Over the next few years, the United States will be significantly reducing its military forces in Europe from their late-1980s strength of about 300,000 troops. This report considers how far this drawdown should go and how many troops should be left behind, focusing on the post-1995 period. The author develops four options for sizing the future U.S. presence, each representing a distinct choice in terms of policy, strategy, and capability: Forward Presence, Dual-Based Presence, Limited Presence, and Symbolic Presence. The author finds that a strong case can be made for a posture of forward presence, which alone meets the requirements flowing from all U.S. goals while maintaining flexibility for the future. Militarily, this option provides an operationally coherent force that can conduct major independent combat missions in Europe on short notice. Also, this posture provides a wide range of diverse capabilities for meeting peacetime needs, while fulfilling the broad spectrum of crisis and wartime requirements--small and large--that might arise on a time-urgent basis. Politically, this posture is attractive because it projects a weighty U.S. military presence onto the European continent, thereby reminding all nations that the United States is a European power with vital interests there. This posture would also help maintain NATO's unity under U.S. leadership, reassure allies, and credibly warn potential adversaries. It would contribute to maintaining a military balance of power and encouraging a cooperative security architecture in Europe. Finally, it would help foster the kind of geostrategic stability that encourages progress toward a peaceful and united continent in close partnership with the United States.

"There is an ongoing debate about the effects of U.S. military presence on conflict around the globe. In one view, U.S. military presence helps to deter adversaries, restrain U.S. partners from adopting provocative policies, and make it easier for the United States to achieve its aims without the use of force. In another view, U.S. military presence tends to provoke adversaries and encourage allies to adopt more reckless policies, and it increases the likelihood that the United States will be involved in combat. The authors of this report analyze historical data to assess how U.S. military presence -- in particular, U.S. troop presence and military assistance -- is associated with the interstate and intrastate conflict behavior of states and nonstate actors. Troop presence and military assistance have different effects. Stationing U.S. troops abroad may help deter interstate war. A large U.S. regional troop presence may reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict in two ways: by deterring potential U.S. adversaries from initiating interstate wars or by restraining U.S. allies from initiating militarized behavior. However, U.S. military presence may increase interstate militarized activities short of war. U.S. adversaries may be more likely to initiate militarized disputes against states with a larger U.S. in-country troop presence. U.S. troop presence does not appear to reduce the risk of intrastate conflict or affect the level of state repression. U.S. military assistance is not associated with changes in interstate conflict behavior. However, provision of U.S. military assistance may be associated with increased state repression and incidence of civil war. These findings have implications for near-term decisionmaking on U.S. forward troop presence in Europe and Asia."--Publisher's description

At the EU's Helsinki summit in 1999, European leaders took a decisive step toward the development of a new Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) aimed at giving the EU a stronger role in international affairs backed by a credible military force. This report analyzes the processes leading to the ESDP by examining why and how this new European consensus came about. It touches upon the controversies and challenges that still lie ahead. What are the national interests and driving forces behind it, and what steps need to be taken to realize Europe's ambitions to achieve a workable European crisis mgmt. capability?

Mission Failure argues that, in the past 25 years, the U.S. military has turned to missions that are largely humanitarian and socio-political - and that this ideologically-driven foreign policy generally leads to failure.

Between 1991 and 1993, the Army formulated a fighting doctrine recast to fit the power demands of a new strategic world. This new power-order replaced the Army's earlier "AirLand Battle" doctrine, first issued in 1982. This monograph addresses several questions revolving around the rapid replacement, less than 2 years after its success in the desert war, of a recognized and successful fighting doctrine. Discusses the roots of U.S. Army doctrine and the antecedent developments leading to the Army's recasting of its key battle doctrine. Examines the mechanism of the process of change, the effects of the new doctrine and how it was implemented.

This illustrated book that includes tables, charts, and maps primarily discusses the role of USAREUR (US Army Europe) in rearming and training the new German Army which was perhaps the Army's single greatest contribution toward maintaining security in Western Europe. Likewise, the relationship between American soldiers and their French and West German hosts evolved over time and is a critical element in telling the story of the US Army in Europe.

The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.