The Marine Corps University symposium, "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond" held on September 23, 2009 at the National Press Club, Washington, DC explored ways to improve counterinsurgency leadership, with particular attention to the leaders of American, Afghan, and Iraqi forces. The Symposium was sponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation.

Since the surge in Iraq in 2007, counterinsurgency (COIN) has been at the forefront of military and foreign affairs debates. Although COIN is not a new idea, the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought renewed attention to its theory and practice as top leaders in both the government and the military have considered the most effective strategy for these conflicts. A symposium cosponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation explored the complexities of COIN leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. From that symposium came these papers, which discuss topics such as brigade and regimental command, officer development in the military, and general officer leadership. Featuring leading COIN theorists and practitioners from the military, academic, and private sectors, this volume sheds new light on past and present COIN operations and points the way toward those in the future.

Moyar presents a wide-ranging history of counterinsurgency which draws on the historical record and interviews with hundreds of counterinsurgency veterans. He identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and reveals why these attributes have been more prevalent in some organizations than others.

"After we had exchanged the requisite formalities over tea in his camp on the southern edge of Kabul's outer defense perimeter, the Afghan field commander told me that two of his bravest mujahideen were martyred because he did not have a pickup truck to take them to a Peshawar hospital. They had succumbed to their battle wounds. He asked me to tell his party's bureaucrats across the border that he needed such a vehicle desperately. I double-checked with my interpreter that he was indeed making this request. I wasn't puzzled because the request appeared unreasonable but because he was asking me, a twenty-year-old employee of a humanitarian organization, to intercede on his behalf with his own organization's bureaucracy. I understood on this dry summer day in Khurd Kabul that not all militant and political organizations are alike."—from Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond While popular accounts of warfare, particularly of nontraditional conflicts such as guerrilla wars and insurgencies, favor the roles of leaders or ideology, social-scientific analyses of these wars focus on aggregate categories such as ethnic groups, religious affiliations, socioeconomic classes, or civilizations. Challenging these constructions, Abdulkader H. Sinno closely examines the fortunes of the various factions in Afghanistan, including the mujahideen and the Taliban, that have been fighting each other and foreign armies since the 1979 Soviet invasion. Focusing on the organization of the combatants, Sinno offers a new understanding of the course and outcome of such conflicts. Employing a wide range of sources, including his own fieldwork in Afghanistan and statistical data on conflicts across the region, Sinno contends that in Afghanistan, the groups that have outperformed and outlasted their opponents have done so because of their successful organization. Each organization's ability to mobilize effectively, execute strategy, coordinate efforts, manage disunity, and process information depends on how well its structure matches its ability to keep its rivals at bay. Centralized organizations, Sinno finds, are generally more effective than noncentralized ones, but noncentralized ones are more resilient absent a safe haven. Sinno's organizational theory explains otherwise puzzling behavior found in group conflicts: the longevity of unpopular regimes, the demise of popular movements, and efforts of those who share a common cause to undermine their ideological or ethnic kin. The author argues that the organizational theory applies not only to Afghanistan-where he doubts the effectiveness of American state-building efforts—but also to other ethnic, revolutionary, independence, and secessionist conflicts in North Africa, the Middle East, and beyond.

Includes 3 maps and 35 illustrations. The city of an-Najaf, Iraq, is a provincial and market center located on the western branch of the Euphrates River approximately 100 miles south of Baghdad....This is a “battle study” written purposely from the perspective of the Marines, soldiers, and sailors who fought at an-Najaf in Aug. 2004...The Americans deployed to al-Anbar and an-Najaf Provinces, faced a variety of threats as Iraq attempted to again govern itself. Threats were from disparate sources, including Sunni fighters in Fallujah and Shi’a fighters in Najaf. This complexity of threats did not lend itself to easy solutions. In March 2004, Lieutenant General James T. Conway’s I Marine Expeditionary Force was faced with an outbreak of Sunni insurgency in Fallujah. At the same time, a Shi’a uprising took place across Iraq, including Baghdad, Najaf, an-Nasiriyah, al-Kut, al-Amarah, and Kirkuk. The fighting spread to Karbala, Hillah, and Basrah with attacks on Iraqi and Coalition outposts. This fighting dropped off in June with the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, but the menace of further violence remained. The Multi-National Force-Iraq, under General George W. Casey Jr., USA, felt that before the Iraqis could be responsible for security in each province, the centers of violence had to be dealt with by a “clear-hold-build” approach. Baghdad, Fallujah, and Najaf were thus targeted. When Muqtada al-Sadr fomented another uprising in Aug., the recently arrived 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit found itself assigned to quell the uprising in Najaf. It would be reinforced for this effort by two U.S. Army and four Iraqi Army battalions. The narrative that follows documents this effort from the small unit level. The importance of the close relationship between political and military force is emphasized. The intent is to provide a view of combat for the education and training of Marines who might face similar circumstances.

