From Observables to Unobservables in Science and Philosophy focuses on knowing unobservable real things or attributes by means of observing real things or attributes, a topic central to twentieth-century scientific philosophy. Engaging both current and perennial issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of nature and of science, Connell writes from a realist perspective. He adds a cogent, well written, and much needed voice to the current debate over foundationalism from the perspective of the undersubscribed quarter of empirical realism. Principal audiences for this volume will be scholars and graduate students in philosophy, working in the Aristotelian tradition.

Constructive empiricism is not just a view regarding the aim of science; it is also a view regarding the epistemological framework in which one should debate the aim of science. This is the focus of this book – not with scientific truth, but with how one should argue about scientific truth.

Scientists often make surprising claims about things that no one can observe. In physics, chemistry, and molecular biology, scientists can at least experiment on those unobservable entities, but what about researchers in fields such as paleobiology and geology who study prehistory, where no such experimentation is possible? Do scientists discover facts about the distant past or do they, in some sense, make prehistory? In this book Derek Turner argues that this problem has surprising and important consequences for the scientific realism debate. His discussion covers some of the main positions in philosophy of science - realism, social constructivism, empiricism, and the natural ontological attitude - and shows how they relate to issues in paleobiology and geology. His original and thought-provoking book will be of wide interest to philosophers and scientists alike.

This book systematically creates a general descriptive theory of scientific change that explains the mechanics of changes in both scientific theories and the methods of their assessment. It was once believed that, while scientific theories change through time, their change itself is governed by a fixed method of science. Nowadays we know that there is no such thing as an unchangeable method of science; the criteria employed by scientists in theory evaluation also change through time. But if that is so, how and why do theories and methods change? Are there any general laws that govern this process, or is the choice of theories and methods completely arbitrary and random? Contrary to the widespread opinion, the book argues that scientific change is indeed a law-governed process and that there can be a general descriptive theory of scientific change. It does so by first presenting meta-theoretical issues, divided into chapters on the scope, possibility and assessment of theory of scientific change. It then builds a theory about the general laws that govern the process of scientific change, and goes into detail about the axioms and theorems of the theory.

Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. Anjan Chakravartty traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining the most promising strategies adopted by its proponents in response to the forceful challenges of antirealist sceptics, resulting in a positive proposal for scientific realism today. He examines the core principles of the realist position, and sheds light on topics including the varieties of metaphysical commitment required, and the nature of the conflict between realism and its empiricist rivals. By illuminating the connections between realist interpretations of scientific knowledge and the metaphysical foundations supporting them, his book offers a compelling vision of how realism can provide an internally consistent and coherent account of scientific knowledge.

Though science and philosophy take different approaches to ontology, metaphysical inferences are relevant to interpreting scientific work, and empirical investigations are relevant to philosophy. This book argues that there is no uniquely rational way to determine which domains of ontology are appropriate for belief, making room for choice in a transformative account of scientific ontology.

Few can imagine a world without telephones or televisions; many depend on computers and the Internet as part of daily life. Without scientific theory, these developments would not have been possible. In this exceptionally clear and engaging introduction to philosophy of science, James Ladyman explores the philosophical questions that arise when we reflect on the nature of the scientific method and the knowledge it produces. He discusses whether fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge and reality might be answered by science, and considers in detail the debate between realists and antirealists about the extent of scientific knowledge. Along the way, central topics in philosophy of science, such as the demarcation of science from non-science, induction, confirmation and falsification, the relationship between theory and observation and relativism are all addressed. Important and complex current debates over underdetermination, inference to the best explaination and the implications of radical theory change are clarified and clearly explained for those new to the subject.

In this book van Fraassen develops an alternative to scientific realism by constructing and evaluating three mutually reinforcing theories.

This volume addresses philosophical questions raised by the possibility of alien life and extraterrestrial intelligence. The different philosophical perspectives and approaches presented across the chapters will provide a foundation for future work on exophilosophy. Interest in space, space exploration, and alien life has never been greater. In popular culture, for example, it has proven a persistent theme in science fiction films (e.g., Star Trek, Star Wars), books (e.g., H. G. Wells, Arthur C. Clarke, Ray Bradbury), and computer games (e.g., Sid Meier’s Alpha Centauri), as well as bestselling ‘non- fiction’ books (von Däniken’s multimillion-selling Chariots of the Gods?), and hit ‘documentary’ shows (e.g., Ancient Aliens). There has also been persistent interest in these topics amongst scientists with organizations such as NASA and SETI having an enormous impact on both the scientific and popular imagination. Yet, curiously, the topic has received relatively little philosophical attention. Whilst certain aspects of these topics remain within the proper purview of the sciences, a host of philosophical questions are raised by the possibility of alien life and extraterrestrial intelligences, and the possibility of our coming into contact with them. This collection of essays will examine some of these questions whilst laying the groundwork for future study in an as-yet under-researched area of philosophy. Exophilosophy is essential reading for scholars and students with an interest in space and philosophy, especially those working in philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion.

"Churchland and Hooker have collected ten papers by prominent philosophers of science which challenge van Fraassen's thesis from a variety of realist perspectives. Together with van Fraassen's extensive reply . . . these articles provide a comprehensive picture of the current debate in philosophy of science between realists and anti-realists."—Jeffrey Bub and David MacCallum, Foundations of Physics Letters