This volume collects all Henry Allison's recent essays on Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy.

"This volume brings together essays on Hegel from various decades of my involvement with the most important philosophical thinker of modernity. It is directed against some of the misinterpretations, malicious legends, and fairy tales about Hegel that are still prevalent today"--

A systematic account of Rousseau's significance in relation to Kant's, Fichte's and Hegel's views on freedom, dependence and necessity.

Twentieth-century Canada fostered a range of great minds, but the country's diversity and wide range of academic fields have led to their ideas being portrayed as the work of isolated thinkers. Canadian Idealism and the Philosophy of Freedom contests this assumption by linking the works of C.B. Macpherson, George Grant, and Charles Taylor to demonstrate the presence of a Canadian intellectual tradition.

Essays on Kant contains a collection of seventeen essays written by Henry E. Allison, one of the world's leading scholars on Kant. Although these essays cover virtually the full spectrum of Allison's work on Kant, most of them revolve around three basic themes: the nature of transcendental idealism and its relation to other aspects of Kant's thought; freedom of the will; and the concept of the purposiveness of nature. The first two themes are intended asclarifications, elaborations, and further developments of Allison's previous work on Kant, while the essays on the third theme demonstrate the central place of Kant's 'critical' philosophy in his thought.Allison places Kant's views in their historical context and explores their contemporary relevance to present day philosophers.

This book traces a complex of issues surrounding moral agency from Kant through Schelling to Kierkegaard.

A collection of essays on the foundational themes of freedom and spontaneity in Immanuel Kant's philosophy.

The influence of Kant’s understanding of morality is too strong to be ignored. Hegel, however, fundamentally criticized Kant for offering merely a ‘formal’ model of normativity that cannot sufficiently comprehend human action as free. Instead, Hegel argues in his doctrine of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) that the embeddedness of the acting subject must be taken into account when identifying normativity. Yet the issue of normativity in Kant and Hegel remains contested even today, not least due to the misunderstandings of their conceptions of the topic. The present volume explores developments within recent scholarship which enable a better understanding of the concept of normativity in the thought of Kant and Hegel.

Traces the development of Kant's views on free will from earlier writings through the three Critiques and beyond.

Karen Ng sheds new light on Hegel's famously impenetrable philosophy. She does so by offering a new interpretation of Hegel's idealism and by foregrounding Hegel's Science of Logic, revealing that Hegel's theory of reason revolves around the concept of organic life. Beginning with the influence of Kant's Critique of Judgment on Hegel, Ng argues that Hegel's key philosophical contributions concerning self-consciousness, freedom, and logic all develop around the idea of internal purposiveness, which appealed to Hegel deeply. She charts the development of the purposiveness theme in Kant's third Critique, and argues that the most important innovation from that text is the claim that the purposiveness of nature opens up and enables the operation of the power of judgment. This innovation is essential for understanding Hegel's philosophical method in the Differenzschrift (1801) and Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), where Hegel, developing lines of thought from Fichte and Schelling, argues against Kant that internal purposiveness constitutes cognition's activity, shaping its essential relation to both self and world. From there, Ng defends a new and detailed interpretation of Hegel's Science of Logic, arguing that Hegel's Subjective Logic can be understood as Hegel's version of a critique of judgment, in which life comes to be understood as opening up the possibility of intelligibility. She makes the case that Hegel's theory of judgment is modelled on reflective and teleological judgments, in which something's species or kind provides the objective context for predication. The Subjective Logic culminates in the argument that life is a primitive or original activity of judgment, one that is the necessary presupposition for the actualization of self-conscious cognition. Through bold and ambitious new arguments, Ng demonstrates the ongoing dialectic between life and self-conscious cognition, providing ground-breaking ways of understanding Hegel's philosophical system.