The book considers when governments should give guarantees to private investors. After describing the history of guarantees, and the challenges the politics and psychology create for good decisions, the book sets out a principles for allocating risk (and therefore guarantees), techniques for valuing guarantees, and rules to encourage good decisions.

ÔThis enlightening volume provides an invaluable guide for those perplexed by the seemingly intractable problems of financial crises, sovereign distress, and government guarantees. Contributors include an all-star cast of leading figures in the field. Highly recommended.Õ Ð Geoffrey Miller, New York University, US ÔThe history of the 2007Ð09 and possibly beyond near-global financial crisis needs to be examined carefully in order to identify and understand the causes, the transmission across countries, the harm to macroeconomies, the public policies adopted, the effectiveness of such policies, and the lessons to be learned to prevent or at least mitigate future such crises. This volume contributes to this task. It brings together under one cover the analyses of the various aspects of the crisis by experts in each area. It should be priority reading for serious students of the crisis.Õ Ð George G. Kaufman, Loyola University Chicago, US ÔThe combination of the skills of the lawyer and of the economist has proved increasingly fruitful, developing both understanding and policy in many areas of life, such as accident prevention, crime prevention, and healthcare. This book follows the precedent of these areas and assembles a group of lawyers and economists who by their contributions, consider how best to deal with financial crises, and how to make their future occurrence less likely. It is both intellectually stimulating and practically important. The authors and editors are to be congratulated.Õ Ð Geoffrey Wood, Cass Business School and University of Buckingham, UK Financial Crisis Containment and Government Guarantees analyses the international communityÕs commitment to forging enhanced, well thought-out, mechanisms for containing systemic risks in the context of a highly interconnected global financial framework which incorporates ongoing financial innovation. While use of government guarantees is a central theme, the book also analyses the roles played by prudential regulators, central banks, deposit insurers and treasuries in dealing with the crisis. The book examines how governments, central banks, regulators and deposit insurance agencies have worked together to contain the global financial crisis. Additionally, it focuses on efforts to overcome ongoing obstacles, as well as the most important proposals to improve safety nets, both at the national level and internationally. This concise and detailed book will strongly appeal to students in law, economics and finance, law practitioners, policymakers in central banks and ministries of finance, as well as deposit protection agencies and regulatory agencies.

This volume contains six studies on current topics in macroeconomics. The first shows that while assuming rational expectations is unrealistic, a finite-horizon forward planning model can yield results similar to those of a rational expectations equilibrium. The second explores the aggregate risk of the U.S. financial sector, and in particular whether it is safer now than before the 2008 financial crisis. The third analyzes “factorless income,” output that is not measured as capital or labor income. Next, a study argues that the financial crisis increased the perceived risk of a very bad economic and financial outcome, and explores the propagation of large, rare shocks. The next paper documents the substantial recent changes in the manufacturing sector and the decline in employment among prime-aged Americans since 2000. The last paper analyzes the dynamic macroeconomic effects of border adjustment taxes.

Why America's public-private mortgage giants threaten the world economy—and what to do about it The financial collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 led to one of the most sweeping government interventions in private financial markets in history. The bailout has already cost American taxpayers close to $150 billion, and substantially more will be needed. The U.S. economy--and by extension, the global financial system--has a lot riding on Fannie and Freddie. They cannot fail, yet that is precisely what these mortgage giants are guaranteed to do. How can we limit the damage to our economy, and avoid making the same mistakes in the future? Guaranteed to Fail explains how poorly designed government guarantees for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led to the debacle of mortgage finance in the United States, weighs different reform proposals, and provides sensible, practical recommendations. Despite repeated calls for tougher action, Washington has expanded the scope of its guarantees to Fannie and Freddie, fueling more and more housing and mortgages all across the economy--and putting all of us at risk. This book unravels the dizzyingly immense, highly interconnected businesses of Fannie and Freddie. It proposes a unique model of reform that emphasizes public-private partnership, one that can serve as a blueprint for better organizing and managing government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In doing so, Guaranteed to Fail strikes a cautionary note about excessive government intervention in markets.

This note highlights commonly observed weaknesses in the management of government guarantees, good practices, and measures governments could take to strengthen: (i) the evaluation of guarantee proposals; (ii) the quantification of risks arising from guarantees and their mitigation; and (iii) the budgeting, accounting, monitoring, and disclosure of guarantees.

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) refer to arrangements under which the private sector supplies infrastructure assets and infrastructure-based services that traditionally have been provided by the government. PPPs are used for a wide range of economic and social infrastructure projects, but they are used mainly to build and operate roads, bridges and tunnels, light rail networks, airports and air traffic control systems, prisons, water and sanitation plants, hospitals, schools, and public buildings. PPPs offer benefits similar to those offered by privatization, which is the sale of government-owned enterprises or assets. By the late 1990s, when privatization was losing much of its earlier momentum, PPPs began to be widely seen as a means of obtaining private sector capital and management expertise for infrastructure investment. After a modest start, a wave of PPPs is now beginning to sweep the world. This Special Issue paper provides an overview of some of the issues raised by PPPs, with a particular focus on their fiscal consequences. It also looks at government guarantees, which are used fairly widely to shield the private sector from risk and are a common feature of PPPs. And it examines the consequences of PPPs and guarantees for debt sustainability. The paper concludes with a list of measures that can maximize the benefits and minimize the fiscal risks associated with the use of PPPs. Various appendices augment the discussion by examining country experiences with PPPs, summarizing the statistical reporting framework used to discuss fiscal accounting and reporting, explaining accounting for risk transfer, examining how guarantees are modeled and estimated in Chile, and summarizing international accounting and reporting standards for contingent liabilities.

Focuses on a specific market failure that is associated with asset-backed securitization and proposes a tailored gov¿t. remedy. The additional liquidity provided by securitization may (or may not) lower primary loan rates. If guarantee-sensitive investors doubt the credit quality of asset-backed bonds, large risk premiums can develop. If a financial crisis ensues, securitization can disappear from the market entirely, leaving banks that originate the highest quality loans as the only source of credit. This abrupt increase in lending standards can tighten credit, exacerbate asset price declines, and impinge on econ. growth. An institutional structure for stemming ¿runs¿ could be deployed to insure pre-specified asset-backed instruments. Illus. This is a print on demand pub.