Learning the Lessons of Modern War uses the study of the recent past to illuminate the future. More specifically, it examines the lessons of recent wars as a way of understanding continuity and change in the character and conduct of war. The volume brings together contributions from a group of well-known scholars and practitioners from across the world to examine the conduct of recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, South America, and Asia. The book's first section consists of chapters that explore the value of a contemporary approach to history and reflect on the value of learning lessons from the past. Its second section focuses on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapters on Iraq discuss the lessons of the Iraq War, the British perspective on the conflict, and the war as seen through the lens of Saddam Hussein's military. Chapters on Afghanistan discuss counterinsurgency operations during the war, Britain's experience in Afghanistan, raising and training Afghan forces, and U.S. interagency performance. The book's third section examines the lessons of wars involving Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Georgia, and Colombia. It concludes by exploring overarching themes associated with the conduct of recent wars. Containing a foreword by former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, Learning the Lessons of Modern War is an indispensable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, policymakers, and military professionals.

Examines the experiences of seven national leaders during the First World War

As Army Chief of Staff during the Korean war, General Collins directly monitored operations in the Far East for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He describes the actions of President Truman, Dean Acheson, George C. Marshall, Robert Lovett, Omar Bradley and the field commanders: Walton Walker’s desperate defense of the Pusan perimeter, MacArthur’s brilliant success at Inchon and disaster at the Yalu river and Ridgway taking over from MacArthur to rebuild the morale of a dispirited army. “General Collins... has produced an absorbing book which will be of great interest to the general reader... The book is clearly written... and covers its subject well.” — Denis Stairs, International Journal “[A] superior memoir of policy making on Korea.” — Richard K. Betts, The American Historical Review “[T]he story is told in compact and clear fashion, from the broadest standpoint and in gripping detail, and is supported by excellent cartography... Collins weaves an extremely useful account of his own role within the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. He is particularly informative on the unified department of defense... If he was a cold-war warrior, Collins was of the most responsible breed: a general of intelligence and balance who recoiled from the insanity of playing with global fire.” — Alvin D. Coox, The American Historical Review “This volume should not be missed by those of our citizens who want a view of the Korean war from the vantage point of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army at that time.” — Virgil Ney, Ordnance “As a primary source for decision-making studies and American historians, the book has self-evident value.” — Kirkus

A comparison of nine leaders who led their nations through the greatest wars the world has ever seen and whose unique strengths—and weaknesses—shaped the course of human history, from the bestselling, award-winning author of Churchill, Napoleon, and The Last King of America “Has the enjoyable feel of a lively dinner table conversation with an opinionated guest.” —The New York Times Book Review Taking us from the French Revolution to the Cold War, Andrew Roberts presents a bracingly honest and deeply insightful look at nine major figures in modern history: Napoleon Bonaparte, Horatio Nelson, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, George C. Marshall, Charles de Gaulle, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Margaret Thatcher. Each of these leaders fundamentally shaped the outcome of the war in which their nation was embroiled. Is war leadership unique, or did these leaders have something in common, traits and techniques that transcend time and place and can be applied to the essential nature of conflict? Meticulously researched and compellingly written, Leadership in War presents readers with fresh, complex portraits of leaders who approached war with different tactics and weapons, but with the common goal of success in the face of battle. Both inspiring and cautionary, these portraits offer important lessons on leadership in times of struggle, unease, and discord. With his trademark verve and incisive observation, Roberts reveals the qualities that doom even the most promising leaders to failure, as well as the traits that lead to victory.

Roland Bartetzko is a former soldier with the German Army, the Kosovo Liberation Army, and Croatian Defense Council and took part in extensive engagements during the conflicts in the Balkans. These are his memories of dangerous, deadly, and sometimes funny times. It is the true story of what the war was like in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Combined with the stories are his 'observations' about the military tactics that were applied in these conflicts. They provide practical advice for soldiers and civilians on how to survive in a war zone.

Personal account by the U.S. Air Force general who planned and executed 1991 Persian Gulf War with emphasis on use of technology and new strategies as they apply to modern warfare.

In Lessons from the Vietnam War: Truths the Media Never Told You, decorated Vietnam veteran Leonard M. Scruggs tells the gripping and ultimately tragic story of America's military involvement in Southeast Asia from 1960 to its heartbreaking conclusion in 1975.

Become a Better Martial Artist by Applying Lessons from the World's Greatest Military Strategists from Sun Tzu to Von Clausewitz Lessons in the Art of War investigates the theories and philosophies of the most prominent military thinkers in Asia and Europe and examines the combat roots of a variety of fighting styles from traditional Chinese, Japanese, and Korean martial arts to the fighting arts of the ancient Greeks and modern Israelis. It also demonstrates how the martial arts, whether Asian or Western in origin, were historically about brutal fighting, often to the death, and how ancient attitudes and beliefs can be adapted for success in today's MMA steel cage, judo or karate tournament as they were in ancient armies. Including an introduction to Asian and Western military thought, chapters include: The Nature and Conduct of Combat What is Combat? Preparing for Battle Elements of Tactics and Strategy Imposing Your Will Destroying the Enemy Force Strength of the Defensive Position Failure Moral Quality of Courage Securing Victory

A concise survey of the culture and civilization of mankind, The Lessons of History is the result of a lifetime of research from Pulitzer Prize–winning historians Will and Ariel Durant. With their accessible compendium of philosophy and social progress, the Durants take us on a journey through history, exploring the possibilities and limitations of humanity over time. Juxtaposing the great lives, ideas, and accomplishments with cycles of war and conquest, the Durants reveal the towering themes of history and give meaning to our own.

Colonel Pat Proctor’s long overdue critique of the Army’s preparation and outlook in the all-volunteer era focuses on a national security issue that continues to vex in the twenty-first century: Has the Army lost its ability to win strategically by focusing on fighting conventional battles against peer enemies? Or can it adapt to deal with the greater complexity of counterinsurgent and information-age warfare? In this blunt critique of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, Proctor contends that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army stubbornly refused to reshape itself in response to the new strategic reality, a decision that saw it struggle through one low-intensity conflict after another—some inconclusive, some tragic—in the 1980s and 1990s, and leaving it largely unprepared when it found itself engaged—seemingly forever—in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first book-length study to connect the failures of these wars to America’s disastrous performance in the war on terror, Proctor’s work serves as an attempt to convince Army leaders to avoid repeating the same mistakes.