U.S. Marines in Irregular Warfare: Training and Education is a brief history that recounts how the U.S. Marine Corps adapted to fight the Global War on Terrorism during 2000-10. The Marine Corps has a long history of fighting irregular wars, including the Banana Wars in Central America during the 1920s and the Vietnam War during the 1960s. To battle the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Corps drew upon this experience while also implementing new plans and programs to better prepare Marines to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The Marine Corps updated the curriculum at the Command and Staff College and transformed the annual Combined Arms Exercise into Exercise Mojave Viper: an immersive training program that simulated the urban environments in which Marines would be operating in Southwest Asia. Most importantly, Marines adjusted in the field, as battalion and company commanders drew on their basic training and education to devise innovative tactics to better combat the new threats they now faced. ?us, as this story shows, the Marine Corps did not undergo a radical transformation to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead drew on principles that had defined it as a warfighting organization throughout most of its history. Keywords: United States Marine Corps; United States Marines; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Marines; Marines; Marine Corps; Global War on Terrorism; global war on terrorism; irregular warfare; military strategy; counterinsurgency; combat; iraq war; Iraq War; Afghanistan; military education; soldier training; combat training and tactics; Southwest Asia

While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?

The PRC is engaged in political warfare against most countries of the world. This is an aggressive brand of total war that integrates all aspects of PRC national power into its political warfare campaigns. Open societies normally lack government understanding and response to the political warfare threat, therefore typically establishing weak applicable laws and policies to combat it. Consequently, those nations lack national counterpolitical warfare policies, strategies, organizations, and resources. Worse, as many countries do not realize that they are under attack or are in denial of that fact, they are unwilling and or unable to effectively respond. Most countries lost the ability to recognize and combat political warfare nearly three decades ago after the end of the Cold War. The United States, which has historically provided national security focus and resources for its global network of allies and coalition partners, does not teach about PRC political warfare at either the Foreign Service Institute or the Defense Information School, premier institutions where diplomats and military officers prepare to compete on the information battlefield. Further, there are no systematic courses at its National Defense University or various war colleges. Other countries face similar challenges. Democracies are particularly vulnerable to political warfare because they lack the necessary education about the threat, and because the open nature of free societies offers numerous pathways for the PRC to engage in influence and coercion operations. Many authoritarian nations choose to ignore PRC political warfare in their own countries, obtaining validation for their dictatorships from the PRC’s totalitarian rule or fearing they may anger the Chinese Communist Party if they confront it. In order to effectively combat the PRC political warfare threat, democracies must refocus their national security cultures and initiate new governmental and public education programs.

NATIONAL BESTSELLER In this definitive account of the conflict, acclaimed war correspondent and bestselling author Bing West provides a practical way out of Afghanistan. Drawing on his expertise as both a combat-hardened Marine and a former assistant secretary of defense, West has written a tour de force narrative, rich with vivid characters and gritty combat, which shows the consequences when strategic theory meets tactical reality. Having embedded with dozens of frontline units over the past three years, he takes the reader on a battlefield journey from the mountains in the north to the opium fields in the south. A fighter who understands strategy, West builds the case for changing course. His conclusion is sure to provoke debate: remove most of the troops from Afghanistan, stop spending billions on the dream of a modern democracy, and insist the Afghans fight their own battles. Bing West’s book is a page-turner about brave men and cunning enemies that examines our realistic choices as a nation.

From Kabul to Baghdad and Back provides insight into the key strategic decisions of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns as the United States attempted to wage both simultaneously against al-Qaeda and its supporting affiliates. It also evaluates the strategic execution of those military campaigns to identify how well the two operations were conducted in light of their political objectives. The book identifies the elements that made the 2001 military operation to oust the Taliban successful, then with combat operations in Iraq as a standard of comparison, the authors analyze the remainder of the Afghan campaign and the essential problems that plagued that effort, from the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2002, through the ill-fated transition to NATO lead in Afghanistan in 2006, the dismissal of Generals McKiernan and McChrystal, the eventual decision by President Obama to make the Afghan campaign the main effort in the war on extremism, and the final development of drawdown plans following the end of the war in Iraq. No other book successfully compares and contrasts the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective, analyzing the impact of fighting the Iraq War on the success of the United States campaign in Afghanistan. It is also the first book to specifically question several key operational decisions in Afghanistan including: the decision to give NATO the lead in Afghanistan, the decisions to fire Generals McKiernan and McChrystal and the decision to conduct an Iraq War-style surge in Afghanistan. It also compares the Afghan campaigns fought by the Soviet Union and the United States, the counterinsurgency campaigns styles in Iraq and Afghanistan and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the final chapter, the key lessons of the two campaigns are outlined, including the importance of effective strategic decision-making, the utility of population focused counterinsurgency practices, the challenges of building partner capacity during combat, and the mindset required to prosecute modern war.