This text helps Latin American policymakers meet the challenge of decentralization to improve public sector performance at all levels of government by appropriately assigning jurisdiction over public goods, services, tax authority and user charges.

This book explores the politics of fiscal authority, focusing on the centralization of taxation in Latin America during the twentieth century. The book studies this issue in great detail for the case of Mexico. The political (and fiscal) fragmentation associated with civil war at the beginning of the century was eventually transformed into a highly centralized regime. The analysis shows that fiscal centralization can best be studied as the consequence of a bargain struck between self-interested regional and national politicians. Fiscal centralization was more extreme in Mexico than in most other places in the world, but the challenges and problems tackled by Mexican politicians were not unique. The book thus analyzes fiscal centralization and the origins of intergovernmental financial transfers in the other Latin American federal regimes, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. The analysis sheds light on the factors that explain the consolidation of tax authority in developing countries.

Public sector decentralization has emerged prominently in many Asian and Latin American countries as a strategy to promote development and political reform. Results in both cases have been mixed. Despite broad similarities in intent and outcome, contextual differences between the regions have led to striking differences in the way decentralization has been structured and implemented. This volume takes an atypically historical and interdisciplinary perspective on decentralization, highlighting how fiscal and political forces together have been shaping its evolution in the two regions.

Offers a comprehensive, region-wide analysis of the politics of taxation in Latin America to make reforms politically palatable and sustainable.

'This volume provides a splendid and wide-ranging collection of studies analyzing the political-economy of decentralization in Latin-America. It's a fascinating story with numerous and profound insights into how fiscal decentralization actually works in the context of a variety of fiscal institutions and in a setting with a high degree of inequality in the distribution of income and territorial disparities.' - Wallace E. Oates, University of Maryland, US

Leading scholars and practitioners examine constitutional design and taxing, spending, and regulatory responsibilities at the federal, state/provincial, and local/municipal levels in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. This volume also explores the effects of intergovernmental fiscal relations on securing economic unions and improving social welfare.

"51 Imperfect Solutions told stories about specific state and federal individual constitutional rights, and explained two benefits of American federalism: how two sources of constitutional protection for liberty and property rights could be valuable to individual freedom and how the state courts could be useful laboratories of innovation when it comes to the development of national constitutional rights. This book tells the other half of the story. Instead of focusing on state constitutional individual rights, this book takes on state constitutional structure. Everything in law and politics, including individual rights, comes back to divisions of power and the evergreen question: Who decides? The goal of this book is to tell the structure side of the story and to identify the shifting balances of power revealed when one accounts for American constitutional law as opposed to just federal constitutional law. The book contains three main parts-on the judicial, executive, and legislative branches-as well as stand-alone chapters on home-rule issues raised by local governments and the benefits and burdens raised by the ease of amending state constitutions. A theme in the book is the increasingly stark divide between the ever-more democratic nature of state governments and the ever-less democratic nature of the federal government over time"--

Tulia G. Falleti explains the different trajectories of decentralization processes in post-developmental Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, and why their outcomes diverged so markedly.

Using theoretical essays and case studies, the authors address questions of how and when federal institutions matter for politics, policy-making and democratic practice. They also offer conceptual approaches for studying federal systems, their origins and their internal dynamics. We live in an increasingly federalized world. This fact has generated interest in how federal institutions shape politics, policy-making and the quality of life of those living in federal systems. In this book, Edward L. Gibson brings together a group of scholars to examine the Latin American experience with federalism and to advance our theoretical understanding of politics in federal systems. By means of theoretical essays and case studies, the authors address questions of how and when federal institutions matter for politics, policy-making and democratic practice. They also offer conceptual approaches for studying federal systems, their origins and their internal dynamics. The book provides case studies on the four existing federal systems in Latin America - Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela - and their experiences in dealing with a variety of issues, including federal system formation, democratization, electoral representation and economic reform.

This theoretically inspired study explores legislative politics in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Instead of beginning with an assumption that these legislatures are either rubber-stamps or obstructionist bodies, the chapters provide new data and a fresh analytical approach to describe and explain the role of these representative bodies in these consolidating democracies. For each country the book provides three chapters dedicated, in turn, to executive-legislative relations, the legislatures' organizational structure, and the policy process.