This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

Wigmore's great work continues to influence the law of evidence as we move into the 21st century. From doctrinal considerations such as the nature of inference and the exclusionary rules to case analysis involving such lap-to-the-minute controversies as DNA fingerprinting and patient-psychotherapist privilege, this annually supplemented masterwork continues to provide authoritative guidance again and again. With the most comprehensive coverage you'll find anywhere, Wigmore's plan encompasses all this and more: Admissibility -- Relevancy -- Circumstantial evidence -- Character or disposition as evidence -- Opportunity -- Alibi -- Proving capacity, design, or intent -- Proving knowledge, belief, or consciousness -- Proving motive, feeling, or passion -- Proving identity -- Mental derangement or immaturity -- Moral depravity -- Testimonial recollection -- Confessions -- Impeachment -- Proving bias, corruption, or interest -- Contradiction and self-contradiction -- Rehabilitation -- The hearsay rule and its exceptions -- Opinions -- Authentication of documents -- Privilege -- Confidential communications -- Burdens and presumptions.

Honorable Mention, 2017 Scribes Book Award, The American Society of Legal Writers At the dawn of the twentieth century, the United States was reeling from the effects of rapid urbanization and industrialization. Time-honored verities proved obsolete, and intellectuals in all fields sought ways to make sense of an increasingly unfamiliar reality. The legal system in particular began to buckle under the weight of its anachronism. In the midst of this crisis, John Henry Wigmore, dean of the Northwestern University School of Law, single-handedly modernized the jury trial with his 1904-5 Treatise onevidence, an encyclopedic work that dominated the conduct of trials. In so doing, he inspired generations of progressive jurists—among them Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Cardozo, and Felix Frankfurter—to reshape American law to meet the demands of a new era. Yet Wigmore’s role as a prophet of modernity has slipped into obscurity. This book provides a radical reappraisal of his place in the birth of modern legal thought.

Criminal procedure in the common law world is being recast in the image of human rights. The cumulative impact of human rights laws, both international and domestic, presages a revolution in common law procedural traditions. Comprising 16 essays plus the editors' thematic introduction, this volume explores various aspects of the 'human rights revolution' in criminal evidence and procedure in Australia, Canada, England and Wales, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Singapore, Scotland, South Africa and the USA. The contributors provide expert evaluations of their own domestic law and practice with frequent reference to comparative experiences in other jurisdictions. Some essays focus on specific topics, such as evidence obtained by torture, the presumption of innocence, hearsay, the privilege against self-incrimination, and 'rape shield' laws. Others seek to draw more general lessons about the context of law reform, the epistemic demands of the right to a fair trial, the domestic impact of supra-national legal standards (especially the ECHR), and the scope for reimagining common law procedures through the medium of human rights. This edited collection showcases the latest theoretically informed, methodologically astute and doctrinally rigorous scholarship in criminal procedure and evidence, human rights and comparative law, and will be a major addition to the literature in all of these fields.

Identifies and evaluates the psychological choices implicit in the rules of evidence Evidence law is meant to facilitate trials that are fair, accurate, and efficient, and that encourage and protect important societal values and relationships. In pursuit of these often-conflicting goals, common law judges and modern drafting committees have had to perform as amateur applied psychologists. Their task has required them to employ what they think they know about the ability and motivations of witnesses to perceive, store, and retrieve information; about the effects of the litigation process on testimony and other evidence; and about our capacity to comprehend and evaluate evidence. These are the same phenomena that cognitive and social psychologists systematically study. The rules of evidence have evolved to restrain lawyers from using the most robust weapons of influence, and to direct judges to exclude certain categories of information, limit it, or instruct juries on how to think about it. Evidence law regulates the form of questions lawyers may ask, filters expert testimony, requires witnesses to take oaths, and aims to give lawyers and factfinders the tools they need to assess witnesses’ reliability. But without a thorough grounding in psychology, is the “common sense” of the rulemakers as they create these rules always, or even usually, correct? And when it is not, how can the rules be fixed? Addressed to those in both law and psychology, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law draws on the best current psychological research-based knowledge to identify and evaluate the choices implicit in the rules of evidence, and to suggest alternatives that psychology reveals as better for accomplishing the law’s goals.

Originally published: 5th ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1956.

In this important book, a distinguished legal scholar examines how the legal culture and institutions in Anglo-American countries affect the way in which evidence is gathered, sifted, and presented to the courts. Mirjan Damaska focuses on the significance of the divided tribunal (between judge and jury), the concentrated character of trials ("day-in-court" justice), and the prominent role of the parties in adjudication (the adversary system). Throughout he contrasts the Anglo-American system with civil law justice, where lay fact finders sit with professional judges in unified tribunals, proceedings are episodic rather than concentrated, and the parties have fewer responsibilities than in the common law tradition.