In the wake of 11 September 2001, the issue of homeland security spawned a vibrant public discussion about the need to coordinate a wide range of federal governmental activities to achieve greater security for the United States. Congress enacted laws that established a new executive department, the Department of Homeland Security, and a new federal intelligence chief, the director of national intelligence. In both cases, the objective was to integrate activities of disparate organizations better in order to improve critical government functions. In fact, for more than half a century, there have been numerous efforts to enhance cooperation among the many parts of the nation's intelligence establishment under the leadership of a principal intelligence official, called the director of central intelligence. The story of this study is what the nation's leaders expected of directors of central intelligence in accomplishing this task, and how those who held the responsibility attempted to carry it out. The hope is that lessons drawn from that experience can inform today's ongoing debate about how best the new director of national intelligence can accomplish America's national intelligence mission. The study presents an unusual perspective. Examinations of past intelligence performance often focus on how intelligence has played a role in specific circumstances. Studies of directors of central intelligence have usually stressed how they led the Central Intelligence Agency, conducted their relationships with the president, or affected US policy. No study until this one has focused on how each director sought to fulfill his "community" role. This book was prepared under the auspices of the Center for the Study of Intelligence by Dr. Douglas F. Garthoff, a former CIA analyst and senior manager. It reflects the author's deep experience in Intelligence Community affairs as well as his extensive research and interviews. Dr. Garthoff's study represents a valuable contribution to our professional literature and a rich source of insights at a moment when the responsibilities and authorities of the Intelligence Community's senior leadership are again in the public spotlight.

President Harry Truman created the job of director of central intelligence (DCI) in 1946 so that he and other senior administration officials could turn to one person for foreign intelligence briefings. The DCI was the head of the Central Intelligence Group until 1947, when he became the director of the newly created Central Intelligence Agency. This book profiles each DCI and explains how they performed in their community role, that of enhancing cooperation among the many parts of the nationÆs intelligence community and reporting foreign intelligence to the president. The book also discusses the evolving expectations that U.S. presidents through George W. Bush placed on their foreign intelligence chiefs. Although head of the CIA, the DCI was never a true national intelligence chief with control over the governmentÆs many arms that collect and analyze foreign intelligence. This limitation conformed to President TrumanÆs wishes because he was wary of creating a powerful and all-knowing intelligence chief in a democratic society. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and President Bush decided to alter the position of DCI by creating a new director of national intelligence position with more oversight and coordination of the governmentÆs myriad programs. Thus this book ends with Porter Goss in 2005, the last DCI. Douglas GarthoffÆs book is a unique and important study of the nationÆs top intelligence official over a roughly fifty-year period. His work provides the detailed historical framework that is essential for all future studies of how the U.S. intelligence community has been and will be managed.

Author and former senior CIA official Dr. Douglas F. Garthoff explains how each Director of Central Intelligence or DCI sought to fulfill his "community" role, that of enhancing the cooperation among the many parts of the nation's intelligence community under his leadership. Explores that the nation's leaders expected of directors and how those holding the responsibility attempted to carry it out.The story first takes up the roots of the DCI's community role and then proceeds chronologically, describing the various approaches that successive DCIs have taken toward fulfilling their responsibilities in this regard from the launch of the CIA. At the end, it sums up the circumstances as of 2005 under the George W. Bush administration, when a new official--the Director of National Intelligence or DNI--replaced the DCI role, and some observations about these changes and looking to the future.

President Harry Truman created the job of director of central intelligence (DCI) in 1946 so that he and other senior administration officials could turn to one person for foreign intelligence briefings. The DCI was the head of the Central Intelligence Group until 1947, when he became the director of the newly created Central Intelligence Agency. This book profiles each DCI and explains how they performed in their community role, that of enhancing cooperation among the many parts of the nation's intelligence community and reporting foreign intelligence to the president. The book also discusses the evolving expectations that U.S. presidents through George W. Bush placed on their foreign intelligence chiefs. Although head of the CIA, the DCI was never a true national intelligence chief with control over the government's many arms that collect and analyze foreign intelligence. This limitation conformed to President Truman's wishes because he was wary of creating a powerful and all-knowing intelligence chief in a democratic society. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and President Bush decided to alter the position of DCI by creating a new director of national intelligence position with more oversight and coordination of the government's myriad programs. Thus this book ends with Porter Goss in 2005, the last DCI. Douglas Garthoff's book is a unique and important study of the nation's top intelligence official over a roughly fifty-year period. His work provides the detailed historical framework that is essential for all future studies of how the U.S. intelligence community has been and will be managed.

