The concept of a "middle ground" between simple peace enforcement and traditional peacekeeping by lightly armed observers has been both ill defined and controversial. But the authors of this thoughtful yet challenging volume make a strong case for both the practicability and the desirability of such operations. "Coercive inducement"--the term was suggested by Kofi Annan, when he was undersecretary general for peacekeeping--is a form of coercive diplomacy that relies more on the deployment and demonstration of military force than on the use of force per se. In the absence of such an option, the international community finds it hard to respond to a variety of crises, including ones that can spiral into genocide. After first laying out general principles, the book explores four recent UN operations (in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti) in which coercive inducement was particularly relevant, and then presents operational guidelines for its use. Clear-sighted and pragmatic throughout, the authors conclude by suggesting when and to what extent the international community should commit itself to undertake coercive inducement.

This clear and concise text offers a comprehensive comparison of national, international, and human security concepts and policies. Laura Neack argues that security remains elusive because of a centuries-old ethic insisting that states are the primary and most important international actors, can rely ultimately only on themselves for protection, and must keep all options on the table for national security. The author compellingly demonstrates how a state-first security ethic ultimately fails to secure states, the international community and--most important--human beings. Although security as a concept can be widened to include almost any aspect of existence, Neack focuses especially on security from physical violence, beginning with efforts by states to defend themselves against violent attack. She explores such topics as the internal and external dimensions of security, terrorism, and defending the homeland; threat perception and responses; preemptive and preventive wars; and other military interventions. Next, Neack examines efforts over the past century to protect states through the construction of the United Nations international security system and how collective security, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement have been used in that system. Throughout, Neack shows that human security has only mattered in terms of servicing the state's security needs, a critique she takes up directly in the final chapters. A range of short and extended case studies are offered to illustrate the conceptual materials and policy debates over security. In this state-first world, we only can choose between degrees of insecurity; true security remains elusive.

"As Robert Art makes clear in a groundbreaking conclusion, those results have been mixed at best. Art dissects the uneven performance of coercive diplomacy and explains why it has sometimes worked and why it has more often failed."--BOOK JACKET.

This book explores the issue of civilian devastation in modern warfare, focusing on the complex processes that effectively establish civilians’ identity in times of war. Underpinning the physicality of war’s tumult are structural forces that create landscapes of civilian vulnerability. Such forces operate in four sectors of modern warfare: nationalistic ideology, state-sponsored militaries, global media, and international institutions. Each sector promotes its own constructions of civilian identity in relation to militant combatants: constructions that prove lethal to the civilian noncombatant who lacks political power and decision-making capacity with regards to their own survival. Civilians and Modern Warprovides a critical overview of the plight of civilians in war, examining the political and normative underpinnings of the decisions, actions, policies, and practices of major sectors of war. The contributors seek to undermine the ‘tunnelling effect’ of the militaristic framework regarding the experiences of noncombatants. This book will be of much interest to students of war and conflict studies, ethics, conflict resolution, and IR/Security Studies.

Rules for the World provides an innovative perspective on the behavior of international organizations and their effects on global politics. Arguing against the conventional wisdom that these bodies are little more than instruments of states, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore begin with the fundamental insight that international organizations are bureaucracies that have authority to make rules and so exercise power. At the same time, Barnett and Finnemore maintain, such bureaucracies can become obsessed with their own rules, producing unresponsive, inefficient, and self-defeating outcomes. Authority thus gives international organizations autonomy and allows them to evolve and expand in ways unintended by their creators. Barnett and Finnemore reinterpret three areas of activity that have prompted extensive policy debate: the use of expertise by the IMF to expand its intrusion into national economies; the redefinition of the category "refugees" and decision to repatriate by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and the UN Secretariat's failure to recommend an intervention during the first weeks of the Rwandan genocide. By providing theoretical foundations for treating these organizations as autonomous actors in their own right, Rules for the World contributes greatly to our understanding of global politics and global governance.

Many of the world's deadliest conflicts are largely ignored - becoming off-the-radar 'stealth conflicts'. How can this be possible in a world with unprecedented levels of access to information, and unprecedented levels of attention and resources being devoted to foreign affairs? Virgil Hawkins reveals and explains the highly distorted and assimilated responses to foreign conflicts by major actors in the world. He examines the agenda-setting processes of policy makers, the media, the public and academics in relation to foreign conflicts. Using a vast array of detailed examples, he systematically unravels the internal dynamics and external influences experienced by these actors, and in so doing he brings the academic agenda into the loop of the conflict response agenda-setting process for the first time. With agenda-setting research tending to focus on the question of why a response to a particular event or issue occurred, this book furthers research by focusing equally on why a response did not occur. The volume is critically important in understanding why actors do and do not respond to foreign conflicts.