The New Institutional Economics might have significant interactions with the economics of non-human societies. Some possibilities are considered in connection with the ideas of Yarbrough and Yarbrough on human soieties. First, the need for enforcement may be less when the organisms in question treat one another as resources. Second, theories of the division of labor that have been developed in biology are applicable to human societies. There may be some interesting alternatives to traditional sociobiology as well.

This text gives rise to an institutional analysis of the economy centred around the division of labour and social knowledge. The book begins with the issue of scientific development as an aspect of division of labour, before exploring issues on the moral bases of social interaction.

This book provides, for the first time, a systematic and comprehensive narrative of the history of one central idea in economics, namely the division of labour, over the past two and a half millennia, with special focus on that having occurred in the most recent two and a half centuries. Quite contrary to the widely held belief, the idea has a fascinating biography, much richer than that exemplified by the pin-making story that was popularized by Adam Smith’s classical work published in 1776.

This book explores endogenous institutional change and the global, cyclical, and power-based drivers that underpin it. A metatheoretical framework is presented to highlight the influence of path dependence, systemic cycle driven power relations, and institutional design on the development of labor institutions. The framework is applied to the USA, Germany, and China to provide a comparative economic perspective. Systemic Cycle and Institutional Change: Labor Markets in the USA, Germany and China aims to examine endogenous institutional change through analyzing the systemic cycle and bringing together global and national conceptions of capitalism. It is relevant to students and researchers interested in comparative economics, political economy, and labor economics.

While there are many economists in schools, government, unions, and non-profit organizations working in the institutionalst tradition, there has been no book that describes this tradition -- until now. Editors Champlin and Knoedler have brought together prominent labor economists, highly respected institutional economists, and newer scholars working on such compelling issues as immigration, wage discrimination, and living wages. Their essays portray the institutionalist tradition in labor as it exists today as well as its historical and theoretical origins. The result is a major contribution to the literature of labor economics, institutionalist economics, and the history of economic thought.

In this paper, we model the co-evolution of the division of labor and informal institutions based on three assumptions. First, informal institutions lower coordination costs among specialists, which increases the equilibrium division of labor. Second, advances in the division of labor increase the size of interpersonal trading groups and thereby undermine the game theoretic basis of informal institutions. Finally, the collective nature of informal institutions implies that they are undervalued in private decision making. Together these assumptions imply that the equilibrium division of labor is too high from a social perspective. Consequently, the economy has greater than optimal complexity and grows at a higher than optimal rate of growth.

Adam Smith, asserting the common humanity of the street porter and the philosopher, articulated the classical economists' model of social interactions as exchanges among equals. This model had largely fallen out of favor until, recently, a number of scholars in the avant-garde of economic thought rediscovered it and rechristened it "analytical egalitarianism." In this volume, Sandra J. Peart and David M. Levy bring together an impressive array of authors to explore the ramifications of this analytical ideal and to discuss the ways in which an egalitarian theory of individuality can enable economists to reconcile ideas from opposite ends of the political spectrum. "The analytical egalitarianism project that Peart and Levy have advanced has come to occupy a prominent place in the current agenda of historians of economic thought." ---Ross Emmett, Associate Professor of Economics and Co-Director of the Michigan Center for Innovation and Economic Prosperity, Michigan State University "These essays and dialogs from the Summer Institute would make Adam Smith, economist and moral philosopher, proud." ---J. Daniel Hammond, Hultquist Family Professor of Economics, Wake Forest University With essays by: James M. Buchanan, Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences recipient (1985) and Professor Emeritus, George Mason University and Virginia Polytechnic and State University Juan Pablo Couyoumdijian, Universidad del Desearrollo, Chile Tyler Cowen, George Mason University Eric Crampton, University of Canterbury, New Zealand Andrew Farrant, Dickinson College Samuel Hollander, Professor Emeritus, University of Toronto M. Ali Khan, Johns Hopkins University Thomas Leonard, Princeton University Deirdre McCloskey, University of Illinois, Chicago Leonidas Montes, Dean of School of Government, Universidad Adolfo Ibañez, Chile Maria Pia Paganelli, Yeshiva University and New York University Warren J. Samuels, Professor Emeritus, Michigan State University Eric Schliesser, VENI post-doctoral research fellow, Leiden University, and University of Amsterdam Gordon Tullock, George Mason University Sandra J. Peart is Dean of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Virginia. David M. Levy is Professor of Economics at George Mason University (GMU) and Research Associate at the Center for Study of Public Choice at GMU. They are Co-Directors of George Mason University's Summer Institute for the Preservation of the History of Economics.

This paper builds upon a view of economic system and individual economic organization as problem-solving arrangements and presents a simple model of adaptive problem-solving driven by trial-and-error and collective selection. The institutional structure, and in particular its degree of decentralization, determines which solutions are tried out and undergo selection. It is shown that if the design problem at hand is complex (in term of interdependencies between the elements of the system) then a decentralized institutional structure is very unlikely to ever generate optimal solutions and therefore no selection process can ever select them. We also show that nearly-decomposable structures have in general a selective advantage in terms of speed in reaching good locally optimal solutions. -- Theory of the firm ; Vertical and horizontal integration ; Computational complexity

The concepts and techniques presented in this volume originated from the fields of dynamics, statistics, control theory, computer science and informatics, and are applied to novel and innovative real-world applications. Over the past few decades, the use of dynamic systems, control theory, computing, data mining, machine learning and simulation has gained the attention of numerous researchers from all over the world. Admirable scientific projects using both model-free and model-based methods coevolved at today’s research centers and are introduced in conferences around the world, yielding new scientific advances and helping to solve important real-world problems. One important area of progress is the bioeconomy, where advances in the life sciences are used to produce new products in a sustainable and clean manner. In this book, scientists from all over the world share their latest insights and important findings in the field. The majority of the contributed papers for this volume were written by participants of the 3rd International Conference on Dynamics, Games and Science, DGSIII, held at the University of Porto in February 2014, and at the Berkeley Bioeconomy Conference at the University of California at Berkeley in March 2014. The aim of the project of this book “Modeling, Dynamics, Optimization and Bioeconomics II” follows the same aim as its companion piece, “Modeling, Dynamics, Optimization and Bioeconomics I,” namely, the exploration of emerging and cutting-edge theories and methods for modeling, optimization, dynamics and bioeconomy.