This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. U.S. policy attempts to reduce the role of the People¿s Republic of China in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China¿s technology include Pakistan and countries that support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This report discusses the security problem of China¿s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. Supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, and longer-range missiles. China has been a ¿key supplier¿ of technology to North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan for use in programs to develop ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, or nuclear weapons. Charts and tables.

Conventional wisdom portrays the People's Republic of China (PRC) People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a backward continental force that will not pose a military challenge to its neighbors or to the United States well into the 21st century. PLA writings that demonstrate interest in exploiting the revolution in military affairs (RMA) are dismissed by a large segment of the PLA- watching community as wistful fantasies. The author offers an alternative perspective by outlining emerging PLA operational concepts and a range of research and development projects that appear to have been heavily influenced by U.S. and Russian writings on the RMA. Fulfillment of the PLA's vision for the 21st century could have significant repercussions for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Congress has long been concerned about whether policy advances the U.S. interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of PRC technology included Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. Unclassified intelligence reports told Congress that China was a "key supplier" of technology, particularly with PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran. Policy approaches in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. PRC proliferation activities have continued to raise questions about China's commitment to nonproliferation and the need for U.S. sanctions. The United States has imposed sanctions on various PRC "entities" (including state-owned entities) for troublesome transfers related to missiles and chemical weapons to Pakistan, Iran, or perhaps another country, including repeated sanctions on some "serial proliferators." Since 2009, the Obama Administration has imposed sanctions on 17 occasions on numerous entities in China for weapons proliferation. By 2014, the Administration started to negotiate a renewal of the U.S.-PRC nuclear cooperation agreement. Skeptics question whether China's roles in weapons nonproliferation warrant a closer relationship with China, even as sanctions were required on some PRC technology transfers. Some criticize the imposition of U.S. sanctions targeting PRC "entities" but not the government. Others doubt the effectiveness of any stress on sanctions over diplomacy or a comprehensive strategy. Concerns grew that China expanded nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, supported North Korea, and could undermine sanctions against Iran (including in the oil/gas energy sector). In 2002-2008, the U.S. approach relied on China's influence on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons. Beijing hosted the Six-Party Talks (last held in December 2008) with limited results. Since 2006, China's balanced approach has evolved to vote for some U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against missile or nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran. Some called for engaging more with Beijing to use its leverage against Pyongyang and Tehran. However, North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013 prompted greater debate about how to change China's calculus and the value of its cooperation. After negotiations, the PRC voted in June 2009 for UNSC Resolution 1874 to expand sanctions imposed under Resolution 1718 in 2006 against North Korea. The PRC voted in June 2010 for UNSC Resolution 1929 for the fourth set of sanctions against Iran. In 2013, the PRC voted for UNSC Resolutions 2087 and 2094 on North Korea for missile and nuclear tests. Still, China has continued its balanced approach that includes incremental implementation of UNSC sanctions. China's approach has not shown fundamental changes toward Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea.

Developed by the Rand Corporation, the site contains chapters covering an Introduction; Background; Explaining China's Arms Transfers; Possible Constraints on China's Arms; Implications for the United States; An Overview of China's Arms Sales; and a Bibliography.

"This volume brings together an international group of distinguished scholars to provide a fresh assessment of China's strategic military capabilities, doctrines, and perceptions in light of rapidly advancing technologies, an expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal, and increased great-power competition with the United States. China's strategic weapons are its expanding nuclear arsenal and emerging conventional weapons systems such as hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite missiles. China's strategic arsenal is important because of how it affects the dynamics of US-China relations and the relationship between China and its neighbors. Without a doubt China's strategic arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, but this book also examines key uncertainties. Will China's new capabilities and confidence lead it to be more assertive or take more risks? Will China's nuclear traditions (i.e., no first use) change as the strategic balance improves? Will China's approach to military competition in the domains of cyberspace and outer space be guided by a notion of strategic stability or not? Will there be a strategic arms race with the United States? The goal of this book is to update our understanding of these issues and to make predictions about how these dynamics may play out"--

Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly included Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longerrange missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. Unclassified intelligence reports told Congress that China was a "key supplier" of technology, particularly with PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran.

Selected by Choice Magazine as an Outstanding Academic Title The intelligence community's flawed assessment of Iraq's weapons systems—and the Bush administration's decision to go to war in part based on those assessments—illustrates the political and policy challenges of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this comprehensive assessment, defense policy specialists Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer find disturbing trends in both the collection and analysis of intelligence and in its use in the development and implementation of security policy. Analyzing a broad range of recent case studies—Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, North Korea's defiance of U.N. watchdogs, Russia's transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran and China's to Pakistan, the Soviet biological warfare program, weapons inspections in Iraq, and others—the authors find that intelligence collection and analysis relating to WMD proliferation are becoming more difficult, that policy toward rogue states and regional allies requires difficult tradeoffs, and that using military action to fight nuclear proliferation presents intractable operational challenges. Ellis and Kiefer reveal that decisions to use—or overlook—intelligence are often made for starkly political reasons. They document the Bush administration's policy shift from nonproliferation, which emphasizes diplomatic tools such as sanctions and demarches, to counterproliferation, which at times employs interventionist and preemptive actions. They conclude with cogent recommendations for intelligence services and policy makers.