June 1995 The motivation for most of the reforms debated in transition economies is to impose market-based constraints on enterprise managers, whether through competition or through direct corporate governance. Baer and Gray explore debt's role as a control device in such economies, focusing on Hungary and Poland. The basic economic challenge in the transition from socialism to capitalism is creating incentive structures and institutions that promote enterprise change and restructuring. This is the motivation for most of the reforms debated during the transition--whether privatization, demonopolization, trade reform, or financial sector reform. Most research on corporate governance and privatization has focused on the role of owners--whether on the problems inherent in the separation of ownership and management (most Western literature) or on the need for true owners who represents the interests of capital (most literature on transition economies). But debt is also an important control device, as Western literature on corporate finance increasingly recognizes. Baer and Gray explore debt's role as a control device in transition economies, focusing especially on Hungary and Poland, which are relatively far along in the reform process. They ask, first, in what ways creditors exert control over firms in advanced market economies and how such control interacts with that exerted by equity holders. They then ask whether creditors in Central and Eastern European countries play similar roles and, if not, what roles they should play, and what can be done to give them the capacity and incentives to play those roles. They focus on three fundamental requirements for debt to function as a control device: information, proper incentives for creditors (including banks, suppliers, and government), and an efficient legal framework for debt collection (including collateral, workout, and bankruptcy regimes). While both countries are making progress in all three areas, there is still much to be done. Hungary and Poland illustrate only two of many approaches. Other transitional economies, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Russia, are following different approaches that should be explored in future analysis. This paper--a joint product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Department and the Transition Economics Division, Policy Research Department--is part of a larger effort in the Bank to explore issues of corporate governance in transition economies.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.

High public debt often produces the drama of default and restructuring. But debt is also reduced through financial repression, a tax on bondholders and savers via negative or belowmarket real interest rates. After WWII, capital controls and regulatory restrictions created a captive audience for government debt, limiting tax-base erosion. Financial repression is most successful in liquidating debt when accompanied by inflation. For the advanced economies, real interest rates were negative 1⁄2 of the time during 1945–1980. Average annual interest expense savings for a 12—country sample range from about 1 to 5 percent of GDP for the full 1945–1980 period. We suggest that, once again, financial repression may be part of the toolkit deployed to cope with the most recent surge in public debt in advanced economies.

This paper explores the impact of high public debt on long-run economic growth. The analysis, based on a panel of advanced and emerging economies over almost four decades, takes into account a broad range of determinants of growth as well as various estimation issues including reverse causality and endogeneity. In addition, threshold effects, nonlinearities, and differences between advanced and emerging market economies are examined. The empirical results suggest an inverse relationship between initial debt and subsequent growth, controlling for other determinants of growth: on average, a 10 percentage point increase in the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year, with the impact being somewhat smaller in advanced economies. There is some evidence of nonlinearity with higher levels of initial debt having a proportionately larger negative effect on subsequent growth. Analysis of the components of growth suggests that the adverse effect largely reflects a slowdown in labor productivity growth mainly due to reduced investment and slower growth of capital stock.

Abstract: August 1995 - In urban areas of Côte d'Ivoire, human capital is the endowment that best explains welfare changes over time. In rural areas, physical capital - especially the amount of land and farm equipment owned - matters most. Empirical investigations of poverty in developing countries tend to focus on the incidence of poverty at a particular point in time. If the incidence of poverty increases, however, there is no information about how many new poor have joined the existing poor and how many people have escaped poverty. Yet this distinction is of crucial policy importance. The chronically poor may need programs to enhance their human and physical capital endowments. Invalids and the very old may need permanent (targeted) transfers. The temporarily poor, on the other hand, may best be helped with programs that complement their own resources and help them bridge a difficult period. Results from analyses of panel surveys show significant mobility into and out of poverty and reveal a dynamism of the poor that policy should stimulate. Understanding what separates chronic from temporary poverty requires knowing which characteristics differentiate those who escape poverty from those who don't. In earlier work, Grootaert, Kanbur, and Oh found that region of residence and socioeconomic status were important factors. In this paper they investigate the role of other household characteristics, especially such asset endowments as human and physical capital, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. In urban areas of Côte d'Ivoire, human capital is the most important endowment explaining welfare changes over time. Households with well-educated members suffered less loss of welfare than other households. What seems to have mattered, though, is the skills learned through education, not the diplomas obtained. Diplomas may even have worked against some households in having oriented workers too much toward a formal labor market in a time when employment growth came almost entirely from small enterprises. In rural areas, physical capital - especially the amount of land and farm equipment owned - mattered most. Smallholders were more likely to suffer welfare declines. Households with diversified sources of income managed better, especially if they had an important source of nonfarm income. In both rural and urban areas, larger households suffered greater declines in welfare and households that got larger were unable to increase income enough to maintain their former welfare level. Households whose heads worked in the public sector maintained welfare better than other households, a finding that confirms earlier observations. The results also suggest that government policies toward certain regions or types of household can outweigh the effects of household endownments. Surprisingly, migrant non-Ivorian households tended to be better at preventing welfare losses than Ivorian households, while households headed by women did better than those headed by men (after controlling for differences in or changes in endowment). The implications for policymakers? First, education is associated with higher welfare levels and helps people cope better with economic decline. Second, targeting the social safety net to larger households - possibly through the schools, to reach children - is justified in periods of decline. Third, smallholders might be targeted in rural areas, and ways found to encourage diversification of income there. This paper - a joint product of the Social Policy and Resettlement Division, Environment Department, and the Africa Regional Office, Office of the Chief Economist - is the result of a research project on The Dynamics of Poverty: Why Some People Escape Poverty and Others Don't, A Panel Analysis for Côte d'Ivoire (RPO 678-70).

Why is moving from moderate to low inflation almost always slow or costly? This paper answers this question, based on the Polish experience. First, reflecting the transition to a market economy, Polish inflation has been marked by significant changes in relative prices. Second, as wage and price indexation takes root, the inflationary effect of shocks to relative prices is magnified. Third, lagging structural reform, including the failure to extend hard budget constraints to all sectors of the economy, makes monetary policy less effective. Reduced money supply growth with structural reform offers the best prospect for moving to low inflation.

'Judicial Systems in Transition Economies' looks at the experience of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as they reform their legal and judicial institutions to fit the needs of a market economy. The study shows, rather disturbingly, that less progress has been made in judicial reform than in most other areas of institutional reform in these countries. The transition from socialism to capitalism requires a fundamental reorientation of legal and judicial institutions. This study reviews the environment preceding reforms, forces that provoked and supported them, and the reform agendas undertaken in these countries since 1990. Against this background, it exposes the impact of reforms, implementation gaps, and the underlying determinants of success and failure. The report examines how courts have performed, and reveals their impact on public opinion and the business environment. It provides insight into linkages among reforms as well as linkages between reforms and public demand for a fair judiciary. The authors show that while each country presents different challenges and opportunities, certain lessons apply in most settings. Their insights and data would be useful to policy makers, judicial personnel, and those involved in reforming judiciaries. The study draws on numerous data sources. These include the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, the American Bar Association-Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI), the World Values Survey, the World Economic Forum, and the University of Strathclyde.