producing state in the peninsula. This book brings together a range of key sub-themes - economic geography, the institutional legacy of colonialism, increasing federal government centralization, forces of economic agglomeration, and human migration - which drove Perak's fortunes in sometimes dramatic economic cycles and ultimately led to the collapse of its tin and rubber industries and the migration of many of its young and skilled. The book concludes by looking forward, analysing Perak's characteristics, and extrapolating lessons from formerly wealthy industrial centres originally blessed with natural resources but subsequently left behind by new waves of globalization, such as Cornwall and Sheffield in the United Kingdom, and Pittsburgh and Scranton in the United States. With a new vision Perak can regenerate itself and once again emerge triumphant against a tough global background-Covid-19, war, and deglobalization.

November 1995 Institutions interested in stimulating the development of securities markets in developing and transition economies should remember lessons from U.S. financial history: Put fiscal practices on a solid ground and then encourage disclosure of financial information to investors. One benefit of a good stock market is that a developing country will find it easier to sell bonds to foreign investors. At least that was the U.S. experience more than a century ago. Using U.S. securities markets as a case history, Sylla explores the role securities markets play in economic development, how they emerge, and how regulation can make them more effective. Why the United States? Two centuries ago, it was a small undeveloped country with serious financial problems. It confronted those problems and, guided by Alexander Hamilton, creatively reformed its financial system, which then became a foundation of the U.S. economic infrastructure and a bulwark for long-term growth. When Hamilton's program established public credit and securities markets in the early 1790s, U.S. citizens were immediately able to borrow from older, richer countries. U.S. wealth then increased until, by the end of the nineteenth century, U.S. residents began to lend and invest more abroad than they borrowed. During the 1820s and 1830s, the United States--usually state governments--borrowed large sums from foreign investors to build roads, canals, and early railroads, to make other transportation improvements, and to capitalize state banks. From the 1830s to the end of the century, still larger sums from overseas went into private U.S. railway companies that provided cheap transcontinental transportation. Most of this borrowing took the form of state and corporate bond sales to overseas investors. The pristine U.S. government credit established by Hamilton thus rubbed off on U.S. state and corporate debt. The British stock market did better than the U.S. market until the United States adopted security-market regulation (including disclosure rules) under the SEC. Then the U.S. market became a world leader. The U.S. stock market developed more slowly than the bond market, but it both aided and benefited from foreign investment in U.S. bonds. Foreign investors preferred debt securities to equities, yet equities create a safety margin for bondholders who, because of this margin, are more willing to purchase and hold bonds. Foreign investors preferred bonds; U.S. investors, after exporting bonds, held more stocks than bonds at home. Why? Because good stock markets permit the conversion of equity securities into cash. This paper--a joint product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department, and the Financial Sector Development Department--was presented at a Bank seminar, Financial History: Lessons of the Past for Reformers of the Present, and is a chapter in a forthcoming volume, Reforming Finance: Some Lessons from History, edited by Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Dimitri Vittas.