In a recently released New York Fed staff report, we present a forward-looking monitoring program to identify and track time-varying sources of systemic risk.

We present a forward-looking monitoring program to identify and track the sources of systemic risk over time and to facilitate the development of preemptive policies to promote financial stability. We offer a framework that distinguishes between shocks, which are difficult to prevent, and vulnerabilities, which amplify shocks. Building on substantial research, we focus on leverage, maturity transformation, interconnectedness, complexity, and the pricing of risk as the primary vulnerabilities in the financial system. The monitoring program tracks these vulnerabilities in four areas: the banking sector, shadow banking, asset markets, and the nonfinancial sector. The framework also highlights the policy trade-off between reducing systemic risk and raising the cost of financial intermediation by taking preemptive actions to reduce vulnerabilities.

This paper describes the conceptual framework that guides assessments of financial stability risks for multilateral surveillance, as currently presented in the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR). The framework emphasizes consistency in measuring financial vulnerabilities across countries and over time and offers a summary statistic to quantify aggregate financial stability risks. The two parts of the empirical approach—a matrix of specific vulnerabilities and a summary measure of financial stability risks—are distinct but highly complementary for monitoring and policymaking.

The Dodd Frank Act (DFA) broadens the regulatory reach to reduce systemic risks to the U.S. financial system, but it does not address some important risks that could migrate to or emanate from entities outside the federal safety net. At the same time, the Act limits the types of interventions by financial authorities to address systemic events when they occur. As a result, a broad and forward-looking monitoring program, which seeks to identify financial vulnerabilities and guide the development of pre-emptive policies to help mitigate them, is essential. Systemic vulnerabilities, when hit by adverse shocks, can lead to fire sale dynamics, negative feedback loops, and inefficient contractions in the supply of credit. This study presents a framework that centers on the vulnerabilities that propagate adverse shocks, rather than shocks themselves, which are difficult to predict. This framework also highlights how policies that reduce the likelihood of systemic crises may do so only by raising the cost of financial intermediation in non-crisis periods. Figures. This is a print on demand report.

Financial soundness indicators (FSIs) are methodological tools that help quantify and qualify the soundness and vulnerabilities of financial systems according to five areas of interests: capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. With support from the Investment Climate Facilitation Fund under the Regional Cooperation and Integration Financing Facility, this report describes the development of FSIs for Viet Nam and analyzes the stability and soundness of the Vietnamese banking system by using these indicators. The key challenges to comprehensively implementing reforms and convincingly addressing the root causes of the banking sector problems include (i) assessing banks' recapitalization needs, (ii) revising classification criteria to guide resolution options, (iii) recapitalization and restructuring that may include foreign partnerships, (iv) strengthening the Vietnam Asset Management Company, (v) developing additional options to deal with nonperforming loans, (vi) tightening supervision to ensure a sound lending practice, (vii) revamping the architecture and procedures for crisis management, and (viii) strengthening financial safety nets during the reform process.

The October 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) identifies the current key vulnerabilities in the global financial system as the rise in corporate debt burdens, increasing holdings of riskier and more illiquid assets by institutional investors, and growing reliance on external borrowing by emerging and frontier market economies. The report proposes that policymakers mitigate these risks through stricter supervisory and macroprudential oversight of firms, strengthened oversight and disclosure for institutional investors, and the implementation of prudent sovereign debt management practices and frameworks for emerging and frontier market economies.

An accessible and detailed overview of the risks posed by financial institutions Understanding Systemic Risk in Global Financial Markets offers an accessible yet detailed overview of the risks to financial stability posed by financial institutions designated as systemically important. The types of firms covered are primarily systemically important banks, non-banks, and financial market utilities such as central counterparties. Written by Aron Gottesman and Michael Leibrock, experts on the topic of systemic risk, this vital resource puts the spotlight on coherency, practitioner relevance, conceptual explanations, and practical exposition. Step by step, the authors explore the specific regulations enacted before and after the credit crisis of 2007-2009 to promote financial stability. The text also examines the criteria used by financial regulators to designate firms as systemically important. The quantitative and qualitative methods to measure the ongoing risks posed by systemically important financial institutions are surveyed. A review of the regulations that identify systemically important financial institutions The tools to use to detect early warning indications of default A review of historical systemic events their common causes Techniques to measure interconnectedness Approaches for ranking the order the institutions which pose the greatest degree of default risk to the industry Understanding Systemic Risk in Global Financial Markets offers a must-have guide to the fundamentals of systemic risk and the key critical policies that work to reduce systemic risk and promoting financial stability.

This paper discusses the findings of the Financial System Stability Assessment for Sweden. The Swedish financial system is large and highly interconnected, putting a premium on the accompanying policy framework. Relative to the size of the domestic economy, the financial system is among Europe’s largest. It features complex domestic and international linkages, reflecting Sweden’s role as a regional financial hub. However, the macrofinancial risks have grown since 2011, for example the rising share of highly indebted households. Stress tests also suggest that banks and nonbanks are largely resilient to solvency shocks, but concerns persist about the ability of bank models to capture unexpected losses.