Asian business conglomerates have clearly been successful agents of growth, mobilizing capital, borrowing technology from abroad and spearheading Asia's exports. However, these firms have long had a number of organisational and financial weaknesses, including heavy reliance on debt, that make them vulnerable to shocks. Nowhere was this more true than in Korea, where the large corporate groups known as chaebol have dominated the economic landscape. This collection of essays by leading political scientists and economists provides a comprehensive look at the chaebol problem in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. The authors consider the historical evolution of the chaebol and their contribution to the onset of economic turmoil in 1997. The book analyses the government's short-run response to corporate and financial distress, and outlines an agenda for longer-term reform of the financial system, corporate governance and the politics of business-government relations.

The 1997 South Korean financial crisis not only shook the country itself but also sent shock waves through the financial world at large. This impressive book critically assesses the conventional wisdom surrounding the Korean crisis and the performance of the IMF-sponsored reform programme.Looking first at the strengths and weaknesses of 'Korea Inc.

Sea-Jin Chang argues that the Korean financial crisis of 1997 was due to the inertia of both the business groups known as chaebols and the Korean government which prevented adaptation to changing external environments. Once the Korean government stopped central economic planning and pursued economic liberalization in the 1980s, the transition created a void under which neither the government nor markets could monitor chaebols' investment activities. The intricate web of cross-shareholding, debt guarantees, and vertical integration resulted in extensive cross-subsidization and kept chaebols from shedding unprofitable businesses. The government's continued interventions in banks' lending practices created 'moral hazards' for both chaebols and banks. This treatment demonstrates how the structure of chaebols later inhibited other adaptations and for all practical purposes became nearly dysfunctional. The book argues that restructuring of chaebols should focus on improving corporate governance systems. After such restructuring, the author predicts, chaebols will re-emerge as stronger, more focused global players.

This book chronicles how Korea dealt with and overcame the crisis over time. The book is organized into eleven chapters. Chapter one outlines the troubling financial market conditions at home and abroad before the crisis. Chapter two then delves into the origin of the crisis and offers analyses on the shortcomings of the Korean economy and the instability of the international financial system. In chapter three, policy measures the government executed in the wake of the onset of the crisis are described and analyzed. Chapter four probes the steps taken to reduce the risk of sovereign insolvency in the face of the cool market reaction to the initial package of crisis response measures announced by the International Monetary Fund in December 1997. Chapter five describes the background within which the government established the institutional framework necessary for corporate, financial, and labor market restructuring between December 1997 and April 1998. The government efforts to secure additional foreign currency liquidity through the markets and to devise initiatives to counter the massive unemployment are discussed in detail. In chapter six, the situation during May and June 1998 is explored with a focus on the closure of nonviable corporate and financial companies and the efforts to drive down interest rates and revive credit flows. This is followed, in chapter seven, by an analysis of the first phase of financial sector restructuring, which started in the third quarter of 1998, and the measures adopted to shore up potential growth and cope with the pressing problem of unemployment. Chapters eight and nine deal separately with the restructuring of the top five chaebols (the large family-controlled and family-run groups that dominate business in Korea), the economic stimulus packages applied during the fourth quarter of 1998, the efforts to restore financial market stability and economic growth, and the initial phase of foreign exchange liberalization measures, which were implemented during the first half of 1999. Chapter ten then discusses the situation during the second half of 1999, with a particular focus on the collapse of the Daewoo business group, including the steps taken to contain the resulting fallout, as well as measures aimed at expanding the economic recovery. Chapter eleven, the final chapter, offers a diagnosis of the Korean economy, along with an analysis of the policy implications and the responses for the future.

After years of strong performance, Korea’s economy entered a crisis in 1997, owing largely to structural problems in its financial and corporate sectors. These problems emerged in the second half of that year, when the capital inflows that had helped finance Korea’s growth were reversed, as foreign investors—reeling from losses in other Southeast Asian economies—decided to reduce their exposure to Korea. This paper focuses on the sources of the crisis that originated in the financial sector, the measures taken to deal with it, and the evolution of key banking and financial variables in its aftermath.

More than five years have passed since South Korea fell prey to the Asian financial crisis. Bringing together experts from Korea and a variety of other countries, this book aims to better understand the three stages of the Korean crisis: the onset, the policy reaction, and the economic response. Providing an integrated analysis of the event and its consequences, the chapters in the book consider the causes of the crisis, the response of the US government and International Monetary Fund, adjustments in the Korean monetary and fiscal policies, and the success of financial and corporate restructuring. The concluding chapters bring the story up-to-date, describing the aftermath of the crisis and assessing whether there has been sufficient reform to facilitate the country s recovery and growth. International and also Asian economists will find this a thoroughly accessible and illuminating book, as will specialists on Korea, political scientists and political economists.

'Business Groups in East Asia' examines some East Asian business groups and their subsequent restructuring following the Asian Crisis of 1997. This crisis affected the inter-relationships among the socio-cultural environment, the state and the market of each country quite differently.

An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.

The 1990s saw lower- and middle-income countries throughout the world come under pressure to open their domestic markets to international trade and investment. Despite the progressive implementation of market-friendly policies, many emerging market countries experienced financial market volatility, exchange rate collapse, and slumps in output. These problems profoundly affected two of the world's largest middle-income industrialized countries —Brazil and South Korea. Despite superficial similarities, prior to the onset of crisis both countries had very different models of industrialization and had adopted contrasting approaches to trade and market reform.This collection analyzes the factors underlying the economic crises in South Korea and Brazil, pointing out areas of similarity and divergence. It also reviews the paths of recovery taken by both economies, examining the role of policy and variations in structural characteristics. Contributors include André Averburg (United Nations Development Programme/ Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, Brazil), Fabio Giambiagi (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social), Andrea Goldstein (OECD Development Centre), Louise Haagh (Department of Politics, University of York), Tat Yan Kong (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London), José Ricardo Ramalho (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Ben Ross Schneider (Center for International and Comparative Studies, Northwestern University), and Jaang-Sup Shin (Department of Economics, National University of Singapore).

"This informative book will appeal to academics and researchers of industrial organization, economics and corporate reform as well as those involved in Asian studies."--BOOK JACKET.