An introduction to one of the most powerful tools in modern economics Game Theory for Applied Economists introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works too abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building—of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Introduces the game-theoretic approach of modelling economic behaviour and interaction, focusing on concepts and ideas from the field of game-theoretic models which find commonly used applications in economics. This book provides the reader with skills necessary to formalize economic games and to make them accessible for game theoretic analysis.

Drawing on examples from current economic literature and politics, this is the first book on game theory at an introductory, but not elementary, level. The author covers topics of great actual or potential use in economics, such as noncooperative games, infinitely repeated games, finitely repeated games, two-person cooperative games, and cooperative games with and without side payments. Thoroughly revised, the new second edition of this authoritative book includes greatly expanded coverage of equilibrium refinements, and the "folk theorem" for repeated games as well as a new chapter on finite noncooperative games.

This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.

A clear, comprehensive introduction to the study of game theory. In the fourth edition, new real-world examples and compelling end-of-chapter exercises engage students with game theory.

Game Theory has been an area of rapid growth and substantial interest in economics and it has impacted upon all areas within economics. This text covers the main theory and techniques and gives particular emphasis to aspects that have been neglected, including co-operative games, experiments, and empirical studies. It provides a comprehensive and up-to-date introduction to the use of game theory in economics.

Comprises lectures given at Tel Aviv University and Oxford University in 1990.

Mathematical economics and game theory approached with the fundamental mathematical toolbox of nonlinear functional analysis are the central themes of this text. Both optimization and equilibrium theories are covered in full detail. The book's central application is the fundamental economic problem of allocating scarce resources among competing agents, which leads to considerations of the interrelated applications in game theory and the theory of optimization. Mathematicians, mathematical economists, and operations research specialists will find that it provides a solid foundation in nonlinear functional analysis. This text begins by developing linear and convex analysis in the context of optimization theory. The treatment includes results on the existence and stability of solutions to optimization problems as well as an introduction to duality theory. The second part explores a number of topics in game theory and mathematical economics, including two-person games, which provide the framework to study theorems of nonlinear analysis. The text concludes with an introduction to non-linear analysis and optimal control theory, including an array of fixed point and subjectivity theorems that offer powerful tools in proving existence theorems.