My dissertation explores the leading role of ownership structures in corporate governance for publicly traded firms in emerging markets. I analyze the relationships between ownership structures, corporate governance mechanisms, firm value and market liquidity for a sample of Latin American firms. The predominant highly concentrated ownership within a context of weak shareholder protection provides a rich environment to explore corporate governance practices in a regional setting. The period of analysis, 2000-2006, is characterized by economic growth sustained by the expansion of foreign direct investment in a post-privatization era. The region as a whole, rather than just individual markets, became an attractive investment destination. In addition the development of a private pension system initiated in Chile and subsequently expanded to more than 25 countries (the AFP system) reinvigorated the capital markets which have become more attractive as a means of diversification for global portfolios. Moreover, understanding the implications of concentrated ownership structures is fundamental for participants in a yet incipient mergers and acquisitions market. My dissertation consists of three related essays which collectively cohere to represent my research approach and understanding of the topic and they all benefit from the exploitation of a unique ownership database. This work serves to advance the finance literature in several dimensions: a) the manuscript examines at markets which have hitherto been ignored or at best simply characterized as having very weak governance structures; b) it addresses endogeneity problems from the initial design of this research project through the data collection process; c) furthermore, I extend the literature on the interactions between governance mechanisms and firm value; and d) it develops new corporate governance measures, including novel "effective" firm ownership variables for these markets. Dominant shareholders may have both the capability and the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. Specifically, I examine performance effects that may be attributable to discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights. I examine the extent to which dominant shareholders can divert resources for their own consumption, in turn reducing overall shareholder value. Given the large potential for private consumption, by the dominant shareholders, I also explore the motivations for outside investors to participate in the financing of the firms' activities.

This book fills the gap between theories and practices of corporate governance in emerging markets by providing the reader with an in-depth understanding of governance mechanisms, practices and cases in these markets. It is an invaluable resource not only for academic researchers and graduate students in law, economics, management and finance but also for people practicing governance such as lawmakers, policymakers and international organizations promoting best governance practices in emerging countries. Investors can benefit from this book to better understand of these markets and to make judicious investment decisions.

Throughout the world, the Anglo-American model of corporate governance tends to prevail – but no two countries are identical. Governance outcomes in developing and emerging economies often deviate from what theory predicts, due to a wide range of factors. Using insights from New Institutional Economics, Corporate Governance in Developing and Emerging Markets aims to explain the different issues and cultural and legal factors at play, and put forward an alternative governance framework for these economies. Structured in three parts, this text investigates different models of corporate governance; it explores the realities of corporate governance in ten nations, including the ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and ‘MINT’ (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) countries; and then considers corporate governance reform. This interdisciplinary text will be a valuable tool for students of corporate governance across Business, Economics and Law; and an equally useful resource for anyone working in or carrying out research in this area.

Research in this book focuses on the strategic behaviour of the State as a shareholder in businesses, and the implications it has for the other shareholder(s) and business performance. It investigates the institutional characteristics of State-linked and State-owned firms (SIEs & SOEs), in emerging markets using Vietnam as a case study with comparative analysis on China and selected ASEAN countries. In doing so, the book adopts an evidence-based approach to explain the State’s role as a shareholder in the different aspects of corporate governance, including CEO appointment, board structure and impact of State ownership on business strategy and performance. It highlights the influence of the State as a shareholder by investigating institutional factors consistent with “path dependence” theory, which postulates that the initial and underlying structure of an economy influences its performance. In addition, the book presents empirical evidence of the dynamics of corporate governance arising from interactions between the State and other shareholders, which has not yet been addressed in the literature, and is distinctive in providing new insights from both qualitative and empirical research on how to successfully navigate the emerging market business environments from the perspective of the State as an “owner-participant”. Explaining the theoretical constructs in corporate governance in State-invested firms, empirical research methodologies, and results to draw and validate inferences, the book is comprehensive and provides a practical guide for practitioners as well as a reference for academics, undergraduate and postgraduate students. The new theoretical models proposed integrate traditional political-economic and agency theories, which also underpin tertiary business courses and academic research.

This book investigates the institutional characteristics of state-linked firms in Vietnam to draw lessons for investors/MNCs targeting Vietnam and other emerging markets in the region. Vietnam and many other ASEAN countries have gone through a period of privatization and equitization of wholly controlled SOEs, with the State retaining partial ownership in many privatized businesses. This book explains the dynamic relationships between the State, BODs, shareholders, and regulators and their influence on corporate governance and SOE performance. This book differs from other publications in that it extrapolates the findings from our study to a broader context on how the defined internal mechanisms implicate the local economy and global supply chains/markets. This book investigates robust theoretical foundations, and rigorous applied empirical research underpin the role of the State in SOEs. It differs from other studies in terms of qualitative and empirical research to provide the contextual setting to elucidate how to successfully navigate emerging market business with the State as an "owner-participant." This book explains the theoretical constructs of corporate governance in SOEs, applies empirical research methodologies, and draws results to validate inferences to (1) investigate the link between the board of directors and ownership attributes and agency cost levels using Vietnamese listed firms for the period from 2006 to 2013, (2) evaluate the effectiveness of State's corporate initiatives and monitoring through its sovereign wealth fund known as the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC), and (3) infer and explain the motivation of the State as a shareholder. This book takes cognizance of Vietnam's idiosyncratic institutional (using its sovereign wealth fund as an investment vehicle and management proxy), economic, regulatory, and corporate environments and the realities for developing an effective and sustainable business model, vis-à-vis the ownership structure, board of directors' composition and corporate governance, for better business performance. While the focus is on Vietnam, the content is also relevant to the role of the State in other emerging markets as a player in shaping the business strategy, model, and direction of SOEs.

Corporate governance reform has become an important global policy agenda driven by events such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, corporate scandals (such as Enron and WorldCom) and the globalisation of capital markets. This book advances debate on corporate governance, accountability and transparency in less developed and emerging economies.

While emerging market economies do not have a mature market structure yet, there is a need for research on corporate governance practices in these economies from different perspectives, including corporate social responsibility. Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Emerging Markets Focus fills the gap with a collection of high-quality research and policy-based papers addressing these issues, using various market cases as illustrations.Unlike previous books that often focused on one or several emerging markets, this book covers a much broader set of countries and tackles ethical, legal and societal aspects of corporate governance, beyond financial issues. It also discusses how companies work towards best corporate governance practices, particularly, in the aftermath of recent financial and economic crises. Readers will benefit from the wide range of theoretical, empirical, and case analyses, selected with care to reflect cutting-edge corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues in countries with emerging markets.

This study examines whether differences in ownership structure across firms can explain their performance differences in an emerging economy, like Bangladesh, where corporate governance variables have been testified whether they exert any influence on firm performance. The empirical evidence of this study suggests that sponsor holding and government holding are significantly positively related to firm performance, whereas institutional holding is insignificantly related to performance. However, board size and existence of audit committee chaired by sponsor director are significantly negatively related to firm's performance. Using the data for the period of 2002-2004, it is observed that a large fraction of cross-sectional variation in performance, found in several studies, is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity, rather than the shareholders holding pattern alone.

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

With global financial markets having become more integrated, the book pays particular attention to the role of corporate governance in emerging-market economies and international capital flows. Rich in facts and ideas, the book is for anyone interested in financial crises, international risk management and global competitiveness.