“This study probes deeply into the dynamics of the blame games that seem now to have become an inevitable part of advanced societies’ responses to negative events. Resodihardjo’s forensic analysis of how such negative events get framed, investigated and accounted for significantly advances our understanding of how incidents and crises affect the reputations and political capital of public authorities, and how they can foster but also significantly impede institutional learning.”—Paul ’t Hart, Utrecht University, The Netherlands “The crisis is often not even over before the mud starts flying. This little gem of a book outlines causes and consequences of blame games. The author offers strategies for dealing with these blame games. An emerging scholar writing a valuable primer on surviving blame games - warmly recommended!”—Arjen Boin, Leiden University, The Netherlands “This is an important book. Crises are followed by questions and the accountability phase inevitably involves the blame game. In using in-depth case study analysis of tragic incidents at festivals, Sandra Resodihardjo explores why and how blame games start, evolve and are then influenced by a variety of factors. This is a fascinating read, when things go badly wrong the cycle of blame is often complex, involving multiple actors and organisations often battling to frame the event to their own agenda. This should be essential reading not just for scholars studying this critical area of public policy, but practitioners who would undoubtedly learn a lot from the analytical oversight and forensic detail contained in this excellent book.”—Mark Bennister, University of Lincoln, United Kingdom ​During the accountability phase following a crisis, the focus is both on learning (how can we prevent a recurrence of this horrific event?) and on finding culprits (who caused and/or contributed to this crisis?). The latter is also known as the blame game where actors receive and respond to blame. Too much focus on the blame game, however, could lead to an unbalanced accountability phase as people are less inclined to share what they know about what happened because of fear, for instance, of resignation. This lack of information hampers the learning process following crises. Hopefully, a better understanding of how blame games work will lead to a better managed blame game which, in turn, should result in a more balanced accountability phase where there is ample of room to learn from the tragic event.This book furthers our understanding of what happens during blame games following crises by looking at both theory and practice. Theories on blame games help to answer questions such as who is blamed and why? How much blame is this person receiving and why? How can this person respond? And why do these responses sometimes not work?One particular response to blame (appointing an inquiry) can have quite an impact on the blame game. That is why the second theoretical chapter addresses questions such as why are inquiries created? How can one influence them? And why are some inquiries more independent than others?The analysis of three festivals gone wrong helps to expand our knowledge of blame games even further. The three cases show that responses to blame can backfire and that rituals, context, and sub-blame games can have an impact on how blame games evolve.Taken together, the theories and cases explored in this book will help people to better understand and manage blame games.

The constant threat of crises such as disasters, riots and terrorist attacks poses a frightening challenge to Western societies and governments. While the causes and dynamics of these events have been widely studied, we know little about what happens following their containment and the restoration of stability. This volume explores 'post-crisis politics,' examining how crises give birth to longer term dynamic processes of accountability and learning which are characterised by official investigations, blame games, political manoeuvring, media scrutiny and crisis exploitation. Drawing from a wide range of contemporary crises, including Hurricane Katrina, 9/11, the Madrid train bombings, the Walkerton water contamination, Space Shuttles Challenger and Columbia and the Boxing Day Asian tsunami, this is a ground-breaking volume which addresses the longer term impact of crisis-induced politics. Competing pressures for stability and change mean that policies, institutions and leaders may occasionally be uprooted, but often survive largely intact.

Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis of Confidence in U.S. Regulation brings fresh insight and analytic rigor to what has become one of the most contested domains of American domestic politics. Critics from the left blame lax regulation for the housing meltdown and financial crisis—not to mention major public health disasters ranging from the Gulf Coast oil spill to the Upper Big Branch Mine explosion. At the same time, critics on the right disparage an excessively strict and costly regulatory system for hampering economic recovery. With such polarized accounts of regulation and its performance, the nation needs now more than ever the kind of dispassionate, rigorous scholarship found in this book. With chapters written by some of the nation's foremost economists, political scientists, and legal scholars, Regulatory Breakdown brings clarity to the heated debate over regulation by dissecting the disparate causes of the current crisis as well as analyzing promising solutions to what ails the U.S. regulatory system. This volume shows policymakers, researchers, and the public why they need to question conventional wisdom about regulation—whether from the left or the right—and demonstrates the value of undertaking systematic analysis before adopting policy reforms in the wake of disaster.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

