This reports finds that the Coalition Government has developed in public a more mature and measured relationship with the US, although there has been no fundamental change in the nature of the tie. The Committee declares the relationship to be in good health. In particular, the Committee said that it was not aware of any evidence that the House of Commons vote in August 2013 against potential military action in Syria had damaged the UK's relationship with the US. Rather, the Committee concluded that the episode illustrated general features of the UK-US relationship, namely that developments in the UK could influence US policy; and that the underlying tie was resilient. Today's publication follows up a report produced by the previous Foreign Affairs Committee at the end of the last Parliament, which recommended that the UK Government should adopt a more hard-headed and less deferential approach to the US. The Coalition Government seemed to have taken up this recommendation. The Committee criticises the UK Government's poor provision of information about the UK-US Joint Strategy Board, which was created during President Obama's State Visit to the UK in May 2011. Among strategic issues that it considered, the Committee agreed with the Government that the proposed EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could have significant positive strategic impact for the UK and the transatlantic relationship.

The Work Of The Joint Committee On The National Security Strategy In 2013-14 (HC 169, HL 1257) covers the work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which was established with a broad role; to consider the National Security Strategy. In practice, the Committee has considered not only the National Security Strategy (NSS) document 'A Strong Britain In An Age Of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy' published by the Government in 2010 (see below), but also the wider strategy that underlies government decision making on matters affecting national security. The report gives an account of activities over the past year, highlighting in particular the evidence session with the Prime Minister in January 2014; draws attention to areas of continuing concern; and outlines objectives for the remainder of the Parliament.

Leading academics from around the world, who specialize in analysing maritime strategic issues, deliberate the impact of the American 'pivot' or 're-balance' strategy, and the 'Air-Sea Battle' operational concept, on the maritime power and posture of a number of selected states. Intending to strengthen US economic, diplomatic, and security engagement throughout the Asia-Pacific, both bilaterally and multilaterally, the re-balance stands out as one of the Obama administration's most far-sighted and ambitious foreign policy initiatives.

Andrew Mumford challenges the notion of a “special relationship” between the United States and United Kingdom in diplomatic and military affairs, the most vaunted and, he says, exaggerated of associations in the post-1945 era. Though they are allies to be sure, national self-interest and domestic politics have often undercut their relationship. This is the first book to combine a history of US-UK interaction during major counterinsurgency campaigns since 1945, from Palestine to Iraq and Afghanistan, with a critical examination of the so called special relationship that has been tested during these difficult, protracted, and costly conflicts. Mumford’s assessment of each nation’s internal political discussions and diplomatic exchanges reveals that in actuality there is only a thin layer of specialness at work in the wars that shaped the postcolonial balance of power, the fight against Communism in the Cold War, and the twenty-first-century “war on terror.” This book is especially timely given that the US-UK relationship is once again under scrutiny because of the Trump administration’s “America First” rhetoric and Britain's changing international relations as a result of Brexit. Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance will interest scholars and students of history, international relations, and security studies as well as policy practitioners in the field.

In this report, published on the last day that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has funding responsibility for the World Service, the Foreign Affairs Committee says that it has "clear differences" with the BBC on new arrangements for governance of the World Service. It specifically has reservations about the move to licence fee funding for the World Service and what that would mean for the World Service's budget, and its ability to be heard amongst all the other competing voices within the BBC. The Committee regrets that the World Service now has no direct voice on either the BBC Executive Board or the Management Board, and it says that it "remains to be seen" whether representation of the World Service's interests at Board level by the Director of News and Current Affairs will indeed safeguard the distinct nature of the World Service. The Committee welcomes the assurance given in evidence by James Harding, the BBC's Director of News and Current Affairs, that the £245 million budget for the World Service in 2014-15 will be used as a baseline for the following two years. But what is really needed is longer-term protection at institutional level, and we continue to be concerned about the absence of a direct voice for the World Service on either the BBC's Executive Board or the Management Board

This new work examines how the European states, the United Kingdom and the United States will approach the defence and Security of Europe in the medium and long-term. It is often assumed that Brexit, the United Kingdom’s departure from the political and commercial European Union, would affect defence and security profoundly, but the basis of that assumption is rarely analysed. Bringing together a panel of specialists from Europe, the UK, the EU, and the United States, this volume evaluates the relative position they play in Europe’s defence in the era of Brexit. It examines the arguments, challenges, and problems in European defence, and tests them against the residual commitment, cohesion, and capabilities of the states concerned, including Anglo-French military co-operation, the silent Anglo-German partnership, the US-UK Special Relationship, and the emergent Northern Group.

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a genuine, if developing, democracy. It is also a haven of tolerance and stability in a critically unstable region where those values are needed more than ever. It has huge strategic value to the UK as a bridge to other regional powers, is a key bulwark against ISIL, and has significant oil and gas potential. But it is also vulnerable and needs the support of its friends. It should respond positively to the invitation from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to be its "partner of choice" on trade, education and cultural exchange as well as on defence and intelligence matters. The Kurdistan Region has work to do on developing its democratic culture and its respect for human rights, and UK support should go hand in hand with proof of progress in these areas. The Committee commends the Region's defence force, the Peshmerga, for its defence of Kurdish territory against ISIL and its protection of vulnerable minorities. It supports the UK Government's decision to offer the Peshmerga equipment and training. Advice is also needed from the Kurdistan Region's experts on issues like counter-terrorism and on the situation on the ground in Iraq and Syria. More diplomats need to be working out of a proper office in Erbil instead of hotel rooms. And this is not easily achieved as the FCO has suffered from cuts to its meagre budget at a time when more expertise and high-level co-operation is desperately needed.

Awakening to China's Rise delivers the first post-Cold War history of how Europe's major powers (Britain, France, and Germany) have responded to the perceived security challenge posed by China's rising assertiveness both in the Asia-Pacific and in Europe.

The cuts imposed on the FCO since 2010 have been severe and have gone beyond just trimming fat: capacity now appears to be being damaged. If further cuts are imposed, the UK's diplomatic imprint and influence would probably reduce, and the Government would need to roll back some of its foreign policy objectives. The FCO's budget is a tiny element of Government expenditure, but the FCO makes disproportionate contribution to policy making at the highest level, including decisions on whether to commit to military action. The next Government needs to protect future FCO budgets under the next Spending Review.

In 1966, the UK concluded an Agreement with the United States giving it permission to use the British Indian Ocean Territory, including the island of Diego Garcia, for defence purposes for an initial period of 50 years. Unless the UK or the US takes steps to terminate the Agreement, it will automatically be extended in 2016 for a further twenty years. The disclosure in 2008 that the US had, contrary to previous statements by the FCO, used facilities at Diego Garcia in the course of rendition (the practice of sending a foreign criminal or terrorist suspect covertly to be interrogated in a country with less rigorous regulations for the humane treatment of prisoners) since 2001, dented public confidence in the UK's ability to exercise control over its sovereign territory. If the UK allows the 1966 Agreement to be extended beyond 2016, the text should be revised. It should specify that any extraordinary use of the US base or facilities, requires prior approval from the UK Government; and it should state explicitly that the British Indian Ocean Territory should not be used for rendition unless authority has first been granted by the UK Government, on a case by case basis