When U-234 slipped out of a Norwegian harbor in March 1945 destined for Japan, it was loaded with some of the most technically advanced weaponry and electronic detection devices of the era, along with a select group of officials. En route, word came that Germany had surrendered, and the boat's commander suddenly found himself with a rogue submarine, a precious assortment of cargo, and two Japanese naval officers still at war. This dramatic account of the voyage offers an intriguing look at the individuals involved. One of these individuals was Luftwaffe General Ulrich Kessler, who was a member of Von Stauffeberg's Valkyrie conspiracy to assassinate of Hitler. Kessler was aboard U-234 to escape the wrath of Hitler, because he had been tabbed by Von Stauffeberg to replace Hermann Goering as the commander of the Luftwaffe. Scalia draws on U.S. Navy interrogation records, European and Japanese archives, and interviews with former U-234 crew members and other principals to develop a full portrait of the group. He also evaluates the technology of the armament on board, which included 560 kg. of uranium oxide, whose presence continues to provoke questions about a Nazi plan to build an atom bomb in Japan.

A narrative account of the Doolittle Raids of World War II traces the daring Raiders attack on mainland Japan, the fate of the crews who survived the mission, and the international war crimes trials that defined Japanese-American relations and changed legal history.

In 1944 Allied codebreakers learned the Imperial Japanese Navy had dispatched the cargo submarine I-52 to occupied France with tons of military supplies and payment--in gold--for German assistance. I-52 undertook the mission as part of the Yanagi missions, a military program meant to alleviate Japan's desperate need for military material and technical knowledge. After tracking I-52 from Asia to the Atlantic, the Allies destroyed the vessel in a battle that ended the Yanagi missions and left I-52 an unlikely treasure ship on the seafloor. David W. Jourdan adds to the history of I-52 with a spellbinding account of his efforts to find the sunken submarine. One of the first joint American-Russian research expeditions, the search for the wreck combined a team effort, exhaustive detective work, and a dramatic battle with the sea. The effort paid off when the group found I-52's nearly intact hull three miles down. The expedition also earned an unexpected historical dividend when it uncovered one-of-a-kind recordings of American Avenger torpedo bomber attacks on an enemy submarine. Part war tale and part seagoing adventure, Operation Rising Sun tells the story of the two very different missions to find submarine I-52.

This book seeks to recount air experience and development before World War II, to describe the objectives, plans and effects of air warfare in Europe and in the Pacific, and to offer criticism, opinion, and lessons of that great conflict. The observations in this book constitute a memoir. This book is part of a series of historical volumes published by the United States Air Force, Office of Air Force History.

The first English-language study of German-Japanese interwar relations to employ sources in both languages.

The factors leading to the defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II have been debated for decades. One prevalent view is that overwhelming Allied superiority in materials and manpower doomed the Axis. Another holds that key strategic and tactical blunders lost the war--from Hitler halting his panzers outside Dunkirk, allowing more than 300,000 trapped Allied soldiers to escape, to Admiral Yamamoto falling into the trap set by the U.S. Navy at Midway. Providing a fresh perspective on the war, this study challenges both views and offers an alternative explanation: the Germans, Japanese and Italians made poor design choices in ships, planes, tanks and information security--before and during the war--that forced them to fight with weapons and systems that were too soon outmatched by the Allies. The unprecedented arms race of World War II posed a fundamental "design challenge" the Axis powers sometimes met but never mastered.

Hiroshima is the story of six people—a clerk, a widowed seamstress, a physician, a Methodist minister, a young surgeon, and a German Catholic priest—who lived through the greatest single manmade disaster in history. In vivid and indelible prose, Pulitzer Prize–winner John Hersey traces the stories of these half-dozen individuals from 8:15 a.m. on August 6, 1945, when Hiroshima was destroyed by the first atomic bomb ever dropped on a city, through the hours and days that followed. Almost four decades after the original publication of this celebrated book, Hersey went back to Hiroshima in search of the people whose stories he had told, and his account of what he discovered is now the eloquent and moving final chapter of Hiroshima.

This study of modern Japan traces the impact of defeat and reconstruction on every aspect of Japan's national life. It examines the economic resurgence as well as how the nation as a whole reacted to defeat and the end of a suicidal nationalism.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.