Breaking from conventional wisdom, this book provides an explanation of exchange rates based on the premise that it is financial capital flows and not international trade that represents the driving force behind currency movements. John T. Harvey combines analyses rooted in the scholarly traditions of John Maynard Keynes and Thorstein Veblen with that of modern psychology to produce a set of new theories to explain international monetary economics, including not only exchange rates but also world financial crises. In the book, the traditional approach is reviewed and critiqued and the alternative is then built by studying the psychology of the market and balance of payments questions. The central model has at its core Keynes’ analysis of the macroeconomy and it assumes neither full employment nor balanced trade over the short or long run. Market participants’ mental model, which they use to forecast future exchange rate movements, is specified and integrated into the explanation. A separate but related discussion of currency crises shows that three distinct tension points emerge in booming economies, any one of which can break and signal the collapse. Each of the models is compared to post-Bretton Woods history and the reader is shown exactly how various shifts and adjustments on the graphs can explain the dollar’s ups and downs and the Mexican (1994) and Asian (1987) crises.

Capital flows to the developing economies have long displayed a boom-and-bust pattern. Rarely has the cycle turned as abruptly as it did in the 1990s, however: surges in lending were followed by the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95 and the sudden collapse of currencies in Asia in 1997. This volume maps a new and uncertain financial landscape, one in which volatile private capital flows and fragile banking systems produce sudden reversals of fortune for governments and economies. This environment creates dilemmas for both national policymakers who confront the "mixed blessing" of capital inflows and the international institutions that manage the recurrent crises.The authors—leading economists and political scientists—examine private capital flows and their consequences in Latin America, Pacific Asia, and East Europe, placing current cycles of lending in historical perspective. National governments have used a variety of strategies to deal with capital-account instability. The authors evaluate those responses, prescribe new alternatives, and consider whether the new circumstances require novel international policies.

An analysis of the connections between capital flows and financial crises as well as between capital flows and economic growth.

Corruption affects the composition of capital inflows in a way that may raise the likelihood of a currency crisis.

The author had already become involved with the subject of this book when President Nixon suspended the convertibility of the dollar on August 15, 1971. This declaration was equivalent to an official admission of the previously evident failure of the inter national monetary system established in Bretton Woods after long and difficult negotiations. Although the real reasons for this failure are much deeper and more complex, the immediate cause was the tremendous outjlow of money from the United States to Europe and Japan. Never before had economic history recorded a currency movement of such magnitude, although during the periods preceding the devaluation of the French franc and the re valuation of the Deutsche Mark (Le. , by the end of 1968 and mostly in 1969), and particularly at the beginning of 1971, the in ternational flow of money grew to such huge proportions as to alm ost traumatize the economic and financial circles of developed capitalist countries. These economic and financial circles correctly foresaw that the ever growing and hardly controllable volume of currency flow could seriously endanger the already precarious balance of the international financial system and perhaps even upset it. This brief analysis, in contrast to many other predictions of cur rency developments, holds true for a longer period as well.

The currency crises that engulfed East Asian economies in 1997 and Mexico in 1994 - and their high development costs - raise a serious concern about the net benefits for developing countries of large flows of potentially reversible short-term international capital. Written by senior policy-makers and academics, the contributions to this volume examine in depth the macroeconomic and other policy dilemmas confronting public authorities in the emerging economies as they deal with short-term capital movements, especially in the period before the outbreak of these crises. The studies are based on comparative case studies of key emerging economies. Valuable insights are also derived from contrasts between the East Asian, Latin American, African, and European experiences, between the financial and real effects of financial flows, and between private and public responsibilities in managing financial markets. The great value of the chapters in this volume is that they analytically identify the weaknesses in both domestic and international capital market regimes. The recommendations derived from this analysis apply to the development of financial markets in developing countries, the monitoring and regulation of mutual funds in source countries, and the future development of international capital markets. They will make an important contribution both to the discussion of national policies and of a new international financial architechture.

This paper analyzes the behavior of output during currency crises using a sample of 195 crisis episodes in 91 developing countries during 1970-98. It finds that more than two-fifths of the crises in the sample were expansionary, and that output contraction was greater in large and more developed economies than in small and less developed economies. Currency crises have not been any more contractionary in the 1990s than in the previous two decades. Countries that traded less with the rest of the world, that had a relatively open capital account, and where crises were preceded by large capital inflows were more likely to be associated with contraction during crises. The contraction was more pronounced if trade competitors devalued, oil prices rose during the crisis, and postcrisis period was marked by tight monetary policy and expansionary fiscal policy.

Corruption affects the composition of capital inflows in a way that may raise the likelihood of a currency crisis.Crony capitalism and international creditors' self-fulfilling expectations are often suggested as rival explanations for currency crises. A possible link between the two has not been explored.Wei shows one channel through which crony capitalism can increase the chance of a currency/financial crisis by altering the composition of capital inflows.Using data on bilateral foreign direct investment and bilateral bank loans, Wei finds clear evidence that in corrupt countries the composition of capital inflows is relatively light in foreign direct investment.Earlier studies indicated that a country with a capital inflow structure is more likely to run into a currency crisis down the road (partly through international creditors' self-fulfilling expectations).Therefore, crony capitalism, through its effect on the composition of a country's capital inflows, makes the country more vulnerable to currency crises brought about by self-fulfilling expectations. Corruption may also weaken domestic financial supervision, with a subsequent deterioration in the quality in banks' and firms' balance sheets.This paper - a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the connection between corruption and international capital flows. This study was supported in part by a grant from the OECD Development Center. The author may be contacted at [email protected].

If flexible exchange rates are not adopted, central banks should at least avoid the widespread practice of trying to sterilise the monetary effects of capital flows." "The author argues that the implementation of this plan will be a far more effective way of enhancing financial stability than controlling international capital flows, or trying to force private lenders to make new loans to countries that suffer crises."--BOOK JACKET.

In the 1990s, currency crises in Europe, Mexico, and Asia have drawn worldwide attention to speculative attacks on government-controlled exchange rates and have prompted researchers to undertake new theoretical and empirical analysis of these events. This paper provides some perspective on this work and relates it to earlier research. It derives the optimal commitment to a fixed exchange rate and proposes a common framework for analyzing currency crises. This framework stresses the important role of speculators and recognizes that the government’s commitment to a fixed exchange rate is constrained by other policy goals. The final section finds that some crises may be particularly difficult to predict using currently popular methods.