Being the first casualty of the international financial crisis, Iceland was, in many ways, turned into a laboratory when it came to responding to one of the largest corporate failures on record. This edited volume offers the most wide-ranging treatment of the Icelandic financial crisis and its political, economic, social, and constitutional consequences. Interdisciplinary, with contributions from historians, economists, sociologists, legal scholars, political scientists and philosophers, it also compares and contrasts the Icelandic experience with other national and global crises. It examines the economic magnitude of the crisis, the social and political responses, and the unique transitional justice mechanisms used to deal with it. It looks at backward-looking elements, including a societal and legal reckoning – which included the indictment of a Prime Minister and jailing of leading bankers for their part in the financial crisis – and forward-looking features, such as an attempt to rewrite the Icelandic constitution. Throughout, it underscores the contemporary relevance of the Icelandic case. While the Icelandic economic recovery has been much quicker than expected; it shows that public faith in political elites has not been restored. This text will be of key interest to scholars, policy-makers and students of the financial crisis in such fields as European politics, international political economy, comparative politics, sociology, economics, contemporary history, and more broadly the social sciences and humanities.

From coping with Covid-19 through to manging climate change, from Brexit through to the barricading of Congress, from democratic disaffection to populist pressures, from historical injustices to contemporary social inequalities, and from scapegoating through to sacrificial lambs... the common thread linking each of these themes and many more is an emphasis on blame. But how do we know who or what is to blame? How do politicians engage in blame-avoidance strategies? How can blaming backfire or boomerang? Are there situations in which politicians might want to be blamed? What is the relationship between avoiding blame and claiming credit? How do developments in relation to machine learning and algorithmic governance affect blame-based assumptions? By focusing on the politics and governance of blame from a range of disciplines, perspectives, and standpoints this volume engages with all these questions and many more. Distinctive contributions include an emphasis on peacekeeping and public diplomacy, on source-credibility and anthropological explanations, on cultural bias and on expert opinions, on polarisation and (de)politicisation, and on trust and post-truth politics. With contributions from the world's leading scholars and emerging research leaders, this volume not only develops the theoretical, disciplinary, empirical, and normative boundaries of blame-based analyses but it also identifies new research agendas and asks distinctive and original questions about the politics and governance of blame.

This work looks at the topic of victimisation and blame as a pathology for our time, and its consequences for personal responsibility.

Supported by ten years of research, Wigmore has gathered extensive data covering the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recovery to provide the first comprehensive history of the period. Financial crises cannot occur unless institutional investors finance the bubbles that created them. Wigmore follows the trail of data putting pressure on institutional investors to achieve higher levels of returns that led to over-leverage throughout the financial system and placed such a burden on recovery. Here is a 'very good picture - and painful reminder - of the crisis' evolution across multiple asset classes, structures, participants, and geographies.' This work serves as a critical analysis of modern portfolio management and an important reference work for financial professionals, academics, investors, and students.

Analyses and compares political blame games in Western democracies to show how democratic political systems manage policy controversies.

This edited volume analyzes mistakes in different areas of international relations including the realms of security, foreign policy, finance, health, development, environmental policy and migration. By starting out from a broad concept of mistakes as “something [considered to have] gone wrong” the edited volume enables comparisons of various kinds of mistakes from a range of analytical perspectives, including objectivist and interpretivist approaches, in order to draw out answers to the following guiding questions: • How does one identify and research a mistake? • Why do mistakes happen? • How are actors made responsible? • When and how do actors learn from mistakes? This book will be of great interest to scholars, undergraduate and postgraduate students as well as practitioners in International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Security Studies, International Political Economy, and Diplomatic History.