Economists have begun to make much greater use of experimental methods in their research. This collection surveys these methods and shows how they can help us to understand firm behaviour in relation to various forms of competition policy.

This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided.

This volume contains a selection of papers that were presented at the CRESSE Conferences held in Chania, Crete, from July 6th to 8th, 2012, and in Corfu from July 5th to 7th, 2013. The chapters address current policy issues in competition and regulation. The book contains contributions at the frontier of competition economics and regulation and provides perspectives on recent research findings in the field. Written by experts in their respective fields, the book brings together current thinking on market forces at play in imperfectly competitive industries, how firms use anti-competitive practices to their advantage and how competition policy and regulation can address market failures. It provides an in-depth analysis of various ongoing debates and offers fresh insights in terms of conceptual understanding, empirical findings and policy implications. The book contributes to our understanding of imperfectly competitive markets, anti-competitive practices and competition policy and regulation.

A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.

This outstanding collection of original essays brings together some of the leading experts in competition economics, policy and law. They examine what lies at the core of the .economic approach to competition law' and deal with its normative and institutional limitations. In recent years the more .economic approach' has led to a modernisation of competition law throughout the world. This book comprehensivelyexamines for the first time, the foundations and limitations of the approach and will be of great interest to scholars of competition policy no matter what discipline. Competition Policy and the Economic Approach will appeal to academics in competition economics and law, policy-makers and practitioners in the field of antitrust/competition law as well as postgraduate students in competition law and economics. Those interested in the interplay of law and economicsin the field of competition will also find this book invaluable.

For thirty years, the British economy has repeated the same old experiment of subjecting everything to competition and market because that is what works in the imagination of central government. This book demonstrates the repeated failure of that experiment by detailed examination of three sectors: broadband, food supply and retail banking. The book argues for a new experiment in social licensing whereby the right to trade in foundational activities would be dependent on the discharge of social obligations in the form of sourcing, training and living wages. Written by a team of researchers and policy advocates based at the Centre for Research on Socio Cultural Change, this book combines rigour and readability, and will be relevant to practitioners, policy makers, academics and engaged citizens.

A theoretical and empirical study of the effects of competition across a broad range of industries. Policies to promote competition are high on the political agenda worldwide. But in a constantly changing marketplace, the effects of more intense competition on firm conduct, market structure, and industry performance are often hard to distinguish. This study combines game-theoretic models with empirical evidence from a "natural experiment" of policy reform. The introduction in the United Kingdom of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act led to the registration and subsequent abolition of explicit restrictive agreements between firms and the intensification of price competition across a range of manufacturing industries. An equally large number of industries were not affected by the legislation. Using data from before and after the 1956 act, this book compares the two groups of industries to determine the effect of price competition on concentration, firm and plant numbers, profitability, advertising intensity, and innovation. The book avoids two problems common to empirical studies of competition: how to measure the intensity of competition and how to unravel the links between competition and other variables. Because the change in the intensity of competition had an external cause, there is no need to measure the intensity of competition directly, and it is possible to identify one-way causal effects when estimating the impact of competition. The book also examines issues such as the industries in which collusion is more likely to occur; the effect of cartels and cartel laws on market structure and profitability; the links between competition, advertising, and innovation; and the constraints on the exercise of merger and antitrust policies.

Offering a concise and critical comparison of EU competition law and US antitrust law from an economic perspective, this is the ideal textbook for international and interdisciplinary courses combining law and economic approaches.

This book combines practical guidance and theoretical background for analysts using empirical techniques in competition and antitrust investigations. Peter Davis and Eliana Garcés show how to integrate empirical methods, economic theory, and broad evidence about industry in order to provide high-quality, robust empirical work that is tailored to the nature and quality of data available and that can withstand expert and judicial scrutiny. Davis and Garcés describe the toolbox of empirical techniques currently available, explain how to establish the weight of pieces of empirical work, and make some new theoretical contributions. The book consistently evaluates empirical techniques in light of the challenge faced by competition analysts and academics--to provide evidence that can stand up to the review of experts and judges. The book's integrated approach will help analysts clarify the assumptions underlying pieces of empirical work, evaluate those assumptions in light of industry knowledge, and guide future work aimed at understanding whether the assumptions are valid. Throughout, Davis and Garcés work to expand the common ground between practitioners and academics.

The Research Handbook on International Competition Law brings together leading academics, practitioners and competition officials to discuss the most recent developments in international competition law and policy. This comprehensive Handbook explores the dynamics of international cooperation and national enforcement. It identifies initiatives that led to the current state of collaboration and also highlights current and future challenges. The Handbook features twenty-two contributions on topical subjects including: competition in developed and developing economies, enforcement trends, advocacy and regional and multinational cooperation. In addition, selected areas of law are explored from a comparative perspective. These include intellectual property and competition law, the pharmaceutical industry, merger control worldwide and the application of competition law to agreements and dominant market position. Presenting an overview of the current state of cooperation and convergence as well as a comparative analysis of substance and procedure, this authoritative Handbook will prove an invaluable reference tool for academics, competition officials and practitioners who focus on international competition law.