"First published in Great Britain in 2011 by Profile Books"--T.p. verso.

In early August 1915, after months of stalemate in the trenches on Gallipoli, British and Dominion troops launched a series of assaults in an all-out attempt to break the deadlock and achieve a decisive victory. The ‘August offensive’ resulted in heartbreaking failure and costly losses on both sides. Many of the sites of the bloody struggle became famous names: Lone Pine, the Nek, Chunuk Bair, Hill 60, Suvla Bay. Debate has continued to the present day over the strategy and planning, the real or illusory opportunities for success, and the causes of failure in what became the last throw of the dice for the Allies. Some argue that these costly attacks were a lost opportunity; others maintain that the outcomes were simply inevitable.This new book about the Gallipoli battles arises out of a major international conference at the Australian War Memorial in 2010 to mark the 95th anniversary of the Gallipoli campaign. The conference drew leading military historians from around the world to bring multi-national viewpoints to the many intriguing questions still debated about Gallipoli. Keynote speaker, Professor Robin Prior of the University of Adelaide, author of Gallipoli: the end of the myth (2009), led a range of international authorities from Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, Germany, India and Turkey to present their most recent research findings. The result was significant: never before had such a range of views been presented, with fresh German and Turkish perspectives offered alongside those of British and Australasian historians. For the resulting book, the papers have been edited and the text has been augmented with soldiers’ letters and diary accounts, as well as a large number of photographs and maps.

Our Friend the Enemy is the first detailed history of the Gallipoli campaign at Anzac since Charles Bean’s Official History. Viewed from both sides of the wire and described in first-hand accounts. Australian Captain Herbert Layh recounted that as they approached the beach on 25 April that, once we were behind cover the Turks turned their .. [fire] on us, and gave us a lively 10 minutes. A poor chap next to me was hit three times. He begged me to shoot him, but luckily for him a fourth bullet got him and put him out of his pain. Later that day, Sergeant Charles Saunders, a New Zealand engineer, described his first taste of battle, The Turks were entrenched some 50-100 yards from the edge of the face of the gully and their machine guns swept the edges. Line after line of our men went up, some lines didn’t take two paces over the crest when down they went to a man and on came another line. Gunner Recep Trudal of the Turkish 27th Regiment wrote of the fierce Turkish counter-attack on 19 May designed to push the Anzac’s back into the sea, It started at morning prayer call time, and then it went on and on, never stopped. You know there was no break for eating or anything … Attack was our command. That was what the Pasha said. Once he says “Attack”, you attack, and you either die or you survive.

The fact that governments lie is generally accepted today, but World War I was the first global conflict in which millions of young men were sacrificed for hidden causes. They did not die to save civilization; they were killed for profit and in the hopes of establishing a one-world government. By 1917, America had been thrust into the war by a President who promised to stay out of the conflict. But the real power behind the war consisted of the bankers, the financiers, and the politicians, referred to, in this book, as The Secret Elite. Scouring government papers on both sides of the Atlantic, memoirs that avoided the censor's pen, speeches made in Congress and Parliament, major newspapers of the time, and other sources, Prolonging the Agony maintains that the war was deliberately and unnecessarily prolonged and that the gross lies ingrained in modern "histories" still circulate because governments refuse citizens the truth. Featured in this book are shocking accounts of the alleged Belgian "outrages," the sinking of the Lusitania, the manipulation of votes for Herbert Hoover, Lord Kitchener's death, and American and British zionists in cahoots with Rothschild's manipulated Balfour Declaration. The proof is here in a fully documented exposé—a real history of the world at war.

This work is an extensive analysis of the 1915 British landing at Suvla Bay, one of the most mismanaged and ineffective operations of World War I. Chapters examine the events that led to the landings on the Gallipoli peninsula, provide a comprehensive report on the landings themselves, and analyze the events and decisions contributing to their failure. Appendices provide first-hand accounts of the landings from period news articles, military documents and personal correspondence.

In 1915 the 1st Australian Division led the way ashore at Gallipoli. In 1916 it achieved the first Australian victory on the Western Front at Pozières. It was still serving with distinction in the battles that led to the defeat of the German army in 1918. To Win the Battle explains how the division rose from obscurity to forge a reputation as one of the great fighting formations of the British Empire during the First World War, forming a central part of the Anzac legend. Drawing on primary sources as well as recent scholarship, this fresh approach suggests that the early reputation of Australia's premier division was probably higher than its performance warranted. Robert Stevenson shows that the division's later success was founded on the capacity of its commanders to administer, train and adapt to the changing conditions on the battlefield, rather than on the innate qualities of its soldiers.

The Gallipoli campaign was launched in April 1915 in an effort to knock Turkey out of the war but the force that was deployed was too small to achieve its aim. Moreover, the commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton was at fault in the way he conducted his campaign. Never happier than when he was in the thick of action, Hamilton was an excellent tactician but, by 1915, and in a situation like Gallipoli, his style of leadership was outdated. This book examines why Hamilton failed at Gallipoli and shows how, in spite of that failure and it being his last command, he became a well-respected military prophet who many several perceptive predictions about the future of warfare.

The Great War confronted Australia’s fledgling field and garrison artillery forces with a seemingly insurmountable challenge: to rapidly raise, prepare, deploy and engage in history’s most lethal war to date. By 1915, the Australian artillery entered into a bloody contest of learning and adaptation against resourceful and resolute opponents, where the stakes would be measured in thousands of soldiers’ lives. Far from popularly-held views of the Great War as one of stalemate and stagnation, Clash of the Gods of War: Australian Artillery and the Firepower Lessons of the Great War reveals a dynamic and rapidly evolving battle-scape, as artillery planners on each side sought to combine innovative concepts, technology and tactics into victory. The book draws on an unparalleled array of perspectives on artillery and firepower, presented by Australian and international experts and practitioners over four years during the Firepower: Lessons from the Great War seminar series, commemorating the Centenary of Anzac. From Anzac Cove to the Hindenburg Line, Clash of the Gods of War tells a gripping Australian story of the Great War through the lens of artillery – the most lethal and influential arm of the war – and considers the legacy that its evolutionary journey holds for warfare today.

While the twentieth century’s conflicting visions and exploitation of the Middle East are well documented, the origins of the concept of the Middle East itself have been largely ignored. With Dislocating the Orient, Daniel Foliard tells the story of how the land was brought into being, exploring how maps, knowledge, and blind ignorance all participated in the construction of this imagined region. Foliard vividly illustrates how the British first defined the Middle East as a geopolitical and cartographic region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through their imperial maps. Until then, the region had never been clearly distinguished from “the East” or “the Orient.” In the course of their colonial activities, however, the British began to conceive of the Middle East as a separate and distinct part of the world, with consequences that continue to be felt today. As they reimagined boundaries, the British produced, disputed, and finally dramatically transformed the geography of the area—both culturally and physically—over the course of their colonial era. Using a wide variety of primary texts and historical maps to show how the idea of the Middle East came into being, Dislocating the Orient will interest historians of the Middle East, the British empire, cultural geography, and cartography.