By illuminating the conflict-resolving mechanisms inherent in the relationships between democracies, Bruce Russett explains one of the most promising developments of the modern international system: the striking fact that the democracies that it comprises have almost never fought each other.

There is a widespread belief, among both political scientists and government policymakers, that "democracies don't fight each other." Here Joanne Gowa challenges that belief. In a thorough, systematic critique, she shows that, while democracies were less likely than other states to engage each other in armed conflicts between 1945 and 1980, they were just as likely to do so as were other states before 1914. Thus, no reason exists to believe that a democratic peace will survive the end of the Cold War. Since U.S. foreign policy is currently directed toward promoting democracy abroad, Gowa's findings are especially timely and worrisome. Those who assert that a democratic peace exists typically examine the 1815-1980 period as a whole. In doing so, they conflate two very different historical periods: the pre-World War I and post-World War II years. Examining these periods separately, Gowa shows that a democratic peace prevailed only during the later period. Given the collapse of the Cold War world, her research calls into question both the conclusions of previous researchers and the wisdom of present U.S. foreign policy initiatives. By re-examining the arguments and data that have been used to support beliefs about a democratic peace, Joanne Gowa has produced a thought-provoking book that is sure to be controversial.

Commencing with Susan Sontag's line that "the only worthwhile answers are those that blow up the questions," ten contributions by UK and US academics critique the "democratic peace" (DP) prescription for inter-state peace of "just add liberal democracy." Contextualizing the DP literature historically and internationally, they call for reassessment of the complex inter-relationships among democracy, liberalism, and war in the global revolution; provide a table summarizing war and democracy by world order periods; and identify directions for future research. Based on US workshops in 1998 and 2000. Barkawi and Laffey are lecturers in international relations, the former at the U. of Wales, Aberystwyth and the latter at the U. of London.--

This reference book analyzes more than a thousand wars waged from 1816 to 2007. It lists and categorizes all violent conflicts with 1,000 or more battle deaths and provides an insightful narrative for each struggle. It describes each encounter and highlights major patterns across eras and regions, identifying which categories of war are becoming more or less prevalent over time, and revealing the connections between the different types of war.

Henderson (political science, Wayne State U.) uses the same basic research design of the democratic peace proposition (DPP)--which contends that democracies rarely fight each other, are generally more peaceful than nondemocracies, and rarely experience civil war--to challenge the validity of the DPP. His results indicate that democracy is not significantly associated with a decreased likelihood of international war, militarized disputes, or civil wars in postcolonial states. He finds that in war between states and nonstate actors, such as colonial and imperial wars, democracies in general are less likely but Western states, specifically, are more likely to become involved in this type of "extrastate" war. He argues that global peace will require more than a worldwide spread of democracy. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Patrick Iber tells the story of left-wing Latin American artists, writers, and scholars who worked as diplomats, advised rulers, opposed dictators, and even led nations during the Cold War. Ultimately, they could not break free from the era’s rigid binaries, and found little room to promote their social democratic ideals without compromising them.

The end of the Cold War has opened up a 'real world laboratory' in which to test and refine general theories of international relations. Using the frameworks provided by structural realism, institutionalism and liberalism, The Post-Cold War International System examines how major powers responded to the collapse of the Soviet Union and developed their foreign policies over the period of post-Cold War transition. The book argues that the democratic peace has begun to generate powerful socialisation effects, due to the emergence of a critical mass of liberal democratic states since the end of the Cold War. The trend this has produced is similar to a pattern that classical realists have interpreted as 'bandwagoning' within a unipolar power structure. Case studies of Germany, China and Japan - identified as key states with the potential to challenge US dominance - provide evidence to support the assessment of international change. The author concludes by exploring the implications of September 11th for the analysis developed. This important volume argues that the end of the Cold War was a major historical turning point in the development of world politics with fundamental implications for the basic way in which the dynamics of the international system are conceptualised.

Examines political philosophies of the classic theorists as a means to understand international dilemmas in the post-Cold War world

This lively survey of the history of conflict between democracies reveals a remarkable--and tremendously important--finding: fully democratic nations have never made war on other democracies. Furthermore, historian Spencer R. Weart concludes in this thought-provoking book, they probably never will. Building his argument on some forty case studies ranging through history from ancient Athens to Renaissance Italy to modern America, the author analyzes for the first time every instance in which democracies or regimes like democracies have confronted each other with military force. Weart establishes a consistent set of definitions of democracy and other key terms, then draws on an array of international sources to demonstrate the absence of war among states of a particular democratic type. His survey also reveals the new and unexpected finding of a still broader zone of peace among oligarchic republics, even though there are more of such minority-controlled governments than democracies in history. In addition, Weart discovers that peaceful leagues and confederations--the converse of war--endure only when member states are democracies or oligarchies. With the help of related findings in political science, anthropology, and social psychology, the author explores how the political culture of democratic leaders prevents them from warring against others who are recognized as fellow democrats and how certain beliefs and behaviors lead to peace or war. Weart identifies danger points for democracies, and he offers crucial, practical information to help safeguard peace in the future.