Cultural Realism is an in-depth study of premodern Chinese strategic thought that has important implications for contemporary international relations theory. In applying a Western theoretical debate to China, Iain Johnston advances rigorous procedures for testing for the existence and influence of "strategic culture." Johnston sets out to answer two empirical questions. Is there a substantively consistent and temporally persistent Chinese strategic culture? If so, to what extent has it influenced China's approaches to security? The focus of his study is the Ming dynasty's grand strategy against the Mongols (1368-1644). First Johnston examines ancient military texts as sources of Chinese strategic culture, using cognitive mapping, symbolic analysis and congruence tests to determine whether there is a consistent grand strategic preference ranking across texts that constitutes a single strategic culture. Then he applies similar techniques to determine the effect of the strategic culture on the strategic preferences of the Ming decision makers. Finally, he assesses the effect of these preferences on Ming policies towards the Mongol "threat." The findings of this book challenge dominant interpretations of traditional Chinese strategic thought. They suggest also that the roots of realpolitik are ideational and not predominantly structural. The results lead to the surprising conclusion that there may be, in fact, fewer cross-national differences in strategic culture than proponents of the "strategic culture" approach think.

Examining the major academic and policy debates over China’s rise and related policy issues, this book looks into the motivations and intentions of a rising China. Most of the scholarly works on China’s rise approach the question at a structural level by looking at the international system and the systemic impact on China’s foreign policy. Traditional Realist theorists define China as a revisionist power eager to address wrongs done to them in history, whilst some cultural and historical analyses attest that China’s strategic culture has been offensive despite its weak material capability. Huiyun Feng’s path-breaking contribution to the debate tests these rival hypotheses by examining systematically the beliefs of contemporary Chinese leaders and their strategic interactions with other states since 1949 when the communist regime came to power. The focus is on tracing the historical roots of Chinese strategic culture and its links to the decision-making of six key Chinese leaders via their belief systems. Chinese Strategic Culture will be of interest to students of Chinese politics, foreign policy, strategic theory and international relations in general.

The author examines the impact of strategic culture on 21st century China. He contends that the People's Republic of China's security policies and its tendency to use military force are influenced not only by elite understandings of China's own strategic tradition, but also by their understandings of the strategic cultures of other states. Gaining a fuller appreciation for how Chinese strategists view the United States and Japan, our key ally in the Asia-Pacific, will better enable us to assess regional and global security issues.

Confucianism has shaped a certain perception of Chinese security strategy, symbolized by the defensive, nonaggressive Great Wall. Many believe China is antimilitary and reluctant to use force against its enemies. It practices pacifism and refrains from expanding its boundaries, even when nationally strong. In a path-breaking study traversing six centuries of Chinese history, Yuan-kang Wang resoundingly discredits this notion, recasting China as a practitioner of realpolitik and a ruthless purveyor of expansive grand strategies. Leaders of the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) prized military force and shrewdly assessed the capabilities of China's adversaries. They adopted defensive strategies when their country was weak and pursued expansive goals, such as territorial acquisition, enemy destruction, and total military victory, when their country was strong. Despite the dominance of an antimilitarist Confucian culture, warfare was not uncommon in the bulk of Chinese history. Grounding his research in primary Chinese sources, Wang outlines a politics of power that are crucial to understanding China's strategies today, especially its policy of "peaceful development," which, he argues, the nation has adopted mainly because of its military, economic, and technological weakness in relation to the United States.

Strategic Asia 2016-17 examines how the region's major powers view international politics and the use of military force. In each chapter, a leading expert analyzes the ideological and historical sources of a country's strategic culture, how strategic culture informs the thinking of the country's policymakers, and how these understandings lead to decisions about the pursuit of strategic objectives and national power.

This book re-visits the history of the Korean War of 1950-1953 from a Chinese perspective, examining Chinese strategy and exploring why China sent three million troops to Korea, in Mao’s words, to “defend the homeland and safeguard the country”—giving rise to what became the war’s common name in China. It also looks into the relatively neglected historical factors which have redefined China’s security concerns and strategic culture. Using newly available sources from China and the former Soviet Union, the book considers how interactive the parameters of defense changes were in a foreign war against Western powers, how flexible Chinese strategy was in the context of its intervention, and how expansive its strategic cultural repertoire was at the crucial moment to “defend the country.” Providing a re-examination of China’s military decisions and strategy evolution, this text narrates the story of successive generations of Chinese leaders and provides a key insight into security issues in China and Northeast Asia today.

The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany’s post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China’s rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany’s armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany’s current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin’s European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that: Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than rejecting the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power – including military power – in international affairs. The authors show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy.

For the past 2 decades, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has made great gains in national development and economic growth and now stands as one of the most important states on the world scene. It is extremely important for U.S. policymakers to have a contextual understanding of what shapes Chinese thought and behavior thus driving Chinese political, economic, and military imperatives. With much of the American public accepting the "China Threat" theory, it is critical that the United States recognize the role of strategic culture in shaping China's domestic and external policies. This paper illustrates the key characteristics of Chinese strategic culture-philosophy, history, and domestic factors that, to a remarkable extent, structure the strategic objectives of China's formal foreign policy and explain how Chinese strategic interests are defined by modern Chinese pragmatic nationalism, its drive for modernization, and the desire for China to have a more prominent role in the Asian and world communities.

This book attempts to identify change and continuity in PRC grand strategy, and the extent to which Chinese imperial history complicates PRC global outreach in the Xi Jinping era. Empires convey the wish to make the world a better place – even in the midst of oppression – and are eschatological in their rhetoric. However, empires that last longer have been more pragmatic in their grand strategy; sometimes appropriating the aura of past golden ages, and at other times learning from the mistakes of their predecessors. To date, Chinese strategic thinkers are preoccupied with learning lessons from the disintegration of the USSR and fascinated by the secrets of American power. Interdisciplinary in its reach, analysing grand strategy through both rhetoric and praxis, this book unpacks the Chinese world view through critical examination of the latest history textbooks currently in use in PRC middle schools. It also brings new evidence to bear on the debate in the West about Chinese strategic culture. Finally, it compares historical Japanese OFDI patterns with China in order to understand what makes the Chinese economy unique. China’s Grand Strategy Under Xi Jinping is aimed towards students and scholars of history, international business and wider Chinese studies.

To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China’s grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.