The U.S. Army's Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel program is responsible for dismantling former chemical agent production facilities and destroying recovered chemical materiel. In response to congressional requirements, the Center for Disease Control (CDC), in 2003, recommended new airborne exposure limits (AELs) to protect workforce and public health during operations to destroy this materiel. To assist in meeting these recommended limits, the U.S. Army asked the NRC for a review of its implementation plans for destruction of production facilities at the Newport Chemical Depot and the operation of two types of mobile destruction systems. This report presents the results of that review. It provides recommendations on analytical methods, on airborne containment monitoring, on operational procedures, on the applicability of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and on involvement of workers and the public in implementation of the new AELs.

The U.S. Army's Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel program is responsible for dismantling former chemical agent production facilities and destroying recovered chemical materiel. In response to congressional requirements, the Center for Disease Control (CDC), in 2003, recommended new airborne exposure limits (AELs) to protect workforce and public health during operations to destroy this materiel. To assist in meeting these recommended limits, the U.S. Army asked the NRC for a review of its implementation plans for destruction of production facilities at the Newport Chemical Depot and the operation of two types of mobile destruction systems. This report presents the results of that review. It provides recommendations on analytical methods, on airborne containment monitoring, on operational procedures, on the applicability of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and on involvement of workers and the public in implementation of the new AELs.

The U.S. Army's Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel program is responsible for dismantling former chemical agent production facilities and destroying recovered chemical materiel. In response to congressional requirements, the Center for Disease Control (CDC), in 2003, recommended new airborne exposure limits (AELs) to protect workforce and public health during operations to destroy this materiel. To assist in meeting these recommended limits, the U.S. Army asked the NRC for a review of its implementation plans for destruction of production facilities at the Newport Chemical Depot and the operation of two types of mobile destruction systems. This report presents the results of that review. It provides recommendations on analytical methods, on airborne containment monitoring, on operational procedures, on the applicability of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and on involvement of workers and the public in implementation of the new AELs.

Under the direction of the U.S. Army's Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) and mandated by Congress, the nation is destroying its chemical weapons stockpile. Over the past several years, the Army has requested several studies from the NRC to assist with the stockpile destruction. This study was requested to advise the CMA about the status of analytical instrumentation technology and systems suitable for monitoring airborne chemical warfare agents at chemical weapons disposal and storage facilities. The report presents an assessment of current monitoring systems used for airborne agent detection at CMA facilities and of the applicability and availability of innovative new technologies. It also provides a review of how new regulatory requirements would affect the CMA's current agent monitoring procedures, and whether new measurement technologies are available and could be effectively incorporated into the CMA's overall chemical agent monitoring strategies.

The Chemical Weapons Convention requires, among other things, that the signatories to the conventionâ€"which includes the United Statesâ€"destroy by April 29, 2007, or as soon possible thereafter, any chemical warfare materiel that has been recovered from sites where it has been buried once discovered. For several years the United States and several other countries have been developing and using technologies to dispose of this non-stockpile materiel. To determine whether international efforts have resulted in technologies that would benefit the U.S. program, the U.S. Army asked the NRC to evaluate and compare such technologies to those now used by the United States. This book presents a discussion of factors used in the evaluations, summaries of evaluations of several promising international technologies for processing munitions and for agent-only processing, and summaries of other technologies that are less likely to be of benefit to the U.S. program at this time.

As the result of disposal practices from the early to mid-twentieth century, approximately 250 sites in 40 states, the District of Columbia, and 3 territories are known or suspected to have buried chemical warfare materiel (CWM). Much of this CWM is likely to occur in the form of small finds that necessitate the continuation of the Army's capability to transport treatment systems to disposal locations for destruction. Of greatest concern for the future are sites in residential areas and large sites on legacy military installations. The Army mission regarding the remediation of recovered chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) is turning into a program much larger than the existing munition and hazardous substance cleanup programs. The Army asked the Nation Research Council (NRC) to examine this evolving mission in part because this change is significant and becoming even more prominent as the stockpile destruction is nearing completion. One focus in this report is the current and future status of the Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Project (NSCMP), which now plays a central role in the remediation of recovered chemical warfare materiel and which reports to the Chemical Materials Agency. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel also reviews current supporting technologies for cleanup of CWM sites and surveys organizations involved with remediation of suspected CWM disposal sites to determine current practices and coordination. In this report, potential deficiencies in operational areas based on the review of current supporting technologies for cleanup of CWM sites and develop options for targeted research and development efforts to mitigate potential problem areas are identified.

