Beverley McLachlin was the first woman to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. Joining the Court while it was establishing its approach to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, McLachlin aided the court in weathering the public backlash against controversial decisions during her tenure. Controversies in the Common Law explores Chief Justice McLachlin’s approach to legal reasoning, examines her remarkable contributions in controversial areas of the common law, and highlights the role of judicial philosophy in shaping the law. Chapters in this book span thirty years, and deal with a variety of topics – including tort, unjust enrichment, administrative and criminal law. The contributors show that McLachlin had a philosophical streak that drove her to ensure unity and consistency in the common law, and to prefer incremental change over revolution. Celebrating the career of an influential jurist, Controversies in the Common Law demonstrates how the common law approach taken by Chief Justice McLachlin has been successful in managing criticism and ensuring the legitimacy of the Court.

Originally published: 5th ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1956.

This book offers a new account of the power of federal courts in the United States to hear and determine uncontested applications to assert or register a claim of right. Familiar to lawyers in civil law countries as forms of voluntary or non-contentious jurisdiction, these uncontested applications fit uneasily with the commitment to adversary legalism in the United States. Indeed, modern accounts of federal judicial power often urge that the language of the Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of concrete disputes between adverse parties, thereby ruling out all forms of non-contentious jurisdiction. Said to rest on the so-called "case-or-controversy" requirement of Article III, this requirement of party contestation threatens the power of federal courts to conduct a range of familiar proceedings, such as the oversight of bankruptcy proceedings, the issuance of warrants, and the adjudication of applications for mandamus and habeas corpus relief. By recounting the tradition of naturalization and other uncontested litigation in antebellum America and coupling that tradition with an account of the important difference between cases and controversies, this book challenges the prevailing understanding of Article III. In addition to defending the power of federal courts to hear uncontested matters of federal law, the book examines the way the Constitution's meaning has changed over time and suggests a constructive interpretive methodology that would allow the Supreme Court to take account of the old and the new in defining the contours of federal judicial power.

In this, the last book published during his lifetime, renowned historian of the English Revolution Christopher Hill uses the literary culture of the seventeenth century to explore the immense social changes of the period as well as the expressions of liberty, the law and the hero-worship of the outlaw defiance. As well as chapters on gypsies and vagabonds, Hill analyzes class, religion and the shift away from the importance of the church after the Reformation. Liberty against the Law is a late classic of Hill's work and essential reading for anyone interested in the history and politics of the seventeenth-century.

The law of commercial remedies raises a number of important doctrinal, theoretical and practical controversies which deserve sustained and rigorous examination. This volume explores such controversies and suggests solutions, which is essential to ensure that the law is defensible, clear and just. With contributions from twenty-three leading academic and practitioner experts, this book addresses significant issues in the law which, taken together, range across the entire remedial jurisdiction as it applies to commercial disputes. The book primarily focuses on the resolution of controversies in the English law of commercial remedies, but recent developments elsewhere are also considered, especially in other common law jurisdictions. The result provides remarkably comprehensive coverage of the field which will be of relevance to academics, students, judges and practitioners.

Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia once remarked that the theory of an evolving, "living" Constitution effectively "rendered the Constitution useless." He wanted a "dead Constitution," he joked, arguing it must be interpreted as the framers originally understood it. In The Living Constitution, leading constitutional scholar David Strauss forcefully argues against the claims of Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Robert Bork, and other "originalists," explaining in clear, jargon-free English how the Constitution can sensibly evolve, without falling into the anything-goes flexibility caricatured by opponents. The living Constitution is not an out-of-touch liberal theory, Strauss further shows, but a mainstream tradition of American jurisprudence--a common-law approach to the Constitution, rooted in the written document but also based on precedent. Each generation has contributed precedents that guide and confine judicial rulings, yet allow us to meet the demands of today, not force us to follow the commands of the long-dead Founders. Strauss explores how judicial decisions adapted the Constitution's text (and contradicted original intent) to produce some of our most profound accomplishments: the end of racial segregation, the expansion of women's rights, and the freedom of speech. By contrast, originalism suffers from fatal flaws: the impossibility of truly divining original intent, the difficulty of adapting eighteenth-century understandings to the modern world, and the pointlessness of chaining ourselves to decisions made centuries ago. David Strauss is one of our leading authorities on Constitutional law--one with practical knowledge as well, having served as Assistant Solicitor General of the United States and argued eighteen cases before the United States Supreme Court. Now he offers a profound new understanding of how the Constitution can remain vital to life in the twenty-first century.

Provides the entire story behind each case, including the facts leading up to the offense, photographs, and background information about the parties. This approach entices analytical thinking about how the law should deal with each case and reveals what actually happened to the defendants and why.

In an ideal world, the laws of Congress--known as federal statutes--would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress. When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.

Regulating Judges presents a novel approach to judicial studies. It goes beyond the traditional clash of judicial independence versus judicial accountability. Drawing on regulatory theory, Richard Devlin and Adam Dodek argue that judicial regulation is multi-faceted and requires us to consider the complex interplay of values, institutional norms, procedures, resources and outcomes. Inspired by this conceptual framework, the book invites scholars from 19 jurisdictions to describe and critique the regulatory regimes for a variety of countries from around the world.