Foundations of Supply-Side Economics: Theory and Evidence is composed of a series of papers containing both theoretical and empirical analyses of a set of issues in government fiscal policy. The type of analysis employed in the book is standard neoclassical economics, and this analysis is used to study the macroeconomic incentive effects of taxation. The book contains contributions that cover the analysis of the effects of taxes imposed purely for generating revenues; the process of capital formation; and an attempt to integrate supply-side analysis into a traditional macroeconomic framework. Reports on the empirical evidence on taxation and economic activity and the estimation of a small macroeconomic model of the United States for the postwar period; description of a method of calculating effective marginal tax rates on factor incomes using available U.S. data; and the estimation of the effect of fiscal policy on private investment in plant and equipment are presented as well. Economists will find the book highly insightful.

Tax rates, factor employment, market production, and welfare; Taxation in a closed economy interpemporal model with a variable supply of labor to the market sector; A neoclassical model of fiscal policy, employment, and capital accumulation; The revenue effects of the Kennedy tax cuts; Fiscal policy and the labor market; Estimates of effective marginal tax rates on factor incomes; Governmental fiscal policy and private capital formation - some aggregate time-series estimates; Persistent growth rate differentials among states in a national economy with factor mobility; The missing equations: the wedge model alternatie.

Supply-Side Follies is a progressive political and economic challenge to the current George W. Bush policies. It debunks commonly held assumptions of conservative economic policies centered on the obsession that tax cuts led to greater productivity and prosperity. These fundamentally flawed policies are setting the United States up for a major economic downturn in the near future. The 21st century knowledge economy requires a fundamentally different approach to boosting growth than simply cutting taxes on the richest investors. The alternative is not, however, to resurrect old Keynesian, populist economics as too many Democrats hope to do. Rather, as Rob Atkinson makes clear, our long-term national welfare and prosperity depends on new economic strategy that fits the realities of the 21st century global, knowledge-based economy: innovation-based growth economics.

This book explores the origins of Arthur Laffer’s economic theories and how they became a part of mainstream economic policy. Utilizing interviews and archival material, Laffer’s life is traced from his early education through to his time working for the Nixon and Reagan administrations. Laffer’s influence on Reaganomics is discussed alongside the development of supply-side economics, the shift towards neoliberal policies, and the Laffer curve. This book aims to contextualise the work of Laffer within archival research and wider economic trends. It will be relevant researchers and policy makers interested in the history of economic thought and the political economy.

The history we can't afford to forget. At last, the definitive history of supply-side economics—an incredibly timely work that reveals the foundations of America's prosperity when those very foundations are under attack. In the riveting, groundbreaking book Econoclasts, historian Brian Domitrovic tells the remarkable story of the economists, journalists, Washington staffers, and (ultimately) politicians who showed America how to get out of the 1970s stagflation and ushered in an unprecedented quarter-century run of growth and opportunity. Based on the author's years of archival research, Econoclasts is a masterful narrative history in the tradition of Amity Shlaes's The Forgotten Man and John Steele Gordon's An Empire of Wealth.

With over a million copies sold, Economics in One Lesson is an essential guide to the basics of economic theory. A fundamental influence on modern libertarianism, Hazlitt defends capitalism and the free market from economic myths that persist to this day. Considered among the leading economic thinkers of the “Austrian School,” which includes Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich (F.A.) Hayek, and others, Henry Hazlitt (1894-1993), was a libertarian philosopher, an economist, and a journalist. He was the founding vice-president of the Foundation for Economic Education and an early editor of The Freeman magazine, an influential libertarian publication. Hazlitt wrote Economics in One Lesson, his seminal work, in 1946. Concise and instructive, it is also deceptively prescient and far-reaching in its efforts to dissemble economic fallacies that are so prevalent they have almost become a new orthodoxy. Economic commentators across the political spectrum have credited Hazlitt with foreseeing the collapse of the global economy which occurred more than 50 years after the initial publication of Economics in One Lesson. Hazlitt’s focus on non-governmental solutions, strong — and strongly reasoned — anti-deficit position, and general emphasis on free markets, economic liberty of individuals, and the dangers of government intervention make Economics in One Lesson every bit as relevant and valuable today as it has been since publication.