The Army's ability to meet public and congressional demands to destroy expeditiously all of the U.S. declared chemical weapons would be enhanced by the selection and acquisition of appropriate explosive destruction technologies (EDTs) to augment the main technologies to be used to destroy the chemical weapons currently at the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) in Kentucky and the Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) in Colorado. The Army is considering four EDTs for the destruction of chemical weapons: three from private sector vendors, and a fourth, Army-developed explosive destruction system (EDS). This book updates earlier evaluations of these technologies, as well as any other viable detonation technologies, based on several considerations including process maturity, process efficacy, process throughput, process safety, public and regulatory acceptability, and secondary waste issues, among others. It also provides detailed information on each of the requirements at BGAD and PCD and rates each of the existing suitable EDTs plus the Army's EDS with respect to how well it satisfies these requirements.

January 2012 saw the completion of the U.S. Army's Chemical Materials Agency's (CMA's) task to destroy 90 percent of the nation's stockpile of chemical weapons. CMA completed destruction of the chemical agents and associated weapons deployed overseas, which were transported to Johnston Atoll, southwest of Hawaii, and demilitarized there. The remaining 10 percent of the nation's chemical weapons stockpile is stored at two continental U.S. depots, in Lexington, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado. Their destruction has been assigned to a separate U.S. Army organization, the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) Element. ACWA is currently constructing the last two chemical weapons disposal facilities, the Pueblo and Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants (denoted PCAPP and BGCAPP), with weapons destruction activities scheduled to start in 2015 and 2020, respectively. ACWA is charged with destroying the mustard agent stockpile at Pueblo and the nerve and mustard agent stockpile at Blue Grass without using the multiple incinerators and furnaces used at the five CMA demilitarization plants that dealt with assembled chemical weapons - munitions containing both chemical agents and explosive/propulsive components. The two ACWA demilitarization facilities are congressionally mandated to employ noncombustion-based chemical neutralization processes to destroy chemical agents. In order to safely operate its disposal plants, CMA developed methods and procedures to monitor chemical agent contamination of both secondary waste materials and plant structural components. ACWA currently plans to adopt these methods and procedures for use at these facilities. The Assessment of Agent Monitoring Strategies for the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants report also develops and describes a half-dozen scenarios involving prospective ACWA secondary waste characterization, process equipment maintenance and changeover activities, and closure agent decontamination challenges, where direct, real-time agent contamination measurements on surfaces or in porous bulk materials might allow more efficient and possibly safer operations if suitable analytical technology is available and affordable.

The US Department of Defense (DOD) is faced with an overwhelming task in evaluating chemicals that could potentially pose a threat to its deployed personnel. There are over 84,000 registered chemicals, and testing them with traditional toxicity-testing methods is not feasible in terms of time or money. In recent years, there has been a concerted effort to develop new approaches to toxicity testing that incorporate advances in systems biology, toxicogenomics, bioinformatics, and computational toxicology. Given the advances, DOD asked the National Research Council to determine how DOD could use modern approaches for predicting chemical toxicity in its efforts to prevent debilitating, acute exposures to deployed personnel. This report provides an overall conceptual approach that DOD could use to develop a predictive toxicology system. Application of Modern Toxicology Approaches for Predicting Acute Toxicity for Chemical Defense reviews the current state of computational and high-throughput approaches for predicting acute toxicity and suggests methods for integrating data and predictions. This report concludes with lessons learned from current high-throughput screening programs and suggests some initial steps for DOD investment.

The Chemical Weapons Convention requires, among other things, that the signatories to the conventionâ€"which includes the United Statesâ€"destroy by April 29, 2007, or as soon possible thereafter, any chemical warfare materiel that has been recovered from sites where it has been buried once discovered. For several years the United States and several other countries have been developing and using technologies to dispose of this non-stockpile materiel. To determine whether international efforts have resulted in technologies that would benefit the U.S. program, the U.S. Army asked the NRC to evaluate and compare such technologies to those now used by the United States. This book presents a discussion of factors used in the evaluations, summaries of evaluations of several promising international technologies for processing munitions and for agent-only processing, and summaries of other technologies that are less likely to be of benefit to the U.S. program at this time.