Counterinsurgency Intelligence And The Emergency In Malaya
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Author |
: Roger C. Arditti |
Publisher |
: Springer |
Total Pages |
: 275 |
Release |
: 2019-04-30 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9783030166953 |
ISBN-13 |
: 3030166953 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (53 Downloads) |
Synopsis Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya by : Roger C. Arditti
This book examines the full range of counterinsurgency intelligence during the Malayan Emergency. It explores the involvement of the Security Service, the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), the Malayan Security Service, Special Branch and wider police service, and military intelligence, to examine how British and Malayan authorities tackled the insurgent challenge posed by the Malayan Communist Party. This study assesses the nature of the intelligence apparatus prior to the declaration of emergency in 1948 and considers how officials attempted to reconstruct the intelligence structures in the Far East after the surrender of the Japanese in 1945. These plans were largely based upon the legacy of the Second World War but quickly ran into difficultly because of ill-defined remits and personality clashes. Nevertheless, officials did provide prescient warning of the existential threat posed by the Malayan Communist Party from the earliest days of British reoccupation of Malaya. Once a state of emergency had been declared, officials struggled to find the right combination of methods, strategy and management structures to eliminate the threat posed by the Communist insurgents. This book argues that the development of an effective counterinsurgency intelligence strategy involved many more organisations than just Special Branch. It was a multifaceted, dynamic effort that took far longer and was more problematic than previous accounts suggest. The Emergency remains central to counterinsurgency theory and thus this wide-ranging analysis sheds crucial light not only on the period, but on contemporary doctrine and security practices today.
Author |
: Leon Comber |
Publisher |
: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies |
Total Pages |
: 354 |
Release |
: 2008 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9789812308290 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9812308296 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (90 Downloads) |
Synopsis Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60 by : Leon Comber
The Malayan Emergency lasted from 1948 to 1960. During these tumultuous years, following so soon after the Japanese surrender at the end of the Second World War, the whole country was once more turned upside down and the lives of the people changed. The war against the Communist Party of Malaya's determined efforts to overthrow the Malayan government involved the whole population in one form or another. Dr Comber analyses the pivotal role of the Malayan Police's Special Branch, the government's supreme intelligence agency, in defeating the communist uprising and safeguarding the security of the country. He shows for the first time how the Special Branch was organised and how it worked in providing the security forces with political and operational intelligence. His book represents a major contribution to our understanding of the Emergency and will be of great interest to all students of Malay(si)a's recent history as well as counter-guerrilla operations. It can profitably be mined, too, to see what lessons can be learned for counterinsurgency operations in other parts of the world.
Author |
: Karl Hack |
Publisher |
: Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages |
: 529 |
Release |
: 2021-12-16 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9781107080102 |
ISBN-13 |
: 110708010X |
Rating |
: 4/5 (02 Downloads) |
Synopsis The Malayan Emergency by : Karl Hack
The first in-depth and multi-perspective study of anti-colonial resistance and counterinsurgency in the Malayan Emergency and its impact on Malaysia.
Author |
: Laura M. Bunyan |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: 40 |
Release |
: 2013 |
ISBN-10 |
: OCLC:907253242 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (42 Downloads) |
Synopsis Intelligence Operations in Small Wars : a Comparison of the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War by : Laura M. Bunyan
"Military strategists have frequently struggled to determine what conditions lead to the success or failure during counter-insurgency operations. Military history focuses a significant amount of effort on military tactics and weaponry used to achieve the results in warfare, but intelligence operations are sometimes only given cursory consideration. In reality, intelligence operations can be key contributors to success or failure of counter-insurgency operations as was the case in both the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War. Both the British and US intelligence operations were not successful at the beginning of the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War respectively but, weaknesses in operations were identified by leadership and rectified to enable defeat of the guerrilla forces encountered. However, the British were successful at achieving unity of effort in their intelligence operations whereas the US operated using several discrete intelligence efforts which were less efficient."--Introduction.
