By substantially increasing defense budgets, the Reagan Admin. (RA) did more than merely underwrite improvements in military forces, it undertook initiatives that changed both the image and reality of America's national defense. This book examines: the Strategic Defense Initiative, the 600 ship Navy, and the hefty increase in the Defense budget. Critics and supporters of the RA do agree on one point: the RA came into office with the intent of strengthening defense policy. How well the RA succeeded in that effort and the cost of that success are debated here.

Updated 12/10/2020: In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that callsfor achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-shipgoal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense AuthorizationAct (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115- 91 of December 12, 2017). The Navy and the Department of Defense(DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal.The new goal is expected to introduce a new, more distributed fleet architecture featuring asmaller proportion of larger ships, a larger proportion of smaller ships, and a new third tier oflarge unmanned vehicles (UVs). On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a document that can beviewed as its vision for future Navy force structure and/or a draft version of the FY202230-year Navy shipbuilding plan. The document presents a Navy force-level goal that callsfor achieving by 2045 a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, 382 to 446 mannedships, and 143 to 242 large UVs. The Administration that takes office on January 20, 2021,is required by law to release the FY2022 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan in connection withDOD's proposed FY2022 budget, which will be submitted to Congress in 2021. In preparingthe FY2022 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Administration that takes office on January 20,2021, may choose to adopt, revise, or set aside the document that was released on December9, 2020. The Navy states that its original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurement ofeight new ships, but this figure includes LPD-31, an LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship thatCongress procured (i.e., authorized and appropriated procurement funding for) in FY2020.Excluding this ship, the Navy's original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurementof seven new ships rather than eight. In late November 2020, the Trump Administrationreportedly decided to request the procurement of a second Virginia-class attack submarinein FY2021. CRS as of December 10, 2020, had not received any documentation from theAdministration detailing the exact changes to the Virginia-class program funding linesthat would result from this reported change. Pending the delivery of that information fromthe administration, this CRS report continues to use the Navy's original FY2021 budgetsubmission in its tables and narrative discussions.

The decades after World War II were a golden age across much of the world. It was a time of economic miracles, an era when steady jobs were easy to find and families could see their living standards improving year after year. And then, around 1973, the good times vanished. The world economy slumped badly, then settled into the slow, erratic growth that had been the norm before the war. The result was an era of anxiety, uncertainty, and political extremism that we are still grappling with today. In An Extraordinary Time, acclaimed economic historian Marc Levinson describes how the end of the postwar boom reverberated throughout the global economy, bringing energy shortages, financial crises, soaring unemployment, and a gnawing sense of insecurity. Politicians, suddenly unable to deliver the prosperity of years past, railed haplessly against currency speculators, oil sheikhs, and other forces they could not control. From Sweden to Southern California, citizens grew suspicious of their newly ineffective governments and rebelled against the high taxes needed to support social welfare programs enacted when coffers were flush. Almost everywhere, the pendulum swung to the right, bringing politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan to power. But their promise that deregulation, privatization, lower tax rates, and smaller government would restore economic security and robust growth proved unfounded. Although the guiding hand of the state could no longer deliver the steady economic performance the public had come to expect, free-market policies were equally unable to do so. The golden age would not come back again. A sweeping reappraisal of the last sixty years of world history, An Extraordinary Time forces us to come to terms with how little control we actually have over the economy.

This latest study in the Brookings series on U.S. defense strategy and the defense budget reviews current American military capabilities and offers suggestions for the new administration and Congress. Michael O'Hanlon makes sense of the hot political topic of military readiness, questions the continued relevance of the current two-war framework for structuring most conventional combat forces, and challenges the wisdom of current plans for the procurement of advanced jet fighters, helicopters, and submarines. The book also focuses on missile defense, other means of homeland defense, the so-called revolution in military affairs, and possible conflicts between Taiwan and China that could involve U.S. forces. Throughout, the author looks for ways to close the gap between the cost of projected U.S. defense forces and the budget actually available to the Pentagon.

First published in 1988, Security & Arms Control in the North Pacific is the first book to focus on the question of North Pacific arms control. Some chapters examine the problems and prospects for arms control in particular states – the USA, erstwhile USSR, China, Japan, the two Koreas, and Canada; others focus on particular issues- the nuclear infrastructure, controlling the arms trade, confidence building, and naval arms control. A unifying theme of this collection is the tension between military and non-military approaches to security, between threat and reassurance and between deterrence and confidence building. This comprehensive book is a must read for scholars and researchers of security studies, defence studies, international politics, and diplomacy.