A central puzzle in jurisprudence has been the role of custom in law. Custom is simply the practices and usages of distinctive communities. But are such customs legally binding? Can custom be law, even before it is recognized by authoritative legislation or precedent? And, assuming that custom is a source of law, what are its constituent elements? Is proof of a consistent and long-standing practice sufficient, or must there be an extra ingredient - that the usage is pursued out of a sense of legal obligation, or, at least, that the custom is reasonable and efficacious? And, most tantalizing of all, is custom a source of law that we should embrace in modern, sophisticated legal systems, or is the notion of law from below outdated, or even dangerous, today? This volume answers these questions through a rigorous multidisciplinary, historical, and comparative approach, offering a fresh perspective on custom's enduring place in both domestic and international law.

Sets forth the evolution of Korea's law and legal system from the Chosǒn dynasty through the colonial and postcolonial modern periods.

Although many modern philosophers of law describe custom as merely a minor source of law, formal law is actually only one source of the legal customs that govern us. Many laws grow out of custom, and one measure of a law's success is by its creation of an enduring legal custom. Yet custom and customary law have long been neglected topics in unsettled jurisprudential debate. Smaller concerns, such as whether customs can be legitimized by practice or by stipulation, stipulated by an authority or by general consent, or dictated by law or vice versa, lead to broader questions of law and custom as alternative or mutually exclusive modes of social regulation, and whether rational reflection in general ought to replace sub-rational prejudice. Can legal rules function without customary usage, and does custom even matter in society? The Philosophy of Customary Law brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter. He establishes that customs are conventional habits and habitual conventions, and allows us to better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system by offering a new foundation of understanding for these concepts.

John M. Zane recommends this work, of which he comments "...the facts and ideas that are called legal can be studied with advantage from the same viewpoint as other branches of social phenomena, such as language, religion, folklore, or customs, that are not legal... The first chapter is called Methods of Jurisprudence, showing the manner in which law develops, sometimes in one way, sometimes in another...The next chapter deals with the particular factors of custom and legislation. It examines, without dogmatizing, the difference between the gradual acceptance of law by means of custom and the conscious, purposeful statement of a law by the law-making power. The next chapter takes a particular instance of the family organization as a fertile source of law in different stages. Finally the last chapter, entitled The Right of Appropriation, carries the discussion into the origins of property and the clashing interests of the individual in his freedom to acquire and contract as against the interests of the social organization. It is all in the easy method of a wise man talking, as if lecturing, upon topics, not seeking to exhaust, but to suggest. The book is stimulating. It will bear reading and rereading. Like all good books, it suggests more than it says..." John M. Zane, Yale Law Journal 35:1026-1027.

Some legal rules are not laid down by a legislator but grow instead from informal social practices. In contract law, for example, the customs of merchants are used by courts to interpret the provisions of business contracts; in tort law, customs of best practice are used by courts to define professional responsibility. Nowhere are customary rules of law more prominent than in international law. The customs defining the obligations of each State to other States and, to some extent, to its own citizens, are often treated as legally binding. However, unlike natural law and positive law, customary law has received very little scholarly analysis. To remedy this neglect, a distinguished group of philosophers, historians and lawyers has been assembled to assess the nature and significance of customary law. The book offers fresh insights on this neglected and misunderstood form of law.

Provides an in-depth study of the theory, history, practice, and interpretation of customary international law.

This Oxford Handbook examines the sources of international law, how the understanding of sources changed throughout the history of international law; how the main legal theories understood sources; the relationship between sources and the legitimacy of international law; and how sources differ across the various sub-areas of international law.

Because of its unique nature, the sources of international law are not always easy to identify and interpret. This book provides an ideal introduction to these sources for anyone needing to better understand where international law comes from. As well as looking at treaties and custom, the book will look at more modern and controversial sources.

Although customary international law has long been an important source of rights and obligations in international relations, there has been extensive debate in recent years about whether this body of law is equipped to address complex modern problems such as climate change, international terrorism, and global financial instability. In addition, there is growing uncertainty about how, precisely, international and domestic courts should identify rules of customary international law. Custom's Future seeks to address this uncertainty by providing a better understanding of how customary international law has developed over time, the way in which it is applied in practice, and the challenges that it faces going forward. Reflecting an interdisciplinary mix of historical, empirical, economic, philosophical, and doctrinal analysis, and containing chapters by leading international law experts, it will be of use to lawyers, judges, and researchers alike.

This book seeks to re-appreciate the concept of customary international law as a form of spontaneous societal self-organisation, and to develop the methodological consequences that ensue from this conception for the practice of its application. In pursuing this aim, the author draws from three different strands of scholarship that have not yet been considered in connection with one another: First, general jurisprudential theories of customary law; second, theories of customary international law, especially as they relate to international relations scholarship; and third, methodological approaches to the interpretation of international law. This expansive, philosophical layout of the book enables the author to put the conceptual enigmas of customary international law into a broader perspective. Among the issues discussed in the book are the dichotomy of its traditional and modern forms and the respective benefits and disadvantages of inductive and deductive approaches to its ascertainment. In the course of this analysis, the author draws insights from Friedrich August Hayek’s theory of law as a ‘spontaneous order’, an information-processing device which enables the participants of a legal system to make use of decentralised knowledge. The book argues that the major advantage of custom as a source of international law lies in the fact that it is the result of a gradual process of trial and error, rather than the product of deliberate planning. This makes it a particularly apposite source of law in a time of seismic shifts in the distribution of power within a vastly diverse community of States, when a new global order is expected to emerge, the contours of which are not yet clearly discernible. This book applies general concepts of legal philosophy to explain the continuing relevance of custom as a source of international law while at the same time inferring from this theoretical framework concrete practical and methodological consequences, the most important of which is the special role that purposive interpretation plays with respect to rules of international custom. Given this broad approach, the book will be of interest to several groups of potential readers including academics interested in the philosophy of customary law in general, academic international lawyers and legal practitioners, especially judges, scholars of international relations and all those interested in how the international community of States organises itself.