Author |
: R. W. Komer |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: 112 |
Release |
: 1972 |
ISBN-10 |
: STANFORD:36105044679566 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (66 Downloads) |
Synopsis The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect by : R. W. Komer
The report is one of several case studies on the organization and management of counterinsurgency efforts in Southeast Asia. It focuses on the structure and control -- and their effect on policy and performance -- of an actual counterinsurgency effort. Its purpose is to determine what lessons of future value the U.S. military establishment may learn from that effort.
Author |
: Richard L. Clutterbuck |
Publisher |
: London : Cassell |
Total Pages |
: 232 |
Release |
: 1967 |
ISBN-10 |
: STANFORD:36105120034926 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (26 Downloads) |
Synopsis The Long Long War by : Richard L. Clutterbuck
Author |
: Michael A S. Shaik |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: 288 |
Release |
: 1990 |
ISBN-10 |
: OCLC:221903577 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (77 Downloads) |
Synopsis A Comparison of Counter-insurgency Strategies Used in the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War by : Michael A S. Shaik
Author |
: David Anderson |
Publisher |
: Manchester University Press |
Total Pages |
: 240 |
Release |
: 2017-03-01 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9781526123688 |
ISBN-13 |
: 1526123681 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (88 Downloads) |
Synopsis Policing and decolonisation by : David Anderson
As imperial political authority was increasingly challenged, sometimes with violence, locally recruited police forces became the front-line guardians of alien law and order. This book presents a study that looks at the problems facing the imperial police forces during the acute political dislocations following decolonization in the British Empire. It examines the role and functions of the colonial police forces during the process of British decolonisation and the transfer of powers in eight colonial territories. The book emphasises that the British adopted a 'colonial' solution to their problems in policing insurgency in Ireland. The book illustrates how the recruitment of Turkish Cypriot policemen to maintain public order against Greek Cypriot insurgents worsened the political situation confronting the British and ultimately compromised the constitutional settlement for the transfer powers. In Cyprus and Malaya, the origins and ethnic backgrounds of serving policemen determined the effectiveness which enabled them to carry out their duties. In 1914, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) of Ireland was the instrument of a government committed to 'Home Rule' or national autonomy for Ireland. As an agency of state coercion and intelligence-gathering, the police were vital to Britain's attempts to hold on to power in India, especially against the Indian National Congress during the agitational movements of the 1920s and 1930s. In April 1926, the Palestine police force was formally established. The shape of a rapidly rising rate of urban crime laid the major challenge confronting the Kenya Police.
Author |
: John Nagl |
Publisher |
: Bloomsbury Publishing USA |
Total Pages |
: 273 |
Release |
: 2002-10-30 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780313077036 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0313077037 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (36 Downloads) |
Synopsis Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam by : John Nagl
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
Author |
: Rory Cormac |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 308 |
Release |
: 2014-03-01 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780199365272 |
ISBN-13 |
: 019936527X |
Rating |
: 4/5 (72 Downloads) |
Synopsis Confronting the Colonies by : Rory Cormac
Moving the debate beyond the place of tactical intelligence in counterinsurgency warfare, Confronting the Colonies considers the view from Whitehall, where the biggest decisions were made. It reveals the evolving impact of strategic intelligence upon government understandings of, and policy responses to, insurgent threats. Confronting the Colonies demonstrates for the first time how, in the decades after World War Two, the intelligence agenda expanded to include non-state actors, insurgencies, and irregular warfare. It explores the challenges these emerging threats posed to intelligence assessment and how they were met with varying degrees of success. Such issues remain of vital importance today. By examining the relationship between intelligence and policy, Cormac provides original and revealing insights into government thinking in the era of decolonisation, from the origins of nationalist unrest to the projection of dwindling British power. He demonstrates how intelligence (mis-)understood the complex relationship between the Cold War, nationalism, and decolonisation; how it fuelled fierce Whitehall feuding; and how it shaped policymakers' attempts to integrate counterinsurgency into broader strategic policy.