Hedonic Wage Equilibrium examines empirically and theoretically the properties of the equilibrium wage function.

Abstract This paper studies implicit pricing of non-wage job characteristics in the labor market using a two-sided matching model. It departs from the previous literature by allowing worker heterogeneity in productivity, which gives rise to a double transaction problem in a hedonic model. Deriving sufficient conditions under which assortative matching is the unique stable job-worker matching, we show that observed wage differentials between jobs reflect not only compensating wage differentials, but also worker productivity gaps between the jobs. We find that the job-worker matching pattern determines the extent to which compensating wage differentials are confounded with the worker productivity gap effect.

This paper analyzes equilibrium in labor markets with costly search. Even in steady state equilibrium, identical labor may receive different wages; this may be the case even when the only source of imperfect information is the inequality of wages which the market is perpetuating. When there are information imperfections arising from (symmetric)differences in non-pecuniary characteristics of jobs and preferences of individuals, there will not in general exist a full employment, zero profit single wage equilibrium. There are, in general, a multiplicity of equilbria. Equilibrium may be characterized by unemployment; in spite of the presence of an excess supply of labor, no firm is willing to hire workers at a lowerwage. It knows that if it does so, the quit rate will be higher, and hence turnover costs(training costs) will be higher, so much so that profits will actually be lower. The model thus provides a rationale for real wage rigidity. The model also provides a theory of equilibrium frictional unemployment. Though the constrained optimality (taking explicitly into account the costs associated with obtaining information and search) may entail unemployment and wage dispersion, the levels of unemployment and wage dispersion in the market equilibrium will not, in general, be (constrained) optimal.

Although intuitively appealing, the use of hedonic wage estimates to determine people's willingness to pay to avoid the risk of fatal hazards is fraught with problems. The theoretical basis for such estimates are flawed in a number of important ways. The underlying behavioral model is wrong, there is imperfect information about job hazards, and labor markets do not look like the perfectly competitive model on which the theory depends for its conclusions. Further, there are many serious problems with the techniques used to estimate hedonic wage equations. This paper describes these problems. Not surprisingly, these problems result in a wide range of results with respect to willingness to pay to avoid fatal hazards. It is argued that this wide range of results is not fully apparent in the literature because of the bias in publication towards positive as opposed to negative findings. The paper concludes that it is unlikely that economics has much to contribute to the public policy debate over the value of a life.