This edition of the “brief, yet subtle and penetrating account” of the CIA includes a new prologue covering the agency’s more recent history (Christian Science Monitor). Now in its third edition, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones’s comprehensive history of the Central Intelligence Agency is widely acclaimed for its thorough and even-handed analysis. A renowned U.S. intelligence expert, Jeffreys-Jones chronicles the evolution of the agency from its beginning in 1947 to the present day. With clarity and acuity, he examines the CIA’s activities during some of the most dramatic episodes in American history, from McCarthyism to the Bay of Pigs, the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the Iran-Contra affair, and many others. A new prologue by the author also covers the CIA’s history from the end of the Cold War to the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001. A landmark of intelligence history since its first edition in 1989, The CIA and American Democracy is “a judicious and reasonable...sophisticated study” (David P. Calleo, New York Times Book Review).

From anthrax to botulism, from smallpox to Ebola, the threat of biological destruction is rapidly overtaking our collective fear of atomic weaponry. This riveting narrative traces America's own covert biological weapons program from its origins in World War II to its abrupt cancellation in 1969. In light of America's increasing surveillance and condemnation of foreign biological weapons programs, this expos of America's own dangerous Cold War secret is both fascinating and shocking. The project, at its peak, employed 5,000 people and tested pathogens on 2,000 live human volunteers; conducted open-air tests on American soil; sprayed our cities with bacterial aerosols; and stockpiled millions of bacterial bombs for instant deployment. Yet, surprisingly, almost nothing has been published about this project until now. This is the first book to expose the true story of America's secret program to create biological weapons of mass destruction.

This resource offers readers a highly accessible and informed account of the circumstances under which scientists, soldiers, and statesmen were able to mobilize resources for extensive biological weapons programs and explains why such weapons were never deployed in a major conflict.

The threat of biological weapons has never attracted as much public attention as in the past five years. Yet there has been little historical analysis of such weapons over the past half-century. Deadly Cultures sets out to fill this gap by analyzing the historical developments since 1945 and addressing three central issues: why states have continued or begun programs for acquiring biological weapons, why states have terminated biological weapons programs, and how states have demonstrated that they have truly terminated their biological weapons programs.

Neoliberalism has been the reigning ideology of our era. For the past four decades, almost every real-world event of any consequence has been traced to the supposedly omnipresent influence of neoliberalism. Instead, this book argues that states across the world have actually grown in scope and reach. The authors in this volume contest the view that the past three decades have been marked by the diminution of the state in the face of neoliberalism. They argue instead that we are witnessing a new phase of state formation, which revolves around hybrid rule—that is, a more expansive form of state formation that works through privatization and seeks pacification and depoliticization as instrumental to enhancing state power. Contributors argue that that the process of hybridization, and hybrid rule point towards a convergence on a more authoritarian capitalist regime type, possibly, but not necessarily, more closely aligned with the Beijing model—one toward which even the United States, with its penchant for surveillance and discipline, appears to be moving. This volume will shed new light on evolving public-private relations, and the changing nature of power and political authority in the 21st century and will be of interest to students and scholars of IPE, international relations and political theory.

"Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called 'the poor man's atomic bomb,' yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes."—from Living Weapons Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare. Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments. Living Weapons draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened.