Discusses the judicial role in constitutional authoritarianism in the context of Korea's political and constitutional transitions.

This book explores the complicated relationship between constitutions and transitional justice. It brings together scholars and practitioners from different countries to analyze the indispensable role of constitutions and constitutional courts in the process of overcoming political injustice of the past. Issues raised in the book include the role of a new constitution for the successful practice of transitional justice after democratization, revolution or civil war, and the difficulties faced by the court while dealing with mass human rights infringements with limited legal tools. The work also examines whether constitutionalizing transitional justice is a better strategy for new democracies in response to political injustice from the past. It further addresses the complex issue of backslides of democracy and consequences of constitutionalizing transitional justice. The group of international authors address the interplay of the constitution/court and transitional justice in their native countries, along with theoretical underpinnings of the success or unfulfilled promises of transitional justice from a comparative perspective. The book will be a valuable resource for academics, researchers and policy-makers working in the areas of Transitional Justice, Comparative Constitutional Law, Human Rights Studies, International Criminal Law, Genocide Studies, Law and Politics, and Legal History.

Barber shows that New Right theorists, such as Bork, and establishment liberals, such as Ronald Dworkin, are moral relativists who cannot escape conclusions ("might makes right," for example) that could destroy constitutionalism in America. The best hope for American freedoms, Barber argues, is to revive classical constitutionalism - and he explains how new movements in philosophy today allow the Court's friends to do just that. Written in a lively and engaging style.

How the Supreme Court’s move to the right has distorted both logic and the Constitution What Supreme Court justices do is far more than just “calling balls and strikes.” The Court has never simply evaluated laws and arguments in light of permanent and immutable constitutional meanings. Social, moral, and yes, political ideas have always played into the justices’ impressions of how they think a case should be decided. Mark Tushnet traces the ways constitutional thought has evolved, from the liberalism of the New Deal and the Great Society to the Reagan conservatism that has been dominant since the 1980s. Looking at the current crossroads in the constitutional order, Tushnet explores the possibilities of either a Trumpian entrenchment of the most extreme ideas of the Reagan philosophy, or a dramatic and destabilizing move to the left. Wary of either outcome, he offers a passionate and informed argument for replacing judicial supremacy with popular constitutionalism—a move that would restore to the other branches of government a role in deciding constitutional questions.

America is facing a constitutional crisis that threatens the continuation of the Republic as founded and structured. The US Supreme Court is a primary agent in the rise, expansion, and promotion of this crisis. By the employ of one of the amendments, the Court continues its work of restructuring the governmental order established by the Constitution and of shifting the nation from its Christian foundation to one wholly secular. Such actions by the Court raise very serious questions: By what lawful authority does the Court engage in this work? What are the driving motives behind the Courts stratagem? What are some of the main consequences thus far produced? Address is given to these questions, as well as to the means of restoring constitutional order and limiting the powers of the Supreme Court to those specified.

The constitutional system of South Korea is a work in progress, and this volume fleshes out and makes intelligible to foreign readers that process within the specific political and historical context of modern South Korea. The current South Korean Constitution of 1987 is the culmination of decades-long efforts by the South Korean people to achieve democratic self-government. It is the fruition of untold sacrifices made by dedicated citizens who tirelessly fought to rein in the power of the government under some form of constitutional rule. In that sense, it should be understood against the backdrop of South Korea's experimentation with constitutionalism that began at the turn of the last century. Yet, it also represents a radical break, the beginning of a new era which ended a long political history of 'constitution without constitutionalism'. For the first time in the history of the South Korean nation, the constitution has become a living norm rather than an ornament, or a façade, for illegitimate or ineffectual governments. It has proven to be a binding law that matters not only for government leaders but also for private individuals. With the adoption, especially, of a system allowing the adjudication of constitutional issues at an independent court, the people have begun to realise that the constitution can be invoked to protect their rights and advance their interests. As a result, the South Korean Constitutional Court is being stretched to its limits with a great number of cases filed at its docket. This book is an insightful new addition to Hart's successful series, Constitutional Systems of the World.

From Brown v. Board of Education to Roe v. Wade to Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court has, over the past fifty years, assumed an increasingly controversial place in American national political life. As the recurring struggles over nominations to the Court illustrate, few questions today divide our political community more profoundly than those concerning the Court's proper role as protector of liberties and guardian of the Constitution. If the nation is today in the midst of a "culture war," the contest over the Supreme Court is certainly one of its principal battlefields. In this volume, distinguished constitutional scholars aim to move debate beyond the sound bites that divide the opposing parties to more fundamental discussions about the nature of constitutionalism. Toward this end, the volume includes chapters on the philosophical and historical origins of the idea of constitutionalism; on theories of constitutionalism in American history in particular; on the practices of constitutionalism around the globe; and on the parallel emergence of—and the persistent tensions between—constitutionalism and democracy throughout the modern world. In democracies, the primary point of having a constitution is to place some matters beyond politics and partisan contest. And yet it seems equally clear that constitutionalism of this kind results in a struggle over the meaning or proper interpretation of the constitution, a struggle that is itself deeply political. Although the volume represents a variety of viewpoints and approaches, this struggle, which is the central paradox of constitutionalism, is the ultimate theme of all the essays.

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Here a leading scholar in constitutional law, Mark Tushnet, challenges hallowed American traditions of judicial review and judicial supremacy, which allow U.S. judges to invalidate "unconstitutional" governmental actions. Many people, particularly liberals, have "warm and fuzzy" feelings about judicial review. They are nervous about what might happen to unprotected constitutional provisions in the chaotic worlds of practical politics and everyday life. By examining a wide range of situations involving constitutional rights, Tushnet vigorously encourages us all to take responsibility for protecting our liberties. Guarding them is not the preserve of judges, he maintains, but a commitment of the citizenry to define itself as "We the People of the United States." The Constitution belongs to us collectively, as we act in political dialogue with each other--whether in the street, in the voting booth, or in the legislature as representatives of others. Tushnet urges that we create a "populist" constitutional law in which judicial declarations deserve no special consideration. But he warns that in so doing we must pursue reasonable interpretations of the "thin Constitution"--The fundamental American principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution. A populist Constitution, he maintains, will be more effective than a document exclusively protected by the courts. Tushnet believes, for example, that the serious problems of the communist scare of the 1950s were aggravated when Senator Joseph McCarthy's opponents were lulled into inaction, believing that the judicial branch would step in and declare McCarthy's actions unconstitutional. Instead of fulfilling the expectations, the Court allowed McCarthy to continue his crusade until it was ended. Tushnet points out that in this context and in many others, errors occurred because of the existence of judicial review: neither the People nor their representatives felt empowered to enforce the Constitution because they mistakenly counted on the courts to do so. Tushnet's clarion call for a new kind of constitutional law will be essential reading for constitutional law experts, political scientists, and others interested in how and if the freedoms of the American Republic can survive into the twenty-first century.