China’s approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first test in 1964, but it has recently accelerated nuclear force modernization. China’s strategic environment is likely to grow more complex, and nuclear constituencies are gaining a larger bureaucratic voice. Beijing is unlikely to change official nuclear policies but will probably increase emphasis on nuclear deterrence and may adjust the definition of key concepts.

"This volume brings together an international group of distinguished scholars to provide a fresh assessment of China's strategic military capabilities, doctrines, and perceptions in light of rapidly advancing technologies, an expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal, and increased great-power competition with the United States. China's strategic weapons are its expanding nuclear arsenal and emerging conventional weapons systems such as hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite missiles. China's strategic arsenal is important because of how it affects the dynamics of US-China relations and the relationship between China and its neighbors. Without a doubt China's strategic arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, but this book also examines key uncertainties. Will China's new capabilities and confidence lead it to be more assertive or take more risks? Will China's nuclear traditions (i.e., no first use) change as the strategic balance improves? Will China's approach to military competition in the domains of cyberspace and outer space be guided by a notion of strategic stability or not? Will there be a strategic arms race with the United States? The goal of this book is to update our understanding of these issues and to make predictions about how these dynamics may play out"--

China�s nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. The arsenal has historically been small, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert, and married to a no-first-use doctrine � all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong�s oft-quoted remark that �nuclear weapons are a paper tiger� seems to be bluster or madness. China�s nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world�s most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China�s nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

India has come a long way from being a nuclear pariah to a de facto member of the nuclear club. The transition in its nuclear identity has been accompanied by its transformation into a major economic power and underlines a pragmatic turn in its foreign-policy thinking. This book provides a historical narrative of the evolution of India’s nuclear policy since 1947, as the country continues its pursuit for complete integration into the global nuclear order. Situating India’s nuclear behaviour in this context, the book explains how India’s engagement with the atom is unique in international nuclear history and politics. Aided by declassified archival documents and oral history interviews, it focuses on how status, security, domestic politics, and the role of individuals have played a key role in defining and shaping India’s nuclear trajectory, policy choices, and their consequences.

Since the 1949 Communist Revolution, China has devised nine different military strategies, which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) calls strategic guidelines. What accounts for these numerous changes? Active Defense offers the first systematic look at China's military strategy from the mid-twentieth century to today. Exploring the range and intensity of threats that China has faced, M. Taylor Fravel illuminates the nation's past and present military goals and how China sought to achieve them, and offers a rich set of cases for deepening the study of change in military organizations. Drawing from diverse Chinese-language sources, including memoirs of leading generals, military histories, and document collections that have become available only in the last two decades, Fravel shows why transformations in military strategy were pursued at certain times and not others. He focuses on the military strategies adopted in 1956, 1980, and 1993 when the PLA was attempting to wage war in a new kind of way to show that China has pursued major change in its strategic guidelines when there has been a significant shift in the conduct of warfare in the international system and when China's Communist Party has been united. Delving into the security threats China has faced over the last seven decades, Active Defense offers a detailed investigation into how and why states alter their defense policies.

China’s emergence as a global economic superpower, and as a major regional military power in Asia and the Pacific, has had a major impact on its relations with the United States and its neighbors. China was the driving factor in the new strategy the United States announced in 2012 that called for a “rebalance” of U.S. forces to the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, China’s actions on its borders, in the East China Sea, and in the South China Sea have shown that it is steadily expanding its geopolitical role in the Pacific and having a steadily increasing impact on the strategy and military developments in other Asian powers.

There is a small risk of deliberate nuclear use and a larger risk of inadvertent nuclear use in a future US-China conflict, both of which could increase if the possibility of conflict grows or if Washington or Beijing pursue more ambitious nuclear strategies. China’s nuclear strategy has to date focused on deterring an adversary’s nuclear threats and use. While its recent nuclear arsenal modernisation is consistent with this strategy, Beijing has acquired new capabilities that could enable a shift to a nuclear first-use strategy. The United States and China are not in a nuclear arms race. Nevertheless, efforts by the United States to maintain its current margin of superiority over China’s nuclear forces, or to deter North Korea or Russia, could prompt further growth in China’s arsenal. Australia’s interests would be best served by an allied military strategy for countering China that emphasises robust conventional capabilities, relies on US nuclear weapons to deter the unlikely prospect of Chinese nuclear first-use, and strives to mitigate the risks of inadvertent nuclear escalation. Australia should work through existing mechanisms for consultation in the alliance, as well as multilateral fora, to lessen the risks of nuclear use in a future US-China conflict scenario and support informal arms control among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Global power is shifting to Asia. The U.S. military is embarking on an American "pivot" to the Indo-Pacific region, and the bulk of global arms spending is directed toward Asian theaters. India and Pakistan are thought to be building up their nuclear arsenals while questions persist about China's potential to "sprint to parity." China remains by far the world's largest market for new nuclear energy production, and India aspires to be on a similar trajectory. Despite these trends, The China-India Nuclear Crossroads is the first serious book by leading Chinese and Indian experts to examine the political, military, and technical factors that affect Sino-Indian nuclear relations. In this book, editor and translator Lora Saalman presents a comprehensive framework through which China and India can pursue enhanced cooperation and minimize the unintended consequences of their security dilemmas.

Drawing on Chinese military writings, this report finds that China’s strategic-deterrence concepts are evolving in response to Beijing’s changing assessment of its external security environment and a growing emphasis on protecting its emerging interests in space and cyberspace. China also is rapidly closing what was once a substantial gap between the People’s Liberation Army’s strategic weapons capabilities and its strategic-deterrence concepts.