Economic Policy and the Great Stagflation discusses the national economic policy and economics as a policy-oriented science. This book summarizes what economists do and do not know about the inflation and recession that affected the U.S. economy during the years of the Great Stagflation in the mid-1970s. The topics discussed include the basic concepts of stagflation, turbulent economic history of 1971-1976, anatomy of the great recession and inflation, and legacy of the Great Stagflation. The relation of wage-price controls, fiscal policy, and monetary policy to the Great Stagflation is also elaborated. This publication is beneficial to economists and students researching on the history of the Great Stagflation and policy errors of the 1970s.

Suitable for foundation degrees and non-specialist courses for first year undergraduates, this book introduces students to both Microeconomic and Macroeconomic principles. The text is supported by an Online Resource Centre and includes PowerPoint slides, instructors manual and a multiple-choice test bank.

There is an economics that works, that rescued the nation from the depths of the Great Depression, that organized the mobilization of World War II, that executed a successful transition from war to peace, that built the peace into prosperity, that explained the instability and decline, and that predicted the Great Financial Crisis. This economics was abandoned, partly for the benefit of a corporate oligarchy which now controls public policy. This economics now points the way out of stagnation and uncertainty, and it embraces the challenges of world poverty and global climate change. This is the economics of John Maynard Keynes and the new Deal. Demand Side Economics draws the history and explains the thinking of nine great economists. This is a cogent treatment of complex events and concepts that will lead the reader to an understanding of what happened and why. The policy answers it projects are 180 degrees from the austerity, small government and bail-outs for the few that is the current path. Massive private debt has conspired with an orthodox economics that literally ignores that debt to put the world in a financial vise. Public policy is controlled by those who must save an architecture that cannot be saved. Markets have become casinos, with chips provided by central banks, whose players keep the winnings, but shift any losses onto the taxpayer. The foundations of sturdy, stable growth are ignored or abandoned to the detriment of all. Public goods, the Commons, the long-term survival of the planet, and the needs of the world's poor are not costs which must be minimized, but opportunities to create value and organize recovery. It is ignoring the great challenges that is truly unaffordable History, theory, evidence, presented clearly for the reader's own conclusions. We present John Maynard Keynes, the godfather of macoeconomics and Demand Side economics; Leon Keyserling, representing the New Deal and the successful transition from war to prosperity under Harry Truman John Kenneth Galbraith, with his unapologetic look at the character of affluence and the rise of the corporation; Hyman Minsky, exploring his financial instability hypothesis, the main line of Keynes into Finance; Joseph Stiglitz, looking at the cruel hoax of free market capitalism foisted on the developing world; James K. Galbraith, bringing insight into the capture of government by the corporation; George Soros, explaining how markets really work; Steve Keen, developing Minsky and Keynes into compelling economic models that actually predict real outcomes; Nouriel Roubini, taking apart the European debt and banking crisis, and presaging the trouble to come. The book suggest that central bankers do not understand how money is created. Market-first economists imagine an economy that does not exist. General equilibrium forecasters propose an invisible hand that does not exist. Elaborate mathematical expressions of the workings of the economy - "models" - present an elegant description, but of an entirely hypo¬thetical world. Whole schools of economic thought, scores of careers, thousands of academic papers and texts have been built on patently false assumptions. Models commonly used to predict, even in the aftermath of a financial crisis born in the banking system, do not include a banking sector. Massive private debt is ignored, while at the same time the public sector - government - is excoriated for somehow slipping back through time to be the cause of the financial crisis. Jobs, physical and social infrastructure, and preparation for a looming climate crisis are all deemed too expensive to buy directly. This is exactly wrong. The first error of orthodox economics is that the economy is constrained by resources. It is constrained by demand. Direct spending on these critical needs is the route out of this Second Depression. Substantial, disciplined, public demand can right the economy for all sectors, and for our collective future.