Group lending has been widely adopted in the past thirty years by many microfinance institutions as a means to mitigate information asymmetries when delivering credit to the poor. This paper proposes an empirical method to address the potential omitted-variable problem resulting from unobserved group types when modeling the repayment behavior of group members. We estimate the model using a rich dataset from a group-lending program in India. The estimation results support our model specification and show the advantages of relying on a type-varying method when analyzing the probability of default of group members. In particular, our model helps to better understand the factors driving repayment behavior, which may differ across group types, and shows a higher predictive power than standard single-agent choice models.

This paper proposes and implements a mixture model to account for the unobserved group heterogeneity when modeling repayment behavior in group lending. We discuss the model properties and identification. We estimate the model using a rich dataset from a group lending program in India. The estimation results support the existence of two different group types: “responsible” and “irresponsible” groups. We find that the effects of the factors driving the repayment behavior differ across types. The model also shows a higher predictive performance than standard probabilistic models, particularly in identifying potential defaulters. We provide evidence supporting the robustness of the estimations.

Identifying policies which can improve water sector management is critically important given the global burden of water-related disease. Each year, 1 in 10 child deaths—roughly 800,000 in total—is the direct result of diarrhea. Can private-sector participation (PSP) in the urban piped water sector improve child health? The author uses child-level data from 39 African countries during 1986–2010 to show that introducing PSP decreases diarrhea among urban dwelling children under five years of age by 5.6 percentage points, or 35 percent of its mean prevalence. PSP also leads to greater reliance on piped water. To attribute causality, the author exploits time variation in the private water market share controlled by African countries’ former colonizers. A placebo analysis reveals that PSP does not affect symptoms of respiratory illness in the same children, nor does it affect a rural control group unaffected by PSP.

This study has been conducted in order to generate evidence of the visibility of exit from farm input subsidies in an African context. The study simulates the impact of alternative exit strategies from Malawi’s farm input subsidy program on maize markets. The simulation is conducted using a multiequation partial equilibrium model of the national maize market, which is sequentially linked via a price-linkage equation to local rural maize markets. The model accounts for market imperfections prevailing in the country that arise from government price interventions. Findings show that some alternative exit strategies have negative and sustained impacts on maize yields, production, and acreage allocated to maize over the simulation period. Market prices rise steadily as a result of the implementation of different exit strategies. Despite higher maize prices, domestic maize consumption remains fairly stable, with a slow but increasing trend over the simulation period. Results further suggest that exit strategies that are coupled with improvements in agricultural extension services have the potential to offset the negative impacts of the removal or scaling down of agricultural input subsidies. The study findings demonstrate the difficulty of feasibly removing farm input subsidies. Study recommendations are therefore relevant for policymakers and development partners debating removal or implementation of farm input subsidies.

Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor, and enforce each other's loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender's overall profitability and the poor's access to financial markets. The authors worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. They randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability 'centers' of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients.

In this comparative study of programmes against poverty in developing countries, the authors argue that building sustainable, target group-oriented financial institutions is important and feasible, and that it is likely to have greater development impact than the channelling of external funds to poor target groups (small and micro-scale business, small farmers, and women). The analysis has far-reaching implications for development policy and will interest development specialists, policymakers, and scholars of development finance and international banking.

The conventional wisdomaboutcreditmarketshas been radically alteredin recent years through the introduction of elements of moral hazard,adverseselectionofrisk,and quality-price relationships. Important empiricalstudies have been published which are leading to vastly different policyimplications. This analysis has not been explicitly extended to informalcredit markets so far, although it is widely recognized that credit transactedoutside the banking circuit is quantitatively huge and qualitatively critical,especially in developing countries.This book combines the new theoretical approach to credit markets withcertain precepts of the New Institutional Economics in order to analyzeinformal credit markets. While the formal financial institutions in developingcountries carry out credit transactions within the limits set by the marketenvironment and by government policies, informal institutions evolve by aparticular selection of modes of economic behavior which are responses tointrinsic imperfections of the market. The informal sector enhances trust bymakingexistingtiesanintegralcomponentofcreditcontracts:thecontractualcomponent of informal credit capitalizes on the personalistic (social andeconomic) relationships between the transacting parties.

In this book Christian Prem features new innovations on several levels. On a conceptual level he presents a complete restructuring and modularisation of the field of lending theory. On a formal level he bestows great care on providing precise definitions and promotes notational standardisation. On a technical level the development of an algorithm to solve repayment games automatically is thoroughly documented. Eventually, new theoretic results on the performance of various credit schemes are established, the quality of existing lending schemes is scrutinised and new more efficient mechanisms are presented. The content therefore inspires theorists as well as it provides well-grounded advice to practitioners in the lending industry. Altogether this thesis is a major step towards improving the quality and applicability of lending theory.