A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.

Table of contents

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. - Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions - New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications - New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

How can organizations ensure that they can get best value for money in their procurement decisions? How can they stimulate innovations from their dedicated suppliers? With contributions from leading academics and professionals, this 2006 handbook offers expert guidance on the fundamental aspects of successful procurement design and management in firms, public administrations, and international institutions. The issues addressed include the management of dynamic procurement; the handling of procurement risk; the architecture of purchasing systems; the structure of incentives in procurement contracts; methods to increase suppliers' participation in procurement contests and e-procurement platforms; how to minimize the risk of collusion and of corruption; pricing and reputation mechanisms in e-procurement platforms; and how procurement can enhance innovation. Inspired by frontier research, it provides practical recommendations to managers, engineers and lawyers engaged in private and public procurement design.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Graph Theory, Combinatorics and Algorithms: Interdisciplinary Applications focuses on discrete mathematics and combinatorial algorithms interacting with real world problems in computer science, operations research, applied mathematics and engineering. The book contains eleven chapters written by experts in their respective fields, and covers a wide spectrum of high-interest problems across these discipline domains. Among the contributing authors are Richard Karp of UC Berkeley and Robert Tarjan of Princeton; both are at the pinnacle of research scholarship in Graph Theory and Combinatorics. The chapters from the contributing authors focus on "real world" applications, all of which will be of considerable interest across the areas of Operations Research, Computer Science, Applied Mathematics, and Engineering. These problems include Internet congestion control, high-speed communication networks, multi-object auctions, resource allocation, software testing, data structures, etc. In sum, this is a book focused on major, contemporary problems, written by the top research scholars in the field, using cutting-edge mathematical and computational techniques.

The Sixth International Financial Cryptography Conference was held during March 11-14, 2002, in Southampton, Bermuda. As is customary at FC, these proceedings represent "final" versions of the papers presented, revised to take into account comments and discussions from the conference. Submissions to the conference were strong, with 74 papers submitted and 19 accepted for presentation and publication. (Regrettably, three of the submit ted papers had to be summarily rejected after it was discovered that they had been improperly submitted in parallel to other conferences.) The small program committee worked very hard under a tight schedule (working through Christmas day) to select the program. No program chair could ask for a better committee; my thanks to everyone for their hard work and dedication. In addition to the refereed papers, the program included a welcome from the Minister of Telecommunications and e-Commerce, Renee Webb, a keynote address by Nigel Hickson, and a panel on privacy tradeoffs cheiired by Rebecca Wright (with panelists Ian Goldberg, Ron Rivest, and Graham Wood). The traditional Tuesday evening "rump session" was skillfully officiated by Markus Jakobsson. My job as program chair was made much, much easier by the excellent work of our general chair, Nicko van Someren, who performed the miracle of hiding from me any evidence of the innumerable logistical nightmares associated with conducting this conference. I have no idea how he did it, but it must have involved many sleepless nights.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th Annual Conference on Learning Theory, COLT 2004, held in Banff, Canada in July 2004. The 46 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 113 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on economics and game theory, online learning, inductive inference, probabilistic models, Boolean function learning, empirical processes, MDL, generalisation, clustering and distributed learning, boosting, kernels and probabilities, kernels and kernel matrices, and open problems.