The book examines the law of defamation, and argues that it must be reformed in a number of ways in order to balance two important constitutional rights, the right to reputation and the right to freedom of expression. The book analyses how far the media and others should be entitled to go in reporting on important matters of public interest in society, such as corruption and misconduct in public office. It also examines where the line should be drawn between a public figure's public and private life.

This text examines the law of defamation, and argues that it must be reformed in a number of ways in order to balance two important constitutional rights, the right to reputation and the right to freedom of expression.

Freedom of expression and defamation: where do we draw the line? Freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom, one of the cornerstones of democracy in Europe, enshrined in various key texts, including the European Convention on Human Rights. But the boundaries between freedom to criticise and damaging a person’s honour or reputation are not always very clear. By defining public insults and defamation, the law can set limits on freedom of expression, which is neither absolute nor boundless. But how far can it go? This study examines the details of the European Court of Human Right’s case law on defamation. It explores a range of substantive and procedural issues that the Court has considered, and clarifies the concept of defamation, positioning it in relation to freedom of expression and public debate. It explains how overly protective defamation laws can have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and public debate, and discusses the proportionality of defamation laws and their application.

The Oxford Handbook on Freedom of Speech provides a critical analysis of the foundations, rationales, and ideas that underpin freedom of speech as a political idea, and as a principle of positive constitutional law.

In his book Human Rights: Group Defamation, Freedom of Expression and the Law of Nations, Thomas David Jones presents a discussion and analysis of the laws governing group defamation and speech inciteful of racial hatred in Great Britain, Canada, India, Nigeria, and the United States. Although there exists no federal group defamation law in the United States, a few state legislatures have promulgated group defamation statutes, while a cause of action for group defamation has been recognized as justiciable in the decision law of other states. Mr Jones describes his theory as constitutional minimalism because he does not advocate the legal proscription of all derogatory hate speech. Only the sub-category of hate speech that fulfills the standard elements of proof found in common law defamation claim will be prosecuted criminally by the federal government. The author further asserts that a carefully and narrowly drafted federal criminal group defamation statute will pass constitutional muster without creating a conflict with First Amendment rights.

Most American historians and legal scholars incorrectly assume that controversies and litigation about free speech began abruptly during World War I. However, there was substantial debate about free speech issues between the Civil War and World War I. Important free speech controversies, often involving the activities of sex reformers and labor unions, preceded the Espionage Act of 1917. Scores of legal cases presented free speech issues to Justices Holmes and Brandeis. A significant organization, the Free Speech League, became a principled defender of free expression two decades before the establishment of the ACLU in 1920. World War I produced a major transformation in American liberalism. Progressives who had viewed constitutional rights as barriers to needed social reforms came to appreciate the value of political dissent during its wartime repression. They subsequently misrepresented the prewar judicial hostility to free speech claims and obscured prior libertarian defenses of free speech based on commitments to individual autonomy.

Every liberal democracy has laws or codes against hate speech—except the United States. For constitutionalists, regulation of hate speech violates the First Amendment and damages a free society. Against this absolutist view, Jeremy Waldron argues powerfully that hate speech should be regulated as part of our commitment to human dignity and to inclusion and respect for members of vulnerable minorities. Causing offense—by depicting a religious leader as a terrorist in a newspaper cartoon, for example—is not the same as launching a libelous attack on a group’s dignity, according to Waldron, and it lies outside the reach of law. But defamation of a minority group, through hate speech, undermines a public good that can and should be protected: the basic assurance of inclusion in society for all members. A social environment polluted by anti-gay leaflets, Nazi banners, and burning crosses sends an implicit message to the targets of such hatred: your security is uncertain and you can expect to face humiliation and discrimination when you leave your home. Free-speech advocates boast of despising what racists say but defending to the death their right to say it. Waldron finds this emphasis on intellectual resilience misguided and points instead to the threat hate speech poses to the lives, dignity, and reputations of minority members. Finding support for his view among philosophers of the Enlightenment, Waldron asks us to move beyond knee-jerk American exceptionalism in our debates over the serious consequences of hateful speech.

European Convention on Human Rights – Article 10 – Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. In the context of an effective democracy and respect for human rights mentioned in the Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights, freedom of expression is not only important in its own right, but it also plays a central part in the protection of other rights under the Convention. Without a broad guarantee of the right to freedom of expression protected by independent and impartial courts, there is no free country, there is no democracy. This general proposition is undeniable. This handbook is a practical tool for legal professionals from Council of Europe member states who wish to strengthen their skills in applying the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in their daily work.

A crucial and compelling account of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the landmark Supreme Court case that redefined libel, from the Pulitzer Prize–winning legal journalist Anthony Lewis. The First Amendment puts it this way: "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Yet, in 1960, a city official in Montgomery, Alabama, sued The New York Times for libel—and was awarded $500,000 by a local jury—because the paper had published an ad critical of Montgomery's brutal response to civil rights protests. The centuries of legal precedent behind the Sullivan case and the U.S. Supreme Court's historic reversal of the original verdict are expertly chronicled in this gripping and wonderfully readable book by the Pulitzer Prize Pulitzer Prize–winning legal journalist Anthony Lewis. It is our best account yet of a case that redefined what newspapers—and ordinary citizens—can print or say.