The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence is a state-of-the-art work on intelligence and national security. Edited by Loch Johnson, one of the world's leading authorities on the subject, the handbook examines the topic in full, beginning with an examination of the major theories of intelligence. It then shifts its focus to how intelligence agencies operate, how they collect information from around the world, the problems that come with transforming "raw" information into credible analysis, and the difficulties in disseminating intelligence to policymakers. It also considers the balance between secrecy and public accountability, and the ethical dilemmas that covert and counterintelligence operations routinely present to intelligence agencies. Throughout, contributors factor in broader historical and political contexts that are integral to understanding how intelligence agencies function in our information-dominated age.

President Truman shuttered the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as an unneeded, wartime-only special operations/quasi-intelligence agency. The State Department, the Navy, and the War Department quickly recognized that a secret information vacuum loomed and urged the creation of something to replace OSS. These previously declassified and released documents present the thoughtful albeit tortuous and contentious creation of CIA, culminating in the National Security Act of 1947. The declassified historic material dissects the twists and turns and displays the considerable political and legal finesse required to assess the many plans, suggestions, maneuvers and actions that ultimately led to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency and other national security entities, which included the incorporation of special safeguards to protect civil liberties. Copies of selected intelligence documents and a timeline of miliestones in the creation of the US Intelligence Community from 1941 through 1964 are included in this resource.

In this "thoughtful, entertaining, and often insightful" book, a former CIA director explores the delicate give-and-take between the Oval Office and Langley. With the disastrous intelligence failures of the last few years still fresh in Americans minds--and to all appearances still continuing--there has never been a more urgent need for a book like this. In Burn Before Reading, Admiral Stansfield Turner, the CIA director under President Jimmy Carter, takes the reader inside the Beltway to examine the complicated, often strained relationships between presidents and their CIA chiefs. From FDR and "Wild Bill" Donovan to George W. Bush and George Tenet, twelve pairings are studied in these pages, and the results are eye-opening and provocative. Throughout, Turner offers a fascinating look into the machinery of intelligence gathering, revealing how personal and political issues often interfere with government business--and the nation's safety.

The documents contained within this updated edition incorporate all amendments since the release of Winter 2012 version through February 26, 2016 and verified against the United States Code maintained by the United States Library of Congress and Westlaw private company. The documents cited in this volume range from principles of professional ethics and transparency for the Intelligence Community, several Acts including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that includes information sharing, privacy, and civil liberties, and security clearances, plus Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, Classified Information Procedures Act, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Cybersecurity Act of 2015, numerous executive orders, presidential policy directives, and more. American citizens, law enforcement, especially U.S. Federal agency personnel that engage with intelligence surveillance, classified information, and national security efforts may be interested in this updated edition. Additionally, attorneys, civil servants involved within information technology departments, and records management may also be interested in this resource. Students pursuing courses in the areas of Ethics in Criminal Justice, Computer Forensics, Criminal Law in Criminal Justice, Homeland Security and Terrorism, Information Storage and Retrieval, Computer Security, or Military Science may be interested in this reference for research. Lastly, public, special, and academic libraries may want this legal reference available for their patrons. Related products: Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book, Winter 2012 - Limited quantities while supplies last - can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00278-3 Intelligence and Espionage resources collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/intelligence-espionage Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice topical books can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/law-enforcement-criminal-justice Mail & Communications Security collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/mail-communications-security

Failure of Intelligence is designed to inform the debate over intelligence policy and suggest a reform agenda. The provocative mingling of historical description with contemporary political analysis and reform prescription challenges the conventional wisdom on clandestine collection and ultimately and persuasively asserts that the failure to have diplomatic relations has led to the inability to collect intelligence.

Selected bibliography p. 511-519