Tracing the development of the notion of the dialectic from the classical Greek thinkers to the modern thinkers, Gadamer demonstrates that Hegel 'worked out his own dialectical method by extending the dialectic of the Ancients.' Excellently translated, this book is a valuable if demanding addition to Gadamer's philosophical work now available in English.

This book incorporates seven 'Introductions' that Hegel wrote for each of his major works: the Phenomenology, Logic, Philosophy of Right, History, Fine Art, Religion and History of Philosophy, and includes an Introduction and Epilogue by the Editors, serving to introduce Hegel to the reader and to situate him and his works into their wider context.

This book presents three generations of German, French, and Anglo-American thinking on the Hegelian narrative of desire, recognition, and alienation in life, labor, and language—a narrative that has been subject to extensive commentary in philosophy, literature, psychoanalysis, and feminist thought. The texts focus on a central topos in Western thought, the story of self-consciousness awakened in nature and in history. John O'Neill argues that current postmodern rejections of the Hegelian-Marxist narrative demand an understanding of the texts included here. Without Hegel and Marx in our toolbox, he argues, we will flounder in a world marked by the split between postmodern indifference and premodern passion. The book makes a strong selection from the history of Hegelian-Marxist debate, hermeneutical and critical theory, and Freudian/Lacanian and feminist commentary on the dialectic of desire and recognition, on the levels of social psychology and political economy. Included are articles by Karl Marx, G. W. F. Hegel, Alexandre Kojève, Jean Hyppolite, Jean-Paul Sarte, Georg Lukács, Jürgen Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Howard Adelman, Shlomo Avineri, Jessica Benjamin, Edward S. Casey and J. Melvin Woody, Henry S. Harris, George Armstrong Kelly, Ludwig Siep, Judith N. Shklar, and Henry Sussman. The texts and commentaries show how the Hegelian-Maxist narrative of desire, recognition, and alienation is a contested story, one in which class, race, and gender issues are drawn into a historical romance that is being rewritten in contemporary cultural politics.

Michael Rosen discusses the philosophical issues involved in historical interpretation before presenting a novel and challenging solution to the problem of Hegel's openness to criticism. Contrary to received opinion, Hegel's philosophy does not, he argues, draw upon a universal and pre-suppositionless conception of rationality.

The Dimensions of Hegel's Dialectic examines the epistemological import of Hegelian dialectic in the widest sense. In modern philosophy, German idealism, Hegel in particular, is said to have made significant innovative steps in redefining the meaning, scope and use of dialectic. Indeed, it is dialectic that makes up the very core of Hegel's position, yet it is an area of his thought that is widely neglected by the available literature despite the increased interest in Hegel's philosophy in recent years. This book brings together an international team of expert contributors in a long-overdue discussion of Hegelian dialectic. Twelve specially commissioned essays address the task of making sense and use of Hegel's dialectic, which is fundamental not only for historical and hermeneutic reasons, but also for pragmatic ones; a satisfactory response to this challenge has the power to clarify Hegel's legacy in the current debate. The essays situate the dialectic in the context of German idealism with a clear-sighted elucidation of the problems that Hegel's dialectic is called upon to solve.

Here, 13 major scholars reassess the place of Hegel in contemporary theory and the philosophy of religion. The contributors focus not only on Hegelian analysis but also on the transformative value of his thought in relation to our current 'turn to religion'.

In this book, I deal with some fundamental problems of the Hegelian dialectic. For this purpose, I take a middle course between total scepticism, which considers dialectic as a devastator sophistry with no respect even for the non-contradiction principle, and authoritarian dogmatism, which claims to solve any question with the magic wand of the Hegelian Aufhebung. That is, I decide to be critical, defining concepts anew, bringing out sources, determining conditions of possibility and fields of validity, accepting or rejecting when necessary. Following G. R. G. Mure's thinking, from an inner point of view I examine whether, in carrying out his work, Hegel remains faithful to the different principles he proclaims, and I find substantial deviations. And, following W. Becker's thinking, from an external point of view, that is, from a formal, empirical or existential contemporary angle, I try to determine the extent to which we may legitimately talk about the fruitfulness of Hegelian dialectic. In this way, I reconstruct Hegel's thought so that it may become acceptable to us-readers of the twentieth-century-as intelligible and coherent as possible. I conclude that dialectic, as a logic of human reality, has to be grasped and expressed from the viewpoint of the particular historical individual, in constant interaction with the cultural environment of his or her time. Using this approach, I investigate the questions at issue from Hegel's Logic point of view.

This book was written in 1968, and defended as a doctoral dissertation before the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) in 1969. It treats of the systematic views of Hegel which led him to give to the princi ple of non-contradiction, the principle of double negation, and the principle of excluded middle, meanings which are difficult to understand. The reader will look in vain for the philosophical position of the author. A few words about the intentions which motivated the author to study and clarify Hegel's thought are therefore not out of place. In the early sixties, when occupying myself with the history of Marxist philosophy, I discovered that the representatives of the logical-positivist tra dition were not alone in employing a principle of demarcation; that those of the dialectical Marxist tradition were also using such a principle ('self-move ment') as a foundation of a scientific philosophy and as a means to delimit unscientific ideas. I aimed at a clear conception of this principle in order to be able to judge whether, and to what extent, it accords with the foundations of the analytical method. In this endeavor I encountered two problems: (1) What is to be understood by 'analytical method' cannot be ascertained un equivocally.