Child Versus Childmaker investigates a 'person-affecting' approach to ethical choice. A form of consequentialism, this approach is intended to capture the idea that agents ought both do the most good that they can and respect each person as distinct from each other. Focusing on cases in which a conflict of interest arises between 'childmakers'_parents, infertility specialists, embryologists, and others engaged in the task of bringing new people into existence_and the children they aim to create, the author considers what we today owe those who will come into existence tomorrow. Topics addressed include: what the person-affecting intuition is and how it differs from other forms of consequentialism; the consistency of the person-affecting intuition; the non-identity problem; wrongful life; and human cloning and other new reproductive technologies. This book is intended for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students in philosophy, law and economics and for anyone interested in bioethics, population policy, normative theory, children's rights, constitutional privacy, or family law.

This original, comprehensive theory of procreative ethics explains what kind of act procreation is and when we may permissibly engage in it. In order to ascertain when the procreative risk is permissible to impose, Weinberg proposes contractualist principles to fairly attend to the interests prospective parents have in procreating and the interests future people have in a life of human flourishing. The book presents a solution to the non-identity problem as well as dilemmas regarding our liberal principles of autonomy, consent, and equality, which may seem to be in tension with our procreative practices.

Exploring the technology of Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis and the muddled approach adopted by the UK Parliament, this volume presents a much more ethically consistent and humane system than has been managed so far by the Authority.

Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence? Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether—that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be “fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth” 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence? At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons—persons who don’t yet but will exist—in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful—not worth having—can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.

In this volume, leading philosophers advance our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing normative theories to questions of how we should act and live well.

Can people alive now have duties to future generations, the unborn millions? If so, what do we owe them? What does “justice” mean in an intergenerational context, both between people who will coexist at some point, and between generations that will never overlap? In this book, Axel Gosseries provides a forensic examination of these issues, comparing and analyzing various views about what we owe our successors. He discusses links between justice and sustainability, and looks at the implications of the fact that our successors’ preferences are heavily influenced by what we will actually leave them and by the education they receive. He also points to how these theoretical considerations apply to real-life issues, ranging from pension reform and Brexit to biodiversity and the climate crisis. He ends by outlining how intergenerational considerations may translate into institutional design. Anyone grappling with the dilemmas of our obligations to the future, from students and scholars to policy makers and active citizens, will find this an invaluable theoretical and practical guide to this moral and political minefield.

Melinda A. Roberts introduces the newcomer to population ethics and investigates the key issues in a way that will be of interest to professional philosophers, economists, lawyers, and students in all those areas who seek to understand what a cogent, intuitively plausible theory of population will look like. To that end, Roberts presents five perplexing but telling existence puzzles that already are or shall soon become important parts of the population ethics literature: the Asymmetry Puzzle, the Pareto Puzzle, the Addition Puzzle, the Anonymity Puzzle, and the Better Chance Puzzle. Roberts develops solutions to the puzzles that together form a partial theory of population, a collection of principles grounded in intuition but highly sensitive to the formal demands of consistency and cogency.

The International Society for Justice Research (ISJR) aims to provide a platform for interdisciplinary justice scholars who are encouraged to present and exchange their ideas. This exchange has yielded a fruitful advance of theoretical and empirically-oriented justice research. This volume substantiates this academic legacy and the research prospects of the ISJR in the field of justice theory and research. Included are themes and topics such as the theory of the justice motive, the mapping of the multifaceted forms of justice (distributive, procedural) and justice in context-bound spheres (e.g. non-humans). It presents a comprehensive "state of the art" overview in the field of justice research theory and it puts forth an agenda for future interdisciplinary and international justice research. It is worth noting that authors in this proposed volume represent ISJR's leading scholarship. Thus, the compilation of their research within a single framework exposes potential readers to high quality academic work that embodies the past, current and future trends of justice research.

This book provides a clear and comprehensive introduction to contemporary bioethics. It also presents provocative, philosophically informed arguments on current bioethical issues. Holland engages with debates ranging from the more familiar such as euthanasia, advance decisions to refuse treatment, and new reproductive technologies to the philosophical implications of recent developments in genetics, including prenatal genetic therapy, genetic enhancement and human cloning. The book is built around four crucial themes. The first is moral status: what are the implications of the moral status of human embryos or animals for our biomedical practices? The second theme life, death and killing looks at the ethics of ending, or failing to lengthen, human life. Holland then explores various questions of personal identity raised in contemporary bioethical debates. Finally, he presents and develops a version of the argument from nature which continues to be influential in bioethics in order to make sense of the objection that some biomedical innovations are unnatural. Structuring the discussions in this way creates an engaging introduction to bioethics that is an ideal textbook for students, whilst offering much to stimulate colleagues in the field. This second edition has been thoroughly and comprehensively updated to reflect the most recent advances in bioethics, and includes an entirely new chapter on the ethical treatment of patients in the minimally conscious state.