This report reflects long-term, in-depth discussion and debate by participants in the Latin American Roundtable on Corporate Governance.

This report reflects long-term, in-depth discussion and debate by participants in the Latin American Roundtable on Corporate Governance.

'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level the first such data in the region and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.

This report provides an overview of frameworks and experience in Latin America and internationally in dealing with the challenges associated with corporate governance of company groups. It describes their economic rationale, benefits and relevance in Latin America, and how they are defined, overseen and regulated. It also delves into some of the risks and more specific challenges involved in ensuring protection of minority shareholder rights and managing or minimising conflicts of interest within groups. It notes the rising importance of Latin American-based multinational company groups. Finally, it reviews existing international and regional guidance on corporate governance of company groups before assessing the more specific policy options and challenges in the region, and describing the conclusions reached by the Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable and Task Force on Company Groups based on this report's findings. Country-specific chapters provide more specific descriptions of the frameworks in place for corporate governance of company groups in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.

My dissertation explores the leading role of ownership structures in corporate governance for publicly traded firms in emerging markets. I analyze the relationships between ownership structures, corporate governance mechanisms, firm value and market liquidity for a sample of Latin American firms. The predominant highly concentrated ownership within a context of weak shareholder protection provides a rich environment to explore corporate governance practices in a regional setting. The period of analysis, 2000-2006, is characterized by economic growth sustained by the expansion of foreign direct investment in a post-privatization era. The region as a whole, rather than just individual markets, became an attractive investment destination. In addition the development of a private pension system initiated in Chile and subsequently expanded to more than 25 countries (the AFP system) reinvigorated the capital markets which have become more attractive as a means of diversification for global portfolios. Moreover, understanding the implications of concentrated ownership structures is fundamental for participants in a yet incipient mergers and acquisitions market. My dissertation consists of three related essays which collectively cohere to represent my research approach and understanding of the topic and they all benefit from the exploitation of a unique ownership database. This work serves to advance the finance literature in several dimensions: a) the manuscript examines at markets which have hitherto been ignored or at best simply characterized as having very weak governance structures; b) it addresses endogeneity problems from the initial design of this research project through the data collection process; c) furthermore, I extend the literature on the interactions between governance mechanisms and firm value; and d) it develops new corporate governance measures, including novel "effective" firm ownership variables for these markets. Dominant shareholders may have both the capability and the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. Specifically, I examine performance effects that may be attributable to discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights. I examine the extent to which dominant shareholders can divert resources for their own consumption, in turn reducing overall shareholder value. Given the large potential for private consumption, by the dominant shareholders, I also explore the motivations for outside investors to participate in the financing of the firms' activities.

Shallow capital markets are a key bottleneck for private sector development in Latin America. Still, there is not a large literature on capital markets and corporate governance, or on the politics of regulatory reform and business associations, focused on this region. To help address this gap, this new book introduces private equity into the financial development debate through a Latin American lens. The author looks at the cases of Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Argentina. And proposes a shift in the financial development discussion from institutional explanations focused only on rules to an actor-based argument centered on the role of institutional investors, in particular pension funds .

Covering 26 jurisdictions including in-depth review of Australia, Chile and Germany, this report focuses the role of institutional investors in promoting good corporate governance practices including the incentives they face to promote such